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Regional Summary

The Channel Is Not the Dealmaker The US-Iran conflict turned indispensability into the week’s main prize, and every regional power with the means pressed its claim. Turkey hosted the room; Saudi Arabia ran the phones; the UAE built the legal record; Pakistan carried the message to Tehran. The question is not whether these countries matter — plainly they do. It is whether mattering is the same as being powerful, and the evidence cuts both ways. Pakistan made the strongest claim. The White House designated it the “sole mediator” and praised both Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, and Asim Munir, the army chief turned field marshal, as “very extraordinary men.” Field Marshal Munir spent three days in Tehran carrying American proposals. The week’s most telling detail was operational: after the first Islamabad round ended without agreement, Iranian negotiators told Pakistan they feared an Israeli strike on their aircraft heading home, and Pakistan Air Force jets escorted them out. That was real military risk for a country that cannot control whether Iran returns for a second round or accepts what Washington is offering. Iran left citing excessive American demands and ceasefire violations that Islamabad cannot remedy. The “sole mediator” designation reflects Washington’s limited options more than Pakistani power. Pakistan is the channel; it is not the dealmaker. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are doing something harder and more durable. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, ran nine rounds of consultations in 48 hours — not managing Riyadh’s own exposure but building the diplomatic architecture around the conflict: calls to Tehran, Amman, Cairo, Kuwait, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Islamabad and Seoul, then a four-way ministerial in Antalya with his Turkish, Pakistani and Egyptian counterparts. The $8 billion package for Pakistan that Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, announced the same week follows the same logic: keeping Islamabad solvent preserves Riyadh’s most useful security partner and its main channel into the mediation effort. Turkey, meanwhile, was the room where everyone came — 23 heads of state at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Russia’s Federation Council chair at Dolmabahçe, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meeting Syria’s new leader, Libya’s prime minister and Pakistan’s prime minister on the sidelines. Tom Barrack, the American ambassador, told the forum that Ankara rejoining the F-35 programme was “fine from my boss’s point of view” — the bluntest American signal since Turkey was ejected in 2019, delivered on Turkish soil, at a Turkish-organised event. The July NATO summit will be held in Ankara. Turkey is not merely attending Western institutions; it is hosting the next one. The UAE’s position is the most contradictory and, in some ways, the most honest. Anwar Gargash, a presidential adviser, announced that the country had intercepted 96% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles Iran fired over 40 days — more than double the combined total aimed at Kuwait, and nearly ten times what Qatar faced — and called it a victory. At the same time, Mansour bin Zayed, the vice president, placed the first confirmed senior call to Iran since Abu Dhabi closed its Tehran embassy in March. Iran responded by demanding compensation from the UAE for its role in “the American and Israeli war,” directly inverting Abu Dhabi’s own demands and leaving both sides at their opening positions. The victory narrative rests on a further complication: one French intelligence newsletter, not yet independently confirmed, reported that EDGE Group’s homegrown systems played no part in the intercepts, and that the defences which held were American Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, American Patriot missiles and French Rafale jets. If that finding stands, the UAE remains dependent on foreign systems for actual combat, whatever its ambitions for a domestic arms industry. The legal record it has been building week by week at the International Maritime Organization, and Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, signing 24 agreements in Beijing in the same week the UAE pledged $1.4 trillion in investment in the American economy, suggest a country doing everything at once and trusting the contradictions not to catch up. India, conspicuously, did none of this. While its neighbours scrambled to press into the mediation effort, India’s parliament failed three constitutional bills — a delimitation amendment, a Lok Sabha expansion, and early women’s reservation — for want of a two-thirds majority the National Democratic Alliance does not have and will not have before 2029. Narendra Modi converted the defeat into campaign material the following morning, accusing the opposition of “female foeticide” in a nationally televised address. A South Korean state visit, a vice-presidential trip to Colombo, a call from the French president — none of it was urgent. That steadiness may prove more durable than it looks. The countries that spent this week converting conflict into leverage face a harder test once the conflict resolves: whether the relationships built under pressure survive without it, and whether a channel — once the message has been delivered — remains indispensable at all.

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Country Summaries

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Turkey flag Turkey

The American ambassador to Turkey told a hall full of foreign ministers this week that the S-400 dispute would be “solved soon” and that Ankara rejoining the F-35 programme was “fine from my boss’s point of view” — the bluntest American signal since Turkey was ejected from the programme in 2019, and potentially the most consequential shift in their defence relationship in years. Tom Barrack made that statement at Turkey’s own diplomatic forum. The fifth Antalya Diplomacy Forum drew 23 heads of state and delegations from more than 150 countries, and its scale — matched this week by Turkey’s parallel hosting of the 152nd Inter-Parliamentary Union General Assembly in Istanbul — confirmed that Ankara is now building forums of its own, not merely attending them. Erdoğan met on the sidelines with Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa, Libya’s Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, Bosnia’s tri-presidency, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Masrour Barzani, and Hungary’s new prime minister. Russia’s Federation Council chair was received separately at Dolmabahçe. Turkey was the room where everyone came. Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister, argued at the forum that Turkey was indispensable. Any American withdrawal from European security architecture, he said, “would be very destructive for Europe if not done in a coordinated way.” He called the EU-NATO overlap dysfunctional and the July NATO summit — to be held in Ankara — a chance to reset the alliance’s ties with Washington. Turkey is not just attending Western institutions; it is hosting the next one. On Iran, Mr Erdoğan told parliament on April 15 that Turkey was “working to extend a ceasefire” between Washington and Tehran and conveying “necessary suggestions to ease tensions.” The Defence Ministry pledged to sustain the process. At the forum’s margins, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt met to coordinate — a structured quadrilateral rather than a solo Turkish operation. Mr Barrack’s defence remarks came with a complication. At the same forum, he described Middle Eastern governance as requiring “merciful monarchies or benevolent authoritarian regimes.” Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Istanbul mayor detained since March, called the remarks unacceptable. Özgür Özel, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), declared Mr Barrack persona non grata. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) said nothing. The opposition read its silence as endorsement, and the episode handed İmamoğlu a gift he quickly used: the American ambassador praising authoritarian governance at a forum hosted by the government that had put him in prison. Mr İmamoğlu has not gone quiet from Silivri. This week brought the 23rd hearing in his Istanbul criminal trial. Police also arrested Onursal Adıgüzel, the mayor of Ataşehir district, in a pre-dawn raid — the latest in a wave of operations against CHP-run municipalities. From prison, Mr İmamoğlu published “Çare Millettir” — “The Remedy Is the Nation” — a widely shared article calling for elections and comparing those who “bow to orders” to Eichmann. He described the current government as “a handful of greedy individuals” imposing an “interregnum.” He commands 9.7 million social media followers and has a functioning publishing channel; imprisonment has not silenced him. The week also produced an event with no political content that the government handled as though it had. On April 15, a 14-year-old student killed eight classmates and a teacher at a school in Kahramanmaraş — the country’s first deadly mass school shooting, one day after a separate incident in Şanlıurfa that injured 16. Within hours, police detained around 150 people for social media posts and blocked more than 1,000 accounts and Telegram groups. Mr Erdoğan warned against “politicizing” the tragedy. Schools reopened with prayer. The censorship apparatus activated as reflexively for grief as it does for politics. Turkey’s central bank is expected to hold its policy rate at 37% at its April 22 meeting, extending 11 months of orthodox monetary policy. The bank’s April survey showed market participants revised their year-end inflation forecast up by 2.15 percentage points to 27.53% — slower disinflation than they had expected, but still disinflation. Reserves rose $9.27 billion to $170.9 billion in the week ending April 10.
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Fifth Antalya Diplomacy Forum hosts 23 heads of state, Erdoğan holds intensive bilateral meetings
April 14–19, 2026
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İmamoğlu trial continues as police raids target additional CHP-run municipalities
April 14–19, 2026
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US Ambassador Barrack's 'merciful monarchy' remarks at ADF trigger political storm in Turkey
April 16–19, 2026
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Turkey mediates US-Iran ceasefire, hosts regional foreign ministers meeting at ADF margins
April 14–18, 2026
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Two school shootings in southeastern Turkey kill nine, wound dozens within two days
April 14–19, 2026
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TCMB April rate decision approaching; market survey raises year-end inflation forecast to 27.5%
April 14–19, 2026

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Saudi Arabia flag Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia ran nine rounds of diplomatic consultations in 48 hours this week, not to manage its own position in the US-Iran conflict but to help shape everyone else’s. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, spoke twice with Abbas Araqchi, Iran’s foreign minister, within 96 hours of the Islamabad US-Iran talks, discussing what the talks had produced. He called counterparts in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. He spoke with Ishaq Dar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, for the third time in four days. He took a call from a South Korean special envoy on the conflict’s economic impact. Then he flew to Antalya for the Diplomacy Forum, where he joined a four-way ministerial meeting with his Pakistani, Turkish, and Egyptian counterparts to build support for Pakistan’s mediation push toward a permanent ceasefire. In between, he spoke with Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, on keeping shipping moving through the Strait of Hormuz. The kingdom is no longer a party managing its exposure to the war; it is building the diplomatic architecture around it. The $8 billion financial package for Pakistan, announced the same week, is part of the same logic. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, met Shehbaz Sharif, Pakistan’s prime minister, in Jeddah on April 16, committing a $3 billion deposit to the State Bank of Pakistan — described by Pakistani sources as the crown prince’s personal gesture — plus an extension of an existing $5 billion deposit. Pakistan faces an end-of-April UAE debt repayment deadline. Keeping Pakistan financially solvent preserves Riyadh’s most active security partner and its main channel into the mediation effort. Yet even as it maintains direct ministerial contact with Tehran, Saudi Arabia this week opened a confrontational second track. A deputy foreign minister summoned Iraq’s ambassador, Safia Taleb al-Suhail, and delivered a formal protest over drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory by Iran-aligned militias. Saudi Arabia warned it would “take all necessary measures to defend its security.” This is the first publicly disclosed formal protest to Baghdad over this mode of attack since the conflict began — and it suggests the kingdom is now willing to pressure Iran’s proxy hosts directly, not only engage Iran itself. The week’s other major development was quieter but longer-lasting. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) board, chaired by the crown prince, ratified its 2026-2030 strategy, formalizing a domestic pivot that individual contract cancellations had been signalling for months. Yasir Al-Rumayyan, the fund’s governor, set an 80% domestic investment target and, speaking publicly about The Line for the first time, said: “Is it necessary to have it by 2030? I think no. It’s good to have, but not a must-have.” Sports investments were absent from the strategy release entirely. PIF is now making that absence concrete. Multiple sources confirmed it is preparing to end its funding of LIV Golf after the 2026 season; the tour lost $590 million in its UK entity alone in 2024, and its chief executive acknowledged it is five to ten years from profitability. At the same time, PIF sold its 70% stake in Al Hilal to Kingdom Holding Company — the vehicle of Prince Alwaleed bin Talal — for roughly 1.4 billion Saudi riyals. The club stays in Saudi elite hands, but the sovereign fund is out. The prestige-investment logic that drove both LIV Golf and the original NEOM vision has been formally retired. What survives of NEOM is more modest and more useful. The Port of NEOM, part of the Oxagon industrial hub, declared a fully operational multimodal trade corridor this week: cargo moves from Italy’s Trieste port by ship to Egypt’s Damietta, overland to Safaga on the Red Sea, by ship to NEOM, then by road to Gulf destinations including the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq. European importers from Italy, Britain, Germany, and Poland are already using it. The route bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely. The $2 billion invested in Oxagon is producing measurable results during the conflict that made it necessary — which is more than can be said for the $500 billion vision it replaced.
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PIF approves domestic-focused 2026–2030 strategy, shifting investment priorities away from international exposure
April 13–19, 2026
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PIF reportedly ending LIV Golf funding and selling Al Hilal stake amid broader sports disinvestment
April 14–19, 2026
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NEOM restructured around near-term projects; Port of NEOM emerges as Hormuz-bypass logistics corridor
April 13–19, 2026
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Saudi FM conducts intensive diplomatic blitz on Iran war, Hormuz shipping, and regional ceasefire
April 13–19, 2026
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Saudi Arabia commits \$8 billion to Pakistan amid UAE debt deadline; MBS meets PM Sharif in Jeddah
April 13–16, 2026

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United Arab Emirates flag United Arab Emirates

The ceasefire that ended Iran’s 40-day bombardment has been holding for two weeks, and Abu Dhabi is already doing two contradictory things at once: calling Iran its “main enemy” while opening a direct line to Tehran. The scale of what the country absorbed is only now becoming clear. Long War Journal’s independent analysis confirmed that the UAE took 2,256 drones and 563 missiles over the campaign — more than double the combined total aimed at Kuwait, and nearly ten times what Qatar faced. Anwar Gargash, a presidential adviser, converted those numbers into a victory narrative: Iran had “assumed the UAE was an exposed target,” he said, but the country “responded with competence and excellence,” intercepting 96% of incoming systems. Schools have reopened — the clearest sign that life has returned to normal. Yet even as Gargash demanded written assurances against further attacks and “appropriate compensation” from Iran, Mansour bin Zayed, the vice president and deputy prime minister, called Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the Iranian parliament speaker, to discuss regional de-escalation. It was the first confirmed senior UAE-Iran contact since Abu Dhabi closed its Tehran embassy in March. That Mansour bin Zayed — who has longstanding commercial ties to Iran through Dubai — was chosen for this call rather than the foreign minister or the president appears deliberate: engagement without full commitment. Iran set its own opening terms the same week: Tehran’s UN representative stated that Iran was seeking compensation from the UAE and other regional states for their role in what it called the American and Israeli war against Iran — directly inverting Abu Dhabi’s own demands and leaving both sides at maximum positions before any talks begin. The Mansour-Qalibaf call ran alongside what may be the most intense week of diplomacy the UAE has conducted. Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, travelled to Beijing and signed 24 agreements covering hydrogen, energy storage, and electric vehicles. Xi Jinping presented a four-point peace proposal for the Middle East emphasising sovereignty and non-interference — language that aligns with the UAE’s framing of Iranian attacks as sovereignty violations without naming Iran as aggressor. The delegation included Sultan Al Jaber, the chief executive of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), alongside the investment and trade ministers, marking this as real economic diplomacy rather than ceremony. Yvette Cooper, the UK foreign secretary, flew to Abu Dhabi to meet Abdullah bin Zayed, the UAE’s foreign minister, reaffirming British solidarity and endorsing measures to protect UAE sovereignty. In Washington, Reem Al Hashimy, the minister of state, declared that the UAE-US partnership was “only getting stronger” and cited a $1.4 trillion UAE commitment to invest in the American economy over ten years, on top of a trillion already deployed. The juxtaposition was deliberate: Abu Dhabi deepened its China partnership with 24 agreements and reinforced its American one with a financial commitment of historic scale — in the same week. Beneath the diplomacy, the defence picture is more complicated than the victory narrative suggests. The air defences held, backed by American Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot batteries and French Rafale intercepts. According to one French intelligence newsletter — a finding not yet independently confirmed — the homegrown systems of EDGE Group, the state defence conglomerate ranked among the world’s top 25 arms manufacturers, were absent. Drone threats exposed gaps that existing defences could not fill. If the finding holds, it would suggest the UAE remains dependent on foreign systems for actual combat, whatever its ambitions for a domestic arms industry. Hormuz remains the unfinished business. Despite the ceasefire holding since April 8, only a single tanker cleared the strait this week — a Pakistan-flagged vessel carrying roughly 450,000 barrels of UAE crude, bound for Karachi. Its passage likely reflects a specific arrangement under the Pakistan-mediated ceasefire rather than a general reopening. The Fujairah bypass route, the UAE’s sole Indian Ocean-facing outlet, was never able to fully substitute for Hormuz. Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE president, inspected Fujairah port in person this week — a signal that the leadership’s attention remains fixed on that route while the main strait stays closed. The UAE has also spent the week building an international legal record of the conflict. The International Maritime Organization’s Legal Committee, at its 113th session, adopted a UAE-tabled decision condemning Iran’s Hormuz closure, attacks on vessels, mine threats, and the toll system Iran imposed on passing ships. It was the third such action in four weeks. Whatever the ceasefire ultimately delivers, Abu Dhabi intends to ensure the international legal record reflects what happened in the strait.
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UAE Absorbs Heaviest Iranian Strike Volume of Any Country; Schools Return as Ceasefire Holds
April 14–17, 2026
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Iran-US War and Strait of Hormuz Crisis: Global Coverage of Blockade, Ceasefire Talks, and Shipping Disruption
April 13–19, 2026
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MBZ and Senior UAE Leaders Conduct Intensive Diplomatic Meetings in Context of Iran War
April 13–19, 2026
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UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Conducts Intensive Diplomatic Outreach on Regional Crisis
April 13–19, 2026
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Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Official Visit to China: Xi Presents Four-Point West Asia Peace Proposal
April 13–17, 2026

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India flag India

Three bills at the heart of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) constitutional agenda failed on April 17, and the arithmetic that killed them will not change before 2029. The package was ambitious: a constitutional amendment to redraw parliamentary boundaries, a Lok Sabha expansion to between 816 and 850 seats, and early implementation of 33% women’s reservation by 2029. All three required a two-thirds majority. The ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) holds 293 of the Lok Sabha’s 543 seats — roughly 69 short of the 362 needed. Congress, the Trinamool Congress, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Samajwadi Party voted against. Parliament adjourned the following day without result. The defeat turned on a fault line no oral assurance could bridge. Amit Shah, the home minister, piloted the bills and offered southern states a verbal guarantee of 50% seat increases — designed to offset losses from population-based delimitation, which would penalise Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh for having cut their fertility rates. He then declined to put the guarantee in writing. The DMK voted against, and the package fell. Modi responded the next morning with a nationally televised address in which he accused the opposition of committing “bhrun hatya” — female foeticide — by blocking women’s reservation. Mallikarjun Kharge, the Congress president, replied pointedly: Modi had mentioned Congress 59 times in the address and women barely at all. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India filed complaints with the Election Commission alleging the speech violated the Model Code of Conduct during ongoing state elections and had used state broadcasters as a party platform. Mr Shah was in Tamil Nadu by the time the complaints were filed. He campaigned in Erode against the Congress-DMK alliance, framing its vote as a betrayal of women ahead of state elections and pledging justice for women. The BJP has no realistic path to government in Tamil Nadu. That is not the point: the move converts a parliamentary failure into campaign material, frames the DMK as an obstacle to women’s representation, and applies pressure on the opposition state government. Defeat repurposed as a weapon. Against this, the week’s institutional wins were small. The Rajya Sabha re-elected Harivansh Narayan Singh of the Janata Dal (United) as Deputy Chairman for a third consecutive term — routine coalition management, but necessary since the party’s 12 seats are essential to the NDA majority. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved ₹24,815 crore for 601 km of new railway track in Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, running through the home states of core NDA partners. Diplomatic business continued undisturbed. Lee Jae Myung, the South Korean president, began a State Visit on April 19, reaffirming the India-South Korea Special Strategic Partnership and a shared vision for an open Indo-Pacific — adding another technology-and-defence anchor to India’s regional portfolio at a moment when the wider Quad faces uncertainty. C.P. Radhakrishnan, the vice president, spent two days in Colombo and met both the government and opposition leader Sajith Premadasa, ensuring India’s ties with Sri Lanka hold regardless of who holds power. Macron telephoned Modi during the week; what they discussed could not be established, but the call was routine: the two countries elevated their ties to a Special Global Strategic Partnership in February 2026.
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Women's Reservation and Delimitation Bills fail in Lok Sabha; Modi addresses nation, blames opposition for 'female foeticide'
April 15–19, 2026

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Pakistan flag Pakistan

The White House called Pakistan the “sole mediator” in the US-Iran conflict this week — and when it said Pakistan, it arguably meant Asim Munir, the army chief turned field marshal, who flew to Tehran with a US message while the elected prime minister ran a separate regional tour. Field Marshal Munir spent three days in Tehran, meeting Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, the parliamentary speaker, and Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, to convey American proposals. The American president praised both Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Munir as “very extraordinary men.” The visit ended with no date set for a second round, and Iran publicly cited excessive US demands and ceasefire violations as obstacles. The most striking detail of the week was operational, not diplomatic. After the first round of talks in Islamabad ended without agreement, Iranian negotiators told Pakistan they feared an Israeli attack on their aircraft on the way home. Pakistan Air Force jets escorted them out. That commitment carried real risk: had anything gone wrong, Pakistan’s military would have been involved — caught up not just in the diplomacy but in its physical dangers. While Field Marshal Munir carried the American message to Tehran, Mr Sharif conducted a four-day tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey — showing how the civil-military split has become a diplomatic tool. In Riyadh, Mr Sharif met Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, and came home with $3 billion. In Antalya, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, agreed to convene the eighth Pakistan-Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Ankara. The tour was framed as building regional support for the ceasefire, and the Saudi financial timing confirmed something analysts had suspected: the mediation role is paying dividends beyond prestige. At the World Bank-IMF Spring Meetings in Washington, Muhammad Aurangzeb, the finance minister, met the US Treasury’s deputy secretary and said that Pakistan needed continued American support for its IMF programme. Pakistan was hosting American-Iranian talks in Islamabad at the same moment its finance minister was asking Washington to protect its economic lifeline. The mediation role, it was clear, is partly a transaction: Pakistan’s usefulness as a go-between traded for protection of its IMF programme. Ishaq Dar, the deputy prime minister and new foreign minister, ran the parallel tracks. He met Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing, and on the sidelines of the Islamabad talks held a separate meeting with Iran’s central bank governor — suggesting the two countries are quietly rebuilding economic ties alongside the diplomacy. Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s prime minister, phoned Mr Sharif to express full support for Pakistan’s mediation, and the American president announced that senior envoys would return to Islamabad for a second round. Pakistan’s constraint, though, is real. Iran controls the outcome, not Islamabad. Tehran left the first round without a breakthrough, signalled reluctance about the second, and cited ceasefire violations that Pakistan cannot remedy. The “sole mediator” designation reflects Washington’s limited options as much as Pakistani power. Pakistan is the channel; it is not the dealmaker. At home, the week’s diplomatic success produced an unusual legitimacy manoeuvre. International outlets — including Bloomberg and The Guardian — described Field Marshal Munir as Pakistan’s de facto leader and reported that the American president paid little attention to Mr Sharif. Rather than suppress that characterisation, the domestic political establishment embraced it: the Punjab Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the Nobel Peace Prize for both Mr Sharif and Field Marshal Munir jointly. The co-nomination signals that the governing coalition has stopped projecting a unified civilian face and is instead openly advertising the dual-track arrangement. The India threat hardened more quietly. Asif Ali Zardari, the president, chaired a formal meeting on water resources and called India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty “weaponisation of water,” ordering that all diplomatic and legal measures be taken. The move marks a shift from rhetorical complaint to formal commitment. The State Bank lifted its eight-year ban on virtual currencies, issuing a framework under the Virtual Assets Act 2026 that creates a regulated digital asset authority and requires licensed firms to meet anti-money-laundering standards. The 2018 prohibition had become a liability as Pakistan sought to avoid returning to the Financial Action Task Force grey list; the new rules bring an informal reality within the law, strengthening the compliance case Mr Aurangzeb was making in Washington that same week.
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Pakistan hosts US-Iran talks and launches intensive regional diplomacy as Munir leads Tehran mission and Shehbaz conducts Gulf-Turkey tour
April 13–19, 2026