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Regional Summary

Everyone’s Friend, Nobody’s Ally The Hormuz crisis has not forced the Near East’s key powers to choose sides — it has rewarded those who refuse to. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey each ran contradictory tracks this week and extracted leverage from the contradiction. Pakistan tried the same and failed. The difference is not moral but operational: ambiguity held only where the underlying relationships were strong enough to carry it. Saudi Arabia offers the clearest illustration. Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Jeddah for his second visit in a month and left with a security arrangement — Ukrainian air-defence expertise for Saudi financial and diplomatic backing. In the same week, Reuters confirmed Saudi imports of Russian fuel oil surged 18% in March to 1m metric tons, bought cheaply to free up Saudi crude for Red Sea export, while Saudi Aramco was reportedly in talks to buy interceptor drones from Ukrainian manufacturers to protect oil fields Iran had explicitly threatened. Backing Ukraine, buying Russian energy, mediating with Iran: Riyadh ran all three tracks at once without apparent embarrassment. The traffic into Jeddah confirmed that the kingdom has made itself the essential go-between in the Hormuz crisis precisely because it will talk to everyone. Ajit Doval, India’s national security adviser, arrived on Narendra Modi’s orders for a one-day surprise visit; Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, called counterparts in Iran, Qatar, Pakistan, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and beyond. The UAE carried the same logic further. It emerged this week that Israel had secretly deployed an Iron Dome battery, with several dozen operators, to the UAE during the war — the first time the system had been used operationally outside Israel or the United States, activated after a call between Benjamin Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Zayed. Israeli soldiers were running a weapons system on Emirati soil during active hostilities, and the UAE chose to disclose this now, in the ceasefire window, signalling the depth of what the Abraham Accords built. The disclosure came as Abu Dhabi signed a formal bilateral framework with Yvette Cooper, Britain’s foreign secretary, covering defence, artificial intelligence, energy, and illicit finance, and as Mr bin Zayed spoke to counterparts in the United States, Russia, Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, and Finland. In the same week, UAE officials privately warned Washington that dollar shortages could force oil sales in Chinese yuan — leverage, not distress, given the country’s $285bn in reserves — while Mansoor Abulhoul, the UAE ambassador to Britain, went on BBC Radio 4 to defend the arrest of 375 people, including British nationals, for sharing footage of Iranian attacks online. The result is a country using every instrument at once: deepening its Western alliances, pressing Washington, deploying Israeli hardware, and controlling information at home. Pakistan is the exception that sharpens the argument. It had positioned itself as the sole broker between Washington and Tehran — the White House’s own phrase — and when Iran refused to hold direct talks on Pakistani soil, the mediation unravelled in public. Inter-Services Public Relations, the army’s media arm, made things worse by issuing a communiqué claiming American negotiators were already in Pakistan, a claim international outlets quickly corrected. Iran’s state media accused Pakistan of playing a double game. The damage was partially repaired: Iran’s foreign minister returned to Islamabad, Tehran sent a revised proposal through the Pakistani channel, and Iran’s president thanked the army chief by name in a 50-minute call. But Pakistan had been demoted from sole mediator to one contested channel among several — Iran’s side trip to Moscow had ended the monopoly. Parliament remained prorogued throughout; the National Assembly had not sat since April 8, meaning the country’s most consequential diplomatic episode in years unfolded without a single day of legislative oversight. What the false communiqué revealed is not incompetence alone but the fragility of an institution performing confidence it does not fully possess. Turkey moved the other way that week. Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister, spent two days in London signing a strategic partnership with Ms Cooper, then announced that Turkey stood ready to send forces into the Hormuz Strait to clear mines after any deal — moving Ankara from facilitator to potential participant in any settlement — while calling Iran’s foreign minister, Pakistan’s counterpart, and American mediators within the same week. Where Pakistan’s multiple relationships buckled under scrutiny, Turkey’s held, because Mr Fidan had built them carefully and claimed no monopoly. India is arriving late and moving fast. Mr Doval flew to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi within eight days, on the prime minister’s orders, at a moment when 14 Indian vessels were stranded in the Hormuz region and some 9m to 10m Indian nationals lived in Gulf states at risk. Ahead of the Heads of Mission conference opening April 28, where all Indian envoys will be briefed on the crisis, Delhi is treating the Gulf not as a region to monitor but as a theatre where Indian interests must be managed. The logic is identical to Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s: with 135 ships crossing the strait each day before the war, and that figure now sharply lower, neutrality is too expensive. The countries that built their positions before the crisis — Saudi Arabia by becoming the essential go-between, the UAE by deepening every available alliance at once — are collecting the returns. India’s preparations for the India-Africa Forum Summit, the first in a decade, scheduled for late May, and the formal UAE strategic defence partnership taking shape, suggest Delhi has understood where influence is being built and is trying to catch up. The next few weeks will show whether it can do so without Pakistan’s mistakes — overreaching, being caught out, losing the monopoly.

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Country Summaries

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Saudi Arabia flag Saudi Arabia

Zelensky flew to Jeddah for his second visit in less than a month and left with what both sides called a “strategic security arrangement” — Ukrainian air-defence expertise traded for Saudi financial and diplomatic support. In the same week, Saudi Aramco was in reported talks to buy interceptor drones from Ukrainian manufacturers SkyFall and Wild Hornets to defend oil fields that Iranian officials had explicitly threatened to strike. Reuters confirmed Saudi Arabia’s imports of Russian fuel oil surged 18% in March to 1m metric tons, bought cheap to power domestic generation and free up Saudi crude for Red Sea export. All three tracks were running at once — backing Ukraine’s war effort, doing energy business with Russia, mediating with Iran. The week’s traffic into Riyadh confirmed Saudi Arabia as the essential go-between in the Hormuz crisis. Ajit Doval, India’s national security adviser, arrived for a one-day surprise visit on Narendra Modi’s instructions — confirmed only after it concluded. He met the foreign minister, the energy minister, and his Saudi counterpart; with 14 Indian vessels stranded in the Hormuz region and 9m to 10m Indian nationals in Gulf states, the agenda needed no explanation. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, made another round of calls in parallel — with Iran’s Abbas Araghchi, Qatar’s prime minister, Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar, and counterparts in Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Cuba, Lebanon, and Syria, all centred on the fragile US-Iran ceasefire. The call with the Dutch foreign ministry, focused on “security of international waterways,”
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Saudi FM conducts intensive diplomatic calls on Iran-US ceasefire and regional de-escalation
April 20–27, 2026
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PIF 2026–2030 strategy formalizes domestic pivot and sports funding retreat
April 20–26, 2026
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Vision 2030 Annual Report released marking 10th anniversary with 93% of targets met
April 20–26, 2026
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Zelenskyy makes second visit to Saudi Arabia in weeks, meets MBS on defense and energy cooperation
April 24, 2026
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Saudi cabinet approves PIF 2026–2030 strategy, endorses non-oil export growth and digital readiness
April 22, 2026
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India NSA Doval visits Riyadh for high-level meetings on energy security and regional situation
April 20–24, 2026
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Aramco reports expected Q1 2026 profit surge amid Iran war-driven oil price spike
April 23, 2026
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Aramco security under threat: Iranian drone strikes, Ukrainian drone purchase talks, Gulf production drop
April 21–25, 2026
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PIF-backed Newcastle United faces ownership summit as manager's job comes under scrutiny
April 21–26, 2026
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NEOM repositioned as logistics hub; Port of NEOM operational as The Line scales back dramatically
April 20–24, 2026
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Human rights organizations report Saudi executions surpass 2,000 since King Salman's accession
April 20–21, 2026
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MBS meets Swiss president, Saudi-Swiss bilateral investment protection agreement signed
April 23–24, 2026
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Saudi Arabia joins JPMorgan local currency EM bond index from January 2027
April 23, 2026
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MBS hosts Sudan's army chief Burhan as \$1.5B Saudi-backed arms deal stalls
April 20–21, 2026
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MBS holds talks with Syrian President al-Sharaa in Jeddah
April 22, 2026
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Aramco Ventures commits \$7.5B to deep technology; Prosperity7 US head departs
April 20–26, 2026
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Saudi-funded surgery successfully separates Filipino conjoined twins in Riyadh
April 23–25, 2026
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KSrelief distributes food packages and signs new cooperation agreements in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Niger
April 20–26, 2026
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Russia ramps up fuel oil exports to Saudi Arabia as war reshapes energy trade flows
April 23, 2026
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PIF's investment in Lucid Motors under scrutiny as take-private speculation mounts and shares hit lows
April 20–25, 2026
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Al-Ahli wins second consecutive AFC Champions League Elite, PIF-owned clubs headline Asian football
April 25–26, 2026
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Khalid bin Salman meets Italian defense minister on military partnership enhancement
April 22, 2026
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Aramco signs long-term procurement agreements; Jafurah gas expansion advances
April 20–25, 2026
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Saudi Arabia and Pakistan discuss defense pact amid war context; Saudi-Pakistani ties under spotlight
April 20, 2026
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Hajj 2026 preparations intensify; MBS orders full capability deployment for pilgrim safety
April 20–22, 2026
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Desert Warrior historical epic, filmed at NEOM, releases to mixed reviews
April 24–26, 2026
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Other

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United Arab Emirates flag United Arab Emirates

UAE officials privately warned Washington this week that dollar shortages could force the country to sell oil in Chinese yuan — the sharpest challenge to the petrodollar system from a US ally in a generation, and a sign that Abu Dhabi is now applying financial pressure on the same country that spent weeks defending it from Iranian missiles. The threat is leverage, not distress. The UAE holds $285 billion in foreign reserves, its dirham peg has held, and S&P affirmed its highest short-term credit rating. Khaled Mohamed Balama, the central bank governor, proposed a currency swap arrangement with Scott Bessent, the US Treasury secretary, at IMF and World Bank meetings, and the US president confirmed it was “under consideration.” The UAE Embassy in Washington immediately denied any financial need, asserting the country holds over $2 trillion in assets. The denial was deliberate: the public statement protects investor confidence; the private yuan warning activates American strategic anxiety. The message to Washington is blunt — the UAE absorbed more Iranian attacks than any other country, was not a willing participant in the war, and is owed something. Even as it applied that pressure, the UAE allowed a second revelation to reach the public: Israel had secretly deployed an Iron Dome battery with several dozen Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operators to the UAE during the war, following a call between Benjamin Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Zayed. The system intercepted dozens of Iranian missiles. It was the first time Iron Dome had been used operationally outside Israel or the United States. Israel did not provide the same system to Saudi Arabia — a distinction noted explicitly in Israeli reporting, reflecting the deeper integration the Abraham Accords produced. IDF personnel were operating weapons on UAE soil during active hostilities. EDGE Group, the UAE’s domestic arms conglomerate, contributed no confirmed intercepts; the country’s air defence during the war rested entirely on Israeli, American, and French systems. The controlled disclosure now — attributed to “foreign sources” — signals a deliberate decision to make the military depth of UAE-Israel ties public during the ceasefire window. Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister, signed a formal bilateral framework with Yvette Cooper, the British foreign secretary, covering defence, artificial intelligence, energy transition, and illicit finance — the formal agreement that earlier ministerial visits had not produced. The joint statement strongly condemned Iran’s attacks, cited UN Security Council resolution 2817, and welcomed a UK-France freedom of navigation initiative. Ajit Doval, India’s national security adviser, flew to Abu Dhabi to meet Mr bin Zayed — the second senior Indian visit in a month — with Ali bin Hammad Al Shamsi, secretary-general of the UAE’s Supreme Council for National Security, also in the room, marking it as a substantive security meeting rather than a courtesy call. The January 2026 Strategic Defence Partnership with India is being implemented quickly; Mr Doval’s visit focused on energy security amid Hormuz disruption, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) chose to defer rather than cancel liquefied natural gas supplies to Indian buyers — unlike QatarEnergy, which declared force majeure — protecting the commercial relationship while managing supply constraints. The UAE also brokered the exchange of 386 Russian and Ukrainian prisoners, and Mr bin Zayed spoke in a single week with counterparts in the US, Russia, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, and Finland. Ahmad Al-Sharaa, Syria’s president, made his third visit to Abu Dhabi since taking power, publicly condemning Iran’s attacks as “a breach of sovereignty and international law.” Tubacex, a Basque pipe manufacturer, separately reported an 84% drop in net profit and a 15% fall in sales for the first quarter of 2026, blaming disruptions to its Abu Dhabi facility and its roughly €1 billion Adnoc contract on the Hormuz crisis — an independent, audited confirmation of the war’s industrial cost to Adnoc operations. At home, the regime is managing a different kind of exposure. Abu Dhabi police confirmed 375 arrests — of various nationalities, including British citizens — for filming Iranian attacks and sharing what the government called “misleading information online.” Police referred all 375 to prosecutors under the country’s cybercrimes law. Rather than go quiet, Mansoor Abulhoul, the UAE ambassador to the UK, appeared on BBC Radio 4 to defend the arrests as necessary to stop footage becoming “a propaganda tool by Tehran” — the first time a UAE official publicly defended the action to a Western audience. His tone was assertive, not apologetic, and it tests whether the “wartime” justification will hold with partners who just signed a formal bilateral framework. British nationals caught in the dragnet are a potential friction point in a relationship the UAE spent this same week formally deepening. A second domestic signal ran alongside the arrests. An Emirati academic published — apparently without being suppressed — an argument that US military bases in the UAE are “no longer strategic assets” and amount to “a burden, not an asset.” That the piece appeared at all, while American Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot batteries were providing core air defence, suggests the government is choosing what to allow rather than relaxing control broadly. The academic argument and the yuan threat point in the same direction: a managed signal to Washington that the dependency relationship has limits and a price. One track went dark. The prior week’s finding — a direct back-channel between Mansour bin Zayed and Mohammad Qalibaf, the Iranian parliamentary speaker, with the UAE demanding written assurances and compensation — left no trace in this week’s evidence. The strong anti-Iran language in the UK joint statement would be unusual alongside visible negotiations with Tehran, suggesting the back-channel has either cooled or been deliberately kept away from the Western alignment track. Whether that silence is tactical or permanent is unclear.
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UAE Foreign Minister conducts intensive diplomatic outreach on Iran war across multiple capitals
April 20–26, 2026
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India NSA Doval meets UAE President MBZ in Abu Dhabi to strengthen strategic partnership
April 23–27, 2026
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UAE navigates Iran war fallout: debate on US bases, censorship of attack footage, and official messaging
April 20–26, 2026
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UAE-US currency swap talks emerge as CBUAE governor seeks dollar liquidity backstop; UAE warns of yuan oil sales if dollars run dry
April 21–25, 2026
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MBZ receives Syrian President Al-Sharaa on working visit to Abu Dhabi
April 22–25, 2026
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Israel secretly deployed Iron Dome battery and IDF operators to UAE during Iran war — first-ever operational export of the system
April 26–27, 2026
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ADNOC defers LNG to India, Sultan Al Jaber conducts field visits, and launches bp hydrogen JV amid Hormuz crisis
April 21–26, 2026
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Spanish pipe manufacturer Tubacex reports severe disruption to billion-euro ADNOC contract due to Iran war
April 22–25, 2026
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CBUAE reports Emiratisation in financial sector hits 31%, exceeding 2025 targets
April 21–25, 2026

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India flag India

The Strait of Hormuz blockade has forced India to act in the Gulf. Ajit Doval, the national security adviser, flew to Riyadh on April 19 on the prime minister’s orders, then to Abu Dhabi on April 26 — two visits in eight days that signal India now treats the Hormuz crisis as an emergency, not a matter for routine ministerial management. Before the war that began on February 28, some 135 ships crossed the strait each day. That figure has fallen sharply, squeezing the liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil flows India depends on. In Riyadh, Mr Doval met Saudi counterparts on energy security, regional stability, and India’s unease about Pakistan’s deepening defence ties with the kingdom. In Abu Dhabi, he met Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE president, and other senior Emirati officials under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The visits followed an earlier UAE trip by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the external affairs minister — a series that confirms the Gulf has moved to the top of India’s diplomatic agenda. Those visits preceded the Heads of Mission conference opening April 28, where all Indian envoys will be briefed on the Hormuz crisis, the new global order, and — notably — Pakistan’s peacemaker role in West Asia, which Delhi views as a competitive problem. Narendra Modi will address the envoys on April 30. In the same week, Mr Doval also hosted Jonathan Powell, the UK national security adviser, for the annual India-UK strategic dialogue on counter-terrorism and maritime security — a small but telling sign of the portfolio one man is carrying. Even as the Gulf dominated attention abroad, India and Washington clashed openly for the first time since the February 2026 tariff deal. The American president shared a podcast transcript on Truth Social in which the host called India a “hellhole” and accused Indian immigrants of abusing birthright citizenship. The Ministry of External Affairs responded without naming anyone, calling the remarks “uninformed, inappropriate and in poor taste.” The Indian National Congress used the episode to attack Mr Modi’s silence — proof, they said, that he could not challenge the American president he had called his friend. The American secretary of state’s visit to India remains scheduled for next month. The domestic political landscape was no calmer. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) engineered what it is calling a party merger: seven of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)‘s ten Rajya Sabha MPs — among them Raghav Chadha and Sandeep Pathak — announced they were joining the BJP, invoking the anti-defection law’s two-thirds exception. The opposition called it “Operation Lotus.” The move would lift the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) from 141 to roughly 148 Rajya Sabha seats — eight short of the 156 needed for constitutional amendment capacity. Legal experts challenged the validity immediately: the exception requires a party merger, not merely a legislative group merger, and the AAP as a party has not joined the BJP. One defector, Ashok Kumar Mittal, made his move days after Enforcement Directorate raids — a detail opposition parties were quick to publicise. The Rajya Sabha Chairman has not yet ruled. Even if the merger stands, the real obstacle is the Lok Sabha: the NDA’s 293 seats are roughly 69 short of the 362 needed for a constitutional amendment supermajority there. The West Bengal elections were competing for attention throughout. Phase 1 concluded April 24 with roughly 93% turnout across 152 seats. Mr Modi held rallies invoking the RG Kar rape case and what he called “maha jungle raj” (total lawlessness). Amit Shah, the home minister, predicted the BJP would take 110 of the Phase 1 seats, promised the Uniform Civil Code within six months of forming a Bengal government, and vowed to install a Bengali BJP chief minister. Mamata Banerjee of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) filed legal threats against Mr Shah over remarks she found threatening and declared she would “conquer Delhi” after Bengal. Violence between BJP and TMC workers flared before Mr Modi’s visits. Phase 2 votes on April 29. The strangest development of the week came from inside the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). On April 18, Mr Doval hosted 14 Muslim community figures at the PMO building — industrialists, academics, activists, a doctor, a journalist. Media coverage emerged only on April 24-25. He listened for an hour and a half, spoke of rising Muslim recruitment in the armed forces, and told the gathering that India was “a large ship — we all sail together or we sink together.” The guests asked for a “level playing field — neither discrimination against nor special treatment for Muslims.” That the national security adviser ran this meeting, rather than a minister or party figure, suggests the government is managing communal tension carefully in the post-Sindoor environment, where military action has sharpened political divisions. General MM Naravane, the former army chief, spoke publicly for the first time about the controversy surrounding his unpublished memoir, “Four Stars of Destiny.” He stood by his earlier statement that India lost “not an inch” to China during the 2020 Ladakh standoff, reframed Rajnath Singh’s — then defence minister — “do what you think is right” instruction as evidence of confidence in the army rather than abdication, and called for the armed forces to be kept “as far from politics as possible.” The memoir remains under ministry of defence review. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) cancelled the banking licence of Paytm Payments Bank on April 24, citing governance failures and conduct “detrimental to the interests of both the bank and its depositors.” Winding-up proceedings in the High Court will follow. The RBI simultaneously tightened authentication rules for recurring digital payments above ₹15,000 and reaffirmed that recent rupee support measures are temporary. Against all of this, Mr Jaishankar launched preparations for the 4th India-Africa Forum Summit — the first in ten years — scheduled for May 28-31 in New Delhi. India has opened 17 new African missions since 2015 to reach 46 total. All 54 African nations and the African Union Commission are expected. Framed as “a message of stability in a turbulent world,”
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West Bengal Assembly Elections 2026: BJP-TMC battle intensifies ahead of Phase 2 vote
April 21–27, 2026
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Trump's 'hellhole' remark about India sparks diplomatic rebuke and opposition attacks on Modi's silence
April 23–25, 2026
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Raghav Chadha leads seven AAP Rajya Sabha MPs in mass defection to BJP
April 24–27, 2026
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Former Army Chief Naravane breaks silence on memoir controversy, releases new book on military history
April 23–26, 2026
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NSA Doval conducts Gulf outreach: visits Saudi Arabia then UAE to discuss energy security and West Asia situation
April 20–27, 2026
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India launches 4th India-Africa Forum Summit preparations; Jaishankar declares Africa central to foreign policy
April 23–24, 2026
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RBI cancels Paytm Payments Bank licence; new digital payment authentication rules issued
April 21–26, 2026
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Modi to address India's global envoys on April 30 as Heads of Mission conference focuses on West Asia, Iran war
April 24, 2026
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India-UK Strategic Dialogue: Jaishankar and Doval hold back-to-back meetings with UK NSA Powell
April 23–24, 2026
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UNGA President Baerbock to visit India on April 28 for multilateral talks and AI governance session
April 24–25, 2026
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NSA Doval meets Muslim community leaders with 'we sail or sink together' national unity message
April 24–25, 2026
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Modi expresses relief after White House Correspondents' Dinner shooting evacuation of Trump
April 26, 2026

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Pakistan flag Pakistan

Pakistan’s bid to be the sole broker between Washington and Tehran collapsed and partially revived within 48 hours this week, leaving its diplomatic standing diminished but not destroyed. On April 25, the American president cancelled the planned Islamabad visit of his envoys after Iran declared it would not hold direct talks with the United States on Pakistani soil. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, left Islamabad without meeting the Americans and flew to Moscow — a sign that Tehran was opening other channels. Pakistan’s own military made things worse. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the army’s media arm, issued a communiqué claiming the American negotiators were already in Pakistan — a claim that multiple international news outlets quickly corrected. Iran’s state media then accused Pakistan of playing a “double game” — the first explicit public charge that Islamabad is not a neutral conduit. The damage was real, but not fatal. Mr Araghchi returned to Islamabad on April 26 and 27 for a second visit, meeting Asim Munir, the chief of the defence forces, and Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister. Pakistan reaffirmed its commitment to the process. Iran sent what officials described as a revised proposal through Pakistan — evidence that even after the rupture, Tehran still found the route useful. In a 50-minute phone call confirmed by the government press office, Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, thanked Field Marshal Munir by name. The Iranian position this week was, in short, self-contradictory: state media accused Pakistan of bias while the president expressed gratitude. That contradiction may reflect a genuine split within the Iranian leadership over the relationship with Pakistan, or it may be Tehran managing hardline domestic expectations while keeping the channel open. Either way, the effect is the same: Pakistan has moved from “sole mediator” — the White House’s own phrase — to something closer to a primary but contested channel. Iran’s side trip to Moscow confirmed the monopoly is gone. The lockdown that accompanied the failed talks added to the week’s costs. Islamabad and Rawalpindi nearly ground to a halt for several days in preparation for talks that never produced direct dialogue, with schools closed and commerce disrupted. The civilian cost was plain — and publicly noted. China moved to shore up Pakistan’s position. The Chinese ambassador, Jiang Zaidong, called on Mr Sharif and praised Pakistan’s role in the US-Iran talks — a sign that Beijing, which has its own energy-security interest in a negotiated outcome, wants the Pakistan channel to survive. Separately, Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, visited SANY Heavy Industry in Changsha alongside Sindh provincial officials, discussing technology transfer and investment in construction machinery. At home, the civil-military co-branding exercise continued on geographic autopilot. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly — nominally aligned with the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf — tabled a resolution nominating Mr Sharif and Field Marshal Munir for the Nobel Peace Prize, following Punjab’s resolution last week. That the establishment is promoting its diplomatic-success narrative through an assembly rooted in opposition territory shows where authority sits in Pakistan’s provinces. Parliament itself remained prorogued throughout the week — the National Assembly has not sat since April 8 — meaning the country’s most consequential diplomatic episode in years unfolded without a single day of legislative oversight. The State Bank of Pakistan issued new rules easing conditions for information-technology exporters and freelancers, replaced the existing crop loan insurance scheme with a satellite-assisted successor developed with the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (Suparco) and the Asian Development Bank, and revoked the licence of Al Sahara Exchange Company. These were routine regulatory actions in a week dominated by a single story. What the week settled is this: Pakistan retains a role in the US-Iran process, but the role has been tested and found fragile. ISPR’s false communiqué was not the error of a confident institution. Iran’s simultaneous gratitude and accusation reflects a partner uncertain whether to trust the channel. The Nobel Prize resolutions frame the mediation as triumph; the facts of the week suggest something more provisional.
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Pakistan hosts stalled US-Iran ceasefire talks as Munir and Shehbaz emerge as global mediators — then talks collapse
April 19–27, 2026

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Turkey flag Turkey

Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, offered this week to send Turkish forces into the Hormuz Strait after any Iran-US deal to help clear mines — a step that moves Turkey from diplomatic go-between to participant in any post-deal settlement. The offer came from London, where Mr Fidan had spent two days signing a Strategic Partnership Framework with Yvette Cooper, the British foreign secretary. The document formalizes the relationship between two NATO allies across security, climate, development, and science and technology — operating, as Mr Fidan pointedly noted, outside EU structures. He described the partnership as reaching maturity after 20 years and Turkey and Britain as natural partners outside the EU. When asked about Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, and her recent remarks about keeping Europe free of Turkish influence, Mr Fidan called them unfortunate, adding that Turkey had made its position known. Even from London, Mr Fidan was working the phones — calling Iran’s foreign minister, Pakistan’s foreign minister, and US mediators — maintaining near-daily contact with all parties to the Iran-US negotiations. He said obstacles in the nuclear talks could be overcome, called the current ceasefire insufficient for a final deal, but said progress was being made. Turkey coordinates with Egypt, Oman, and Pakistan. What is new this week is the Hormuz demining offer: previous weeks cast Turkey as a facilitator; now it has offered troops to carry out any deal. The same week, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) announced a joint drug operation with Syria’s Interior Ministry at Latakia port. The agency had tracked a vessel from South-East Asia through Alexandria and Beirut before sharing intelligence with Syrian authorities, enabling the seizure of 236 kilograms of marijuana. Conducted on April 16th, it is the first documented case of the agency carrying out a joint operation on Syrian soil since Bashar al-Assad’s fall — showing that cooperation between the two countries has moved beyond diplomacy to joint operations on the ground. At the central bank, the Monetary Policy Committee held the policy rate at 37% — the outcome most analysts expected — but the meeting produced new complications. The committee’s statement explicitly named the Iran war as a source of energy price volatility, the first time the conflict has appeared as a formal factor in Turkish monetary policy. More notable was what had changed around the table: Cevdet Akçay, the central bank’s deputy governor and a known orthodox voice, was absent, having left the post. Bloomberg reported that sources familiar with bank management describe Fatih Karahan, the governor, as dovish. Of 37 economists surveyed before the meeting, 14 had expected a rate rise — a sign the market is uncertain about the committee’s direction, not just its timing. At home, Özgür Özel, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), addressed a crowd in Sakarya at the 106th installment of the party’s People’s Will rally series. Mr Özel flatly refused Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s public offer of dialogue, saying he would not sit with anyone applying “enemy law” to his party. A letter from Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Istanbul mayor held in Silivri prison, was read aloud. The rallies have become a fixture of opposition politics: 106 events in, the authorities have not stopped them, and Mr İmamoğlu maintains a political presence from his cell. Mr Özel’s refusal marks a hardening — from resistance to outright rejection of any government-brokered settlement. Separately, Murat Emir, a CHP lawmaker, drew a contrast between Mr Erdoğan’s condolence call to the American president — in which Mr Erdoğan described the White House Correspondents’ dinner attack as an act against democracy and press freedom — and his silence on other press freedom cases. Mr Emir called it double standards. It was a small exchange, but it showed an opposition that has learned to use Mr Erdoğan’s own words against him.
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Erdoğan calls Trump to express condolences after armed attack at White House Correspondents' dinner
April 25–26, 2026
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CHP holds 106th 'People's Will' rally in Sakarya, demanding İmamoğlu's release and early elections
April 26, 2026
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MİT and Syria conduct joint drug operation seizing 236 kg marijuana at Latakia port
April 24–26, 2026
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TCMB holds policy rate at 37%; inflation expectations rise amid Iran war energy shock
April 21–26, 2026
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Foreign Minister Fidan visits London, signs Turkey-UK Strategic Partnership Framework
April 23–25, 2026
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Turkey intensifies Iran-US nuclear mediation diplomacy; Fidan signals openness to Hormuz demining role
April 25–26, 2026