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Documentation Index

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Regional Summary

Winning Was the Easy Part Central-Eastern Europe recorded four formal victories this week — an inauguration, a no-confidence vote, a ceasefire, a record defence loan — and each looks less decisive than it seemed. The machinery of democracy is turning, but the results keep disappointing whoever just won. The gap between winning a contest and governing is widening, and the costs are showing. Hungary is the starkest case. Péter Magyar took the oath before 200,000 supporters on Kossuth Square with a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority and the EU flag raised on parliament’s façade for the first time in over a decade. His first act was to demand the resignations of seven officials — the president, the head of the supreme court, the prosecutor general, and four others — all Fidesz appointees. Tamás Sulyok, the president, replied in one sentence: his tenure is governed by the Fundamental Law. Péter Polt, the prosecutor general, said nothing. None of the seven has signalled any intention to leave. Viktor Orbán did not attend his own farewell — the first outgoing prime minister to skip it since 1990 — but his people remain inside every institution that matters for rule-of-law reform. Mr Magyar has the popular legitimacy. He does not yet have the levers. Romania shows what happens when formal process produces a result but not a government. Parliament voted 281-4 to remove Ilie Bolojan as prime minister — a margin 30 votes wider than those who had signed the motion — in an alliance between a nominally pro-European party and a far-right one that had no agreed successor and no majority for anything else. The leu fell 0.8% that day, touching a record low; the National Bank of Romania had already spent about €2.2 billion defending its managed float in April. The interim finance minister rang Fitch and Moody’s to reassure them, acknowledged “obvious concerns,” and could not commit to new fiscal measures because a caretaker government cannot pass budgetary legislation. The agencies know this. The Social Democratic Party (PSD), which toppled the government, is manoeuvring to return to power; the National Liberal Party (PNL) voted 50-4 to refuse any new coalition with the Social Democrats; and a faction inside the Liberals, working with Social Democrat local leaders, is pushing to reverse that vote. The no-confidence vote that was supposed to resolve something produced a three-way fragmentation, a sovereign downgrade pending, and a central bank near the limits of what it can hold. Poland and Ukraine each secured victories on paper while leaving the underlying contest open. Poland signed a €43.7 billion EU defence loan — the largest in the country’s history — by invoking EU treaty law directly rather than the statute the president had vetoed. The legal theory has not been tested in Polish courts; the government did not seek a ruling first. It signed anyway. Donald Tusk, the prime minister, has established in practice, though not yet in law, that presidential vetoes cannot block EU treaty-based agreements — but the two may not stay aligned for long, particularly after the American president called Karol Nawrocki, the Polish president, “a great warrior” and made clear he would rather deal with Mr Nawrocki than with Mr Tusk. Ukraine’s diplomacy was similarly elegant and similarly incomplete. Volodymyr Zelensky accepted an American-brokered Victory Day ceasefire long enough to secure a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange, let Russia absorb the blame when the truce collapsed, and issued a sardonic decree “authorising” the Moscow parade — implying restraint rather than incapacity. He came out ahead. The frontline did not move. What follows is not comfort. Mr Magyar faces a May 31 deadline he set for institutions that have no legal obligation to comply and no political incentive to do so; the real test of his supermajority comes when he tries to legislate them out of position, which will take years and will hit an August deadline for EU recovery funds. Romania is running three clocks at once: a 60-day window before elections become unavoidable, a sovereign-downgrade process a caretaker cannot halt, and a fracture inside the Liberals that could redraw the parliamentary map before any of them expires. Poland’s legal gambit holds only until a court says otherwise, and Mr Nawrocki will not leave that pressure point alone. The week’s formal wins were real. What they have not done is close the distance between what was decided and what can actually be done.

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Country Summaries

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Ukraine flag Ukraine

Ukraine turned an American-brokered Victory Day ceasefire into a diplomatic trap this week: accepting just long enough to secure a prisoner exchange, then letting Russia absorb the blame when the truce collapsed. The American president announced on May 8 that both sides had agreed to a three-day halt coinciding with Russia’s Victory Day parade. Volodymyr Zelensky put his reason plainly: he wanted Ukrainian prisoners home. “Red Square matters less to us than the lives of Ukrainian prisoners of war who can be brought home.” Neither side seriously observed the truce; frontline combat continued throughout. Russia’s defence ministry claimed over 1,000 Ukrainian violations; Mr Zelensky said Russia “was not even really trying.” The ceasefire ended in mutual recrimination, but Ukraine came out ahead: it had shown compliance, secured a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner swap, and framed Russia as the party that broke the truce. Mr Zelensky also issued a sardonic official decree “authorising” the Moscow parade and listing Red Square’s military coordinates — implying that Ukraine chose restraint rather than lacked the reach to strike. Even as the ceasefire expired, Vladimir Putin made his first explicit offer to meet Mr Zelensky in a third country. Analysts received it coolly. A Chatham House researcher noted “plenty of promises over the last 18 months”
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Trump-brokered 3-day Victory Day ceasefire collapses as both sides trade violation accusations
May 5–10, 2026
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Putin claims Ukraine war 'coming to an end,' expresses openness to meeting Zelensky in third country
May 8–10, 2026
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Zelensky issues mock decree 'permitting' Moscow Victory Day parade with military coordinates included
May 7–9, 2026
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Slovakia's Fico visits Putin in Moscow as diplomatic go-between; Kremlin disputes message delivery
May 7–10, 2026
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Russia-Armenia row intensifies after Zelensky attends European Political Community summit in Yerevan
May 7–10, 2026
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Putin proposes ex-German Chancellor Schroeder as Ukraine mediator; Berlin dismisses idea
May 10, 2026
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Syrskyi frontline assessment: 106,000 Russian troops at Pokrovsk, Russia urgently expanding anti-drone forces
May 7–9, 2026
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Ukrainian drones diverted by Russian EW hit Latvian oil storage; Latvia's defense minister resigns
May 8–10, 2026
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Budanov declares ceasefire extension conditional on Russian reciprocity; proposes unified foreign recruitment center
May 5–9, 2026
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Svyrydenko announces EU-backed defense budget surge of UAH 1.56 trillion and privatization push
May 4–8, 2026
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Zelensky orders cabinet reshuffle, Energoatom governance overhaul, Sense Bank privatization
May 6–8, 2026
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SBU foils Russian-recruited assassination plot against Ukrainian Navy officer in Odesa ahead of May 9
May 7–8, 2026
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SBU strikes Russian refineries repeatedly; Zelensky confirms 'Flamingo' cruise missile use on deep targets
May 4–9, 2026
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Zelensky orders PMC legalization legislation; Defense Minister Fedorov deploys AI anti-drone turrets and seeks Swedish Gripen jets
May 7–9, 2026
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Ukraine-Norway joint 155mm artillery shell production agreement announced
May 10, 2026
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Hungary returns Oschadbank assets; Zelensky congratulates new PM Magyar on taking office
May 6–9, 2026

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Poland flag Poland

Poland signed the largest single national allocation in the EU’s new defence financing programme this week, becoming the first member to sign a loan agreement under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument — securing up to €43.7 billion for military modernisation. The deal came despite a presidential veto of the implementing legislation: the government bypassed it by invoking existing legal authority under the armed forces fund, on the theory that EU treaty law is directly binding without a domestic statute. The legal argument has not been tested in Polish courts. The government did not seek a court ruling first. It signed anyway. How Donald Tusk, the prime minister, did it matters as much as what he did. By proceeding through a contractual channel rather than a statutory one, the government established — contested, but in practice — that presidential vetoes cannot block EU treaty-based loan agreements. If courts uphold the theory, the veto’s reach narrows across EU-programme legislation. The immediate cost was real: roughly 7 billion złoty previously earmarked for the border guard and police cannot be released. But Poland’s main defence-modernisation financing is now in place: €43.7 billion committed, the largest such sum in the country’s history. All this unfolded in the same week Washington made clear which Polish official it prefers to deal with. The American president suggested that some of the roughly 5,000 troops the US is withdrawing from Germany could relocate to Poland, calling Karol Nawrocki, the president, ‘a great warrior’ and saying Poland would want them. Mr Nawrocki — speaking during a visit to Lithuania — declared Poland ready to host. Mr Tusk counselled caution, saying Poland should not ‘poach
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Poland signs EU SAFE defence loan despite presidential veto, triggering political battle with Nawrocki
May 7–10, 2026
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ABW publishes first public report in 12 years, warns of professionalised Russian sabotage networks and Chinese influence operations
May 5–10, 2026
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NBP holds interest rates but Glapiński signals rate hikes increasingly probable amid inflation concerns
May 4–8, 2026
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Nawrocki proposes national referendum on EU climate policy, seen as PiS electoral strategy
May 6–10, 2026
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Nawrocki appoints new BBN chief Grodecki after Cenckiewicz resignation, raising conflict-of-interest questions
May 7–10, 2026
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Ziobro flees Hungary for United States, confirms he will fight extradition
May 9–10, 2026
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Mentzen detained at London airport for three hours, sparks free-speech debate and internal Confederation tensions
May 8–9, 2026
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ECHR orders Poland to allow newly elected Constitutional Tribunal judges to begin work; Tribunal president ignores ruling
May 5–8, 2026
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ZondaCrypto scandal expands: Tusk pushes revised crypto bill after Nawrocki veto, links exchange to Russian mafia
May 4–9, 2026
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Trump suggests US troops from Germany could relocate to Poland; Nawrocki welcomes it, Tusk more cautious
May 4–10, 2026
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Andrzej Poczobut freed from Belarusian prison in prisoner exchange, Trump and Nawrocki credited
May 9–10, 2026
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193rd Smolensk monthly commemoration disrupted by counter-protesters; Kaczyński threatens future prosecutions
May 10, 2026

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Czech Republic flag Czech Republic

Andrej Babiš left Prague Castle through a back entrance on Friday after his meeting with Petr Pavel, the president, produced no agreement on who will represent the country at the NATO summit in Ankara, leaving Mr Pavel to face the press alone — the sharpest image yet of a cohabitation that is no longer merely tense but broken in practice. The immediate dispute is over representation at the July summit. The government plans to send Mr Babiš, Petr Macinka, the defence minister, and the chief of general staff. Mr Pavel insists the established practice is for the president to attend NATO summits and has said he may file a constitutional complaint — a legal challenge to the government’s authority — if the June cabinet decision excludes him. He called it “the absolute last resort.”
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Pavel-Babiš clash over NATO Ankara summit delegation escalates into constitutional confrontation
May 3–10, 2026
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SPD and coalition drive parliament to oppose Sudeten German congress in Brno, drawing AfD contradictions
May 3–10, 2026
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Thousands protest Prague media reform plans; EBU warns legislation threatens public broadcaster independence
May 3–8, 2026
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Czech National Bank holds rates at 3.5%, signals possible hike as inflation risks turn pro-inflationary
May 6–8, 2026
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ANO retains large polling lead but slips two points in May surveys as STAN holds second place
May 3–10, 2026
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Nagyová convicted in Stork Nest subsidy fraud; Agrofert EU subsidy freeze questioned
May 3–8, 2026
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Patria signs MoUs with Czech state defence firms for new 8x8 armoured vehicle programme
May 6–7, 2026
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Czech Republic marks 81st Victory Day with Vítkov ceremony; Pavel warns against resignation to force
May 6–8, 2026
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Babiš announces appointment of former NATO ambassador Landovský as government envoy for alliance commitments
May 10, 2026
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Czech public mostly backs maintaining or increasing defence spending but reluctant to serve personally
May 6–10, 2026
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President Pavel promotes ten new generals including BIS deputy director
May 08, 2026

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Romania flag Romania

Parliament voted 281-4 on May 5 to remove Ilie Bolojan, the prime minister — a margin 30 votes wider than the number of MPs who had signed the motion — and produced the most consequential realignment in Romania’s post-communist history: for the first time, a nominally pro-European party joined forces with a far-right one to bring down a government. The vote showed immediately in the currency. The leu fell 0.8% on the day of the vote alone, one of the largest single-day drops among emerging-market currencies, reaching a brief record low of 5.27 to the euro before settling at 5.2364 by May 8. The National Bank of Romania had already spent about €2.2 billion defending its managed float in April, draining reserves to €64.8 billion. Bloomberg reported the leu had lost 2.7% against the euro in two weeks and that the crisis was testing the float regime directly. Dan Suciu, the central bank’s spokesman, said market calm now depended on political and fiscal stability rather than central bank action alone — admitting the bank could not hold this line indefinitely. Société Générale analysts put it plainly: stabilisation was possible, but a sustained improvement would require a clearer policy framework, which in their view had become less likely. S&P issued formal downgrade warnings. Alexandru Nazare, the interim finance minister, held emergency calls with Fitch and Moody’s, sent updated budget data, and said the fiscal trajectory “remains unchanged.” He also acknowledged there were “obviously concerns.” He has no authority to commit to new fiscal measures — a caretaker government cannot pass budgetary legislation — and the agencies know it. Nicușor Dan, the president, has begun consultations at Cotroceni, but no path to a majority is clear. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) toppled the government and is already manoeuvring to return to power: Ionuț Pucheanu, the party’s first vice-president, told reporters PSD was waiting for the National Liberal Party (PNL) to return to the table, estimated a resolution within two weeks, and dismissed Mr Bolojan’s refusal as personal stubbornness rather than a party position. PNL’s National Political Bureau voted 50-4 to enter formal opposition and refuse any new coalition with PSD; PNL and the Save Romania Union (USR) subsequently announced a joint opposition front. The scenarios Mr Dan is weighing — a minority government with PSD and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), a reconstituted broad coalition, or allowing the 60-day window to expire toward early elections — each carries serious risks. PSD’s own leadership called a minority government “political suicide.” The bigger risk is the fracture inside PNL. A faction around Cătălin Predoiu, working with PSD local barons, moved to pressure PNL mayors and county leaders into reversing the 50-4 opposition vote, and was reportedly considering splitting to form a new parliamentary group allied with PSD — explicitly modelled on the Tăriceanu break from PNL under Dragnea in an earlier cycle. Dan Motreanu, PNL’s secretary-general, threatened an extraordinary congress if the subversion continued; Rareș Bogdan, a senior figure in the European Parliament, said flatly that “nobody will leave PNL and the party will not split.”
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PSD-AUR no-confidence motion topples Bolojan's pro-EU government in 281-4 vote
May 3–9, 2026
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Post-collapse coalition negotiations: PNL-USR form opposition bloc, PSD seeks new government
May 5–10, 2026
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PNL internal split over coalition stance: Predoiu rebels, Bogdan dismisses breakaway fears
May 5–10, 2026
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AUR claims future governing role, presents 10-point administrative reform plan
May 6–10, 2026
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S&P Global warns of Romania credit rating downgrade amid fiscal and political risks
May 3–8, 2026
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Romanian leu hits record lows against euro; BNR intervenes, reserves fall €2.2 billion
May 3–11, 2026

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Hungary flag Hungary

Péter Magyar was sworn in as prime minister with 140 parliamentary votes and 200,000 people cheering on Kossuth Square — and that same evening, the president he had publicly demanded resign signed the new government’s first two laws without a word of protest. That exchange captures where Hungary now stands. Tamás Sulyok, a Fidesz appointee, responded to Mr Magyar’s inauguration-day ultimatum — resign by May 31, along with the heads of the Constitutional Court, the Kúria (Hungary’s supreme court), the prosecution service, the State Audit Office, the Competition Authority, the Media Authority, and the National Judicial Office — with a single sentence from his palace: the president’s tenure “is clearly regulated by the Fundamental Law.” Péter Polt, the prosecutor general also named in the demand, said nothing at all. None of the seven institutional heads has signalled any intention to leave. The new government holds a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority; the institutions that matter most for rule-of-law reform remain staffed by its predecessor’s appointments. This is the gap Mr Magyar will now spend years trying to close. The 200,000 on Kossuth Square give him political capital for that fight. Coverage from the Associated Press to Le Monde was extensive. The EU flag was raised on the parliament’s façade for the first time since Mr Orbán removed it in 2014. Hungary now has 54 women lawmakers — more than a quarter of the total, the most in the country’s history. Mr Magyar enters the institutional battles with genuine popular legitimacy. The transition’s first diplomatic act came quickly. Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland’s former justice minister whom Hungary had sheltered while he faced criminal charges in Warsaw, confirmed on May 10 that he had left for the United States — timed not to any diplomatic initiative but to the hour Mr Magyar took office. Mr Magyar had said before his inauguration that Hungary would no longer protect people wanted by allied governments. The departure, the day after the swearing-in, showed that this was a commitment, not a slogan. Mr Magyar also announced that Poland would be his first foreign destination — a pointed choice, given that Donald Tusk’s government is the nearest comparable case of democratic restoration within the EU. The week resolved one early credibility problem. The initial nomination of Mr Magyar’s brother-in-law as justice minister had opened an obvious line of attack. Márton Melléthei-Barna withdrew, saying he did not want to cast “the slightest shadow” on the transition. His replacement, Márta Görög, dean of the University of Szeged’s law faculty, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the author of more than 70 publications, earns respect across party lines — she received a Fidesz-era prize from a Fidesz justice minister in 2019. Her expertise in EU regulatory law bears directly on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office accession legislation, the most important pending rule-of-law test. Mr Magyar reversed course under public pressure; that he reversed quickly and well matters more than that the error was made. The opposition took shape at the same session. All six Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk) MPs walked out before the “Ode to Joy” was played and before a Roma children’s ensemble performed. László Toroczkai, the party’s leader, said the objection was to the EU anthem framing, not to the children; the ensemble’s association called the walkout “unacceptable exclusion.” Mr Magyar called it “unacceptable and shameful.” Mi Hazánk immediately put forward constitutional amendments to abolish parliamentary immunity — a gesture calibrated for popular appeal, not legislative effect, with six seats in a 199-member chamber. They are positioning for Fidesz’s far-right voters. Viktor Orbán did not attend the session — the first outgoing prime minister to skip his own farewell since Hungary’s democratic transition in 1990. Every one of his predecessors came, spoke, and left; Mr Orbán updated his Facebook profile and gave an interview to a rapper. Gergely Gulyás, now leading the Fidesz faction, pledged to be a “normal opposition” and support “good proposals” while criticising Mr Magyar’s ultimatum to Mr Sulyok as “unworthy of a prime minister.” The two gestures — rhetorical moderation from Mr Gulyás, deliberate absence from Mr Orbán — show Fidesz settling into opposition while keeping its grip on the institutions. The economic picture is unchanged. The full cabinet takes its oath on May 12; no formal economic programme has been presented. The EU formal agreement, due May 25, is the main milestone still to come. Energy dependencies — 93% Russian crude, 85% Russian gas, Rosatom nuclear fuel — are inherited constraints that nothing this week addressed. Three clocks are running: the August deadline for EU recovery funds, an autumn credit-rating review, and Mr Magyar’s own May 31 ultimatum to institutions that show no sign of complying.
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Péter Magyar sworn in as Hungary's prime minister, ending Orbán's 16-year rule
May 5–10, 2026
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Magyar demands President Sulyok and Fidesz-appointed officials resign by May 31; presidential palace responds with brief constitutional rebuff
May 7–10, 2026
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Mi Hazánk walks out of inaugural parliamentary session over EU anthem and Roma children's performance, triggering controversy
May 7–10, 2026
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Viral 'dancing politician' Zsolt Hegedűs steals spotlight at inauguration celebrations, goes globally viral
May 10, 2026
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Fidesz transition to opposition: Orbán skips parliament farewell, Gulyás leads new opposition faction
May 7–10, 2026
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Magyar's brother-in-law withdraws as justice minister candidate; new justice minister named
May 7–10, 2026
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Poland's fugitive ex-justice minister Ziobro flees Hungary to US after Magyar takes office