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Regional Summary

Everyone Hedges Except Taiwan The Asia-Pacific this week is not walking away from the United States — but every significant government in the region is quietly building the leverage, the options, or the fallback it would need if American commitments proved shakier than advertised. The US-China summit on May 14–15 is the forcing event, but the hedging predates it and will outlast it. Taiwan’s position is the most exposed. Its main opposition party is now publicly endorsing the language Beijing wants Washington to adopt — a shift from “does not support” to “opposes” Taiwanese independence — which Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, named as his summit ask in a call with the American secretary of state this week. Cheng Li-wun, the Kuomintang chairwoman, told Bloomberg the American framing “would align exactly with her party’s position,” adding that if independence is “no longer an option, cross-strait relations will improve rapidly.” That leaves the governing party racing to shape US policy before May 14 while the opposition races to validate Beijing’s preferred outcome. The Taiwan People’s Party has tied the legislature’s defence budget vote — NT$1.25 trillion sought, NT$380 billion countered by the Kuomintang — to Washington announcing a second arms sale before the summit. Lai Ching-te, the president, scored a small tactical win by reaching Eswatini on a royal charter when China blocked overflight, but that move cannot be repeated everywhere: Germany and the Czech Republic both denied European transit during the original planning. Taiwan has a seat in none of the three negotiations — the summit, the domestic budget, the opposition’s Washington diplomacy — that will most shape its immediate future. Japan, under Sanae Takaichi, the prime minister, is the region’s most active hedger. Her five-day trip through Hanoi and Canberra produced supply-chain agreements, energy diversification pledges, and a ministerial discussion about leasing Japanese conventional submarines to Australia as a fallback for the Aukus security pact. She held two phone calls with Iran’s president urging safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, submitted proposals on using Japan’s presence in the region to protect tanker routes, and sent her defence minister to Manila and Jakarta to advance arms-export deals. The same Hormuz crisis, however, is forcing a harder choice at home. The Bank of Japan held its rate at 0.75% on April 28, but three of nine board members dissented in favour of an immediate hike, and the bank revised its core consumer-price-index forecast for fiscal 2026 from 1.9% to 2.8% while cutting its growth forecast from 1.0% to 0.5%. Japan intervened in the currency market on April 30 — its first such action in nearly two years — after the yen reached 160.7 to the dollar; analysts say the move is limited without a concurrent rate hike. Ms Takaichi’s most exposed position is her refusal to call for energy conservation: 74% of Japanese support saving energy, South Korea and Malaysia have both announced measures, and Japan has not. The Petroleum Association of Japan’s managing director noted Japan’s isolation publicly, then retracted the comment under pressure. Lee Jae-myung, South Korea’s president, has less need to hedge because his leverage is structural. Samsung posted 57.2 trillion won in first-quarter operating profit, with chip margins above 70% and customers booking supply years ahead; Korean memory cannot be replaced quickly. That position is now visible in Mr Lee’s posture. His cabinet was told this week to resolve issues “according to common sense and principles” in a “healthy, future-oriented relationship” with allies — language Seoul reads as a message to Washington. Ninety-six lawmakers from his coalition walked into the US Embassy to deliver a protest letter calling Congressional attempts to link the alliance to a domestic investigation an “infringement on judicial sovereignty.” His unification minister convened a public conference on whether South Korea should begin calling North Korea by its preferred name, “Joseon,” citing the 1972 West German-East German Basic Treaty as a model. The Seoul High Court raised Yoon Suk-yeol’s sentence from five to seven years; the People Power Party’s candidates are now physically excluding their own chairman from nomination events. Mr Lee has been above 60% approval for seven consecutive weeks. He is not managing American pressure so much as discounting it. Australia and Indonesia sit at opposite ends of the confidence spectrum, and both confirm the pattern. Canberra faces a blunt question: with parliamentary scrutiny in both London and Washington documenting serious risk to the Aukus submarine programme’s industrial timeline, the Japanese conventional submarine lease proposal has moved from think-tank advocacy to a contingency worth taking seriously — Australia has already contracted to buy Mogami-class frigates from Japan, and the supply chain exists. Canberra publicly dismissed the option during Ms Takaichi’s visit; that ministers raised it at all is telling. Indonesia shows what unhedged domestic confidence looks like. Prabowo Subianto, the president, spent May Day distributing branded shirts, signing six labour decrees, capping ride-hailing commissions at 8%, and dancing to a ska band at the National Monument — each policy a direct answer to the protests that shook his government last August. The same afternoon, his communications minister condemned a former parliamentary chairman’s eight-minute YouTube video as “hoaxes, slander, and hate speech.” The rally and the prosecution ran in parallel, with no apparent sense of contradiction. Before May 14, the divergence will sharpen. The summit may produce the language shift on Taiwan that Taipei cannot prevent; the Bank of Japan’s board is already moving toward a June hike that Ms Takaichi’s energy policy is making harder to absorb; Mr Lee’s party enters the June 3 elections with structural leverage and a commanding domestic position. The region is not waiting on the summit. The hedges are already in place.

Country Summaries


Taiwan flag Taiwan

In the ten days before the American president flies to Beijing, China’s foreign minister named Taiwan the “biggest risk point” in US-China relations, and Taiwan’s main opposition leader agreed with the terms China wants Washington to accept. Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, told Marco Rubio, the American secretary of state, this week that Beijing expects the May 14-15 summit to produce US movement on Taiwan — specifically, a shift from Washington’s formulation that it “does not support” independence to one that it “opposes” independence. Reuters described the call as a stark departure from Xi Jinping’s deliberate avoidance of the Taiwan issue at his recent South Korea summit, and noted that China has been “constantly sending similar signals at a working level.” Taiwan’s foreign ministry issued a formal statement of concern; its Mainland Affairs Council deputy minister said the government would “use the remaining time to intensify policy communications with the US.” American officials privately stressed that weapons approvals continue, but offered no public rebuttal of Mr Wang’s framing. What makes Taiwan’s position uncomfortable is that its main opposition is pushing in the same direction as Beijing. Cheng Li-wun, the Kuomintang (KMT) chairwoman, confirmed in a Bloomberg interview that if the American president were to tell Xi he “opposes” Taiwan declaring independence, “it would align exactly with her party’s position” — and that there is “a significant difference in tone between not supporting and opposing.” She added that if independence is “no longer an option, cross-strait relations will improve rapidly.” Ms Cheng also confirmed she has requested a meeting with the American president during a planned June Washington trip, and said she believes Xi would approve of her visit. Taiwan’s ruling party is trying to shape US policy before the summit; its main opposition is signalling to Washington that Beijing’s preferred framing reflects Taiwan’s political mainstream. Lai Ching-te, the president, completed the state visit to Eswatini that China had tried to block by denying him overflight rights. Mr Lai arrived on May 2 aboard King Mswati III’s royal charter — the same aircraft formerly in China Airlines service — his office timing the public announcement to coincide with landing, giving Beijing no window for last-minute pressure. Eswatini’s deputy prime minister, Thulisile Dladla, had travelled to Taipei on April 30 carrying the king’s formal invitation. The two sides signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, issued a joint communiqué, and Mr Lai received briefings on two joint projects — a Strategic Petroleum Reserve facility and the Taiwan Industry Innovation Park, described as the largest joint effort since the two countries established ties. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office called Mr Lai a “rat” who “skulked” to Eswatini; the council dismissed Beijing’s response as “fishwife’s gutter talk.” The counter worked — but it cannot be repeated everywhere. Not every ally holds a royal fleet, and Germany and the Czech Republic both denied European transit during original planning, confirming the airspace blockade was applied simultaneously across multiple regions, not only among smaller states. The defense budget vote, scheduled for May 8, has now been pulled into the same gravitational field as the summit. The governing party is seeking NT$1.25 trillion in special defense appropriations; the KMT has countered with NT$380 billion. The eight seats held by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are the deciding factor. Huang Kuo-chang, the TPP chairman, has set an explicit condition: if the American executive and legislative branches “truly have such a strong consensus in support of Taiwan’s defense, they should promptly announce a second round of arms sales, rather than deliberately delaying it until after” the summit. Mr Huang’s position ties the defense spending vote to whether Washington signals resolve before May 14. The KMT is not itself unified: Han Kuo-yu, the legislative speaker, reportedly backs an NT$800 billion alternative — prompting a confrontation at the party’s Central Standing Committee in which a senior official threatened Mr Han’s expulsion if he pressed ahead. Ms Cheng intervened to smooth tensions while reaffirming NT$380 billion as the party’s non-negotiable position. Taiwan’s defense budget, its opposition party’s diplomatic stance, and a great-power summit are all converging in the same week — and Taipei has a seat in none of the three negotiations that will most shape the outcome.
Lai Ching-te completes surprise Eswatini visit after China-backed overflight blockade
April 28 – May 04, 2026
TSMC 2nm expansion accelerates: five fabs ramping, Arizona packaging plant confirmed, ASML High-NA EUV deferred
April 27 – May 03, 2026
KMT-TPP select joint New Taipei City mayoral candidate for upcoming election
April 28–29, 2026
PLA conducts 29-aircraft incursion near Taiwan, 15 sorties crossing median line

Japan flag Japan

Sanae Takaichi spent the week building the partners Japan will need if the Strait of Hormuz stays dangerous — but the same crisis driving her diplomacy is now pushing inflation above target at home, forcing a harder choice she has so far declined to make. The prime minister’s five-day swing through Hanoi and Canberra was the biggest Japanese diplomatic event this year. In Vietnam, she signed six agreements and reframed Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy around what Tokyo now calls “economic security” — fusing supply-chain resilience, energy diversification, and critical minerals into one policy. Under Japan’s $10 billion Power Asia Initiative, Tokyo will help supply crude oil to Vietnam’s Nghi Son Refinery, a direct hedge against Hormuz closure risk. Ms Takaichi was explicit: “Japan and ASEAN must jointly strengthen regional supply chains.” Vietnam’s thin rare-earth processing capacity limits how quickly the minerals push will pay off, but pledged Japanese investment for 2025 rose 19.4% and bilateral trade climbed 12.3%, even as new investment fell 75% year-on-year in the first quarter. Australia came next. The visit marked the 50th anniversary of the Japan-Australia Basic Treaty and coincided with an Australian Strategic Policy Institute report proposing that Canberra explore leasing Japanese conventional submarines — seven Oyashio, twelve Sōryū, and five Taigei — as a fallback if AUKUS runs into serious trouble. The proposal is think-tank advocacy, not policy, but it emerged as a serious option precisely because Australia has already signed contracts to buy Mogami-class frigates from Japan. Richard Marles, the deputy prime minister, has previously said there is “no other country quite as aligned with Australia as Japan.” Summit outcome documents were not yet available. Even while travelling, Ms Takaichi held a second phone call with Masoud Pezeshkian, the Iranian president — the first was April 8 — urging safe Hormuz passage and swift resumption of US-Iran talks. She welcomed the transit of a Japanese-owned oil tanker through the strait as a “positive move.” The LDP submitted policy proposals on using Japan’s existing regional military presence to support safe passage, formalising an emerging debate. In New Delhi the same day, an LDP delegation met India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leadership; India’s foreign ministry formally welcomed Japan’s revised arms export rules, calling defence cooperation “an important pillar of the India-Japan special strategic and global partnership.” The Hormuz crisis is driving Ms Takaichi’s diplomacy. It is also upending the Bank of Japan’s earlier rate calculations. The BOJ held its benchmark rate at 0.75% on April 28, but three of nine board members — Naoki Tamura, Hajime Takata, and, in a surprise shift, Junko Nakagawa — dissented in favour of an immediate hike. The BOJ simultaneously revised its core consumer price index (CPI) forecast for fiscal 2026 from 1.9% to 2.8%, the highest projection in the current tightening cycle, while cutting its economic growth forecast from 1.0% to 0.5%. Kazuo Ueda, the central bank governor, acknowledged that companies “may more actively pass on rising costs for oil-related goods” and confirmed a hike was possible “even while the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.” The Iran war is pushing Japan’s inflation up through knock-on price rises, not holding it below target. The question has shifted from whether inflation will reach 2% to whether it will overshoot and demand aggressive tightening. Economists expect the three dissenting members to keep pushing for a hike at the June meeting. Japan also intervened in the currency market on April 30 — its first such action in nearly two years — after the dollar reached 160.725 yen, its highest since July 2024. Satsuki Katayama, the finance minister, had said hours earlier that the “time to take decisive action was nearing.” Atsushi Mimura, the top currency diplomat, called the intervention a “final evacuation warning” and warned the following day that “speculation remained rife.” The dollar fell to 155.5 yen after the action. Analysts noted the move’s effectiveness is limited without a concurrent BOJ rate hike — a bind that reflects how tightly the security environment and the domestic economy are now entangled. Investors had built the largest short-yen position in nearly two years before Japan stepped in. Ms Takaichi’s most exposed domestic position, though, is her refusal to call for energy conservation. Polls show 74% of Japanese support saving energy; a separate survey puts 64% behind government-mandated measures. The government has declined, with the prime minister saying “economic activity should not be halted at this point.” Japan is the only major oil-dependent nation not calling for demand reduction — South Korea and Malaysia have both done so. A naphtha shortage has already forced a major toilet manufacturer to suspend new orders and is hitting petrochemical firms. Local governments in Tottori and Tokyo have begun conservation measures on their own. The Petroleum Association of Japan’s managing director publicly noted Japan’s isolation; the association then issued a statement retracting his comment. If supply pressure deepens, this position will become harder to sustain. On the security front, Shinjiro Koizumi, the defence minister, travelled to Indonesia and the Philippines to advance arms export negotiations — the Philippines talks include a potential free transfer of an Abukuma-class destroyer; Indonesia is in line for a defence cooperation agreement. At Balikatan 2026, some 1,400 Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel are participating, ten times last year’s number, and for the first time in combat roles rather than disaster response or observation — the direct result of the Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement that took effect in September 2025. JS Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait on April 17 en route to the exercise, the fourth such transit since September 2024. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force also completed a structural reform at the end of March, consolidating Mogami-class frigates into a new Patrol and Defense Group at Yokosuka to free destroyers for emergencies — an explicit response to Chinese coast guard fleet growth that now outnumbers Japan’s coast guard by more than 2:1 in large vessels. Constitution Day on May 3 produced its annual rituals. Ms Takaichi told a pro-revision forum the constitution must be “periodically updated in accordance with the demands of the times.” Polling published the same day showed the LDP’s preferred approach — retaining both Article 9 paragraphs while adding a new clause explicitly recognising the Self-Defense Forces — at 60% support, above the referendum threshold. But 80% of respondents saw no need to revise Paragraph 1 outright, and 73% wanted broad cross-party agreement before any amendment. The LDP and its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai), remain split: the LDP would add while retaining; the party would delete Paragraph 2 entirely. The coalition plans to submit emergency clause legislation this fiscal year but has set no timetable for Article 9. Counter-rallies were held nationwide the same day, with Kyodo News noting support “gaining traction through social media and other channels” — a sign that civil society opposition is more persistent than earlier coverage suggested. Ms Takaichi’s approval fell three points to 69%, attributed to the “US-Japan summit glow fading,” but remains high by any historical standard. The energy-saving standoff is now the most concrete immediate threat to her numbers: it ties an abstract policy stance to household economic pain on an issue where the public and the prime minister are plainly on opposite sides.
Takaichi completes Vietnam summit, arrives in Australia on five-day Indo-Pacific tour
April 27 – May 03, 2026

South Korea flag South Korea

Lee Jae-myung this week stopped managing American pressure and started resisting it — a shift that, taken alongside his government’s move to change what South Korea calls North Korea, marks a president who has decided his mandate is strong enough to challenge the terms of both relationships. The first signal came from the Cabinet. On April 29, Mr Lee told his ministers that South Korea must resolve pending issues “according to common sense and principles” and build a “healthy, future-oriented relationship” with its allies. Nobody in Seoul doubted the audience. The framing — mutual respect, in a relationship with Washington — is not the language of a government eager to ease tensions. The second signal was louder. The day before, Park Hong-bae and 95 other lawmakers from the Democratic Party of Korea and allied parties walked into the US Embassy and delivered a protest letter calling Congressional attempts to link the alliance to a domestic investigation of Coupang an “infringement on judicial sovereignty.” Roughly a third of the National Assembly signed it. The Foreign Ministry confirmed it was weighing a formal reply to the Republican lawmakers who had written first. Mr Park said lawmakers acted without prior co-ordination with the government — though Mr Lee’s own Cabinet remarks the following day left no doubt about his government’s position. The third signal was the most constitutionally charged. Chung Dong-young, the unification minister, sponsored a public conference on whether South Korea should begin calling North Korea by its own preferred name, “Joseon,” rather than the term currently used. Kim Nam-jung, the vice unification minister, opened the event by citing the 1972 West German-East German Basic Treaty — in which the two states recognised each other’s names as a prelude to expanded exchanges — as a model. Legal experts at the conference said adoption would not automatically constitute diplomatic recognition. Song Eon-seog, floor leader of the People Power Party (PPP), called it unconstitutional outright: South Korea’s constitution defines the entire peninsula as its territory, and he demanded the minister’s dismissal. Democratic Party lawmakers walked out of the plenary session. The conference happened anyway. Samsung’s earnings, reported the same week, offered a different kind of argument for South Korean confidence. The company posted 57.2 trillion won in first-quarter operating profit — more than its entire profit for 2025, in a single quarter. The chip division generated 53.7 trillion won of that, up from 1 trillion won in the same quarter a year earlier. Operating margins exceeded 70%. Samsung warned that its demand fulfilment rate is at a record low, with customers booking supply years ahead; the company expects the gap between supply and demand to widen further into 2027. Korean memory chips are not merely competitive — they are, on any near-term timeline, irreplaceable. An additional piece of news eased a separate concern: the Samsung Electronics union chief clarified that Mr Lee’s earlier warning against “excessive demands” targeted LG Uplus, which had sought 30% of operating profit as a bonus, not Samsung’s union, which wants 15%. The May 21 strike threat looks less likely to disrupt production than it did last week. South Korea’s financial reach continued to grow. Three South Korean financial institutions moved simultaneously into digital finance infrastructure: KBank completed a blockchain remittance proof-of-concept with Ripple targeting the UAE and Thailand; Woori Bank and MoonPay Korea signed an agreement to distribute a won-backed stablecoin for cross-border settlement; and KB Financial Group signed deals with both Pantera Capital and the Bank of Korea for blockchain and digital currency infrastructure testing. All three companies say they are getting ahead of the Digital Asset Basic Act. Commercial banks as well as the state are now building won internationalisation — an explicit goal of the new Bank of Korea governor. At the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Samarkand, Hwang Ki-yeon, president of South Korea’s Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), committed $500m by 2029, with a target of $2–3bn over time, to co-finance critical minerals projects across Asia-Pacific through the ADB. China supplies over 80% of the processed minerals South Korea needs; that dependence became acute when Beijing imposed rare earth export controls last year. This is the first time Seoul has routed its supply-chain strategy through a multilateral institution rather than pursuing bilateral deals alone — offering smaller economies more political cover to follow suit. In Samarkand, the Bank of Korea also co-chairs the technical working group driving an upgrade of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation from a commitment-based to a paid-in capital structure, which would convert the region’s financial safety net from a promise into cash. The most internationally covered story of the week was domestic. The Seoul High Court increased Yoon Suk-yeol’s prison sentence from five to seven years, adding charges not in the original verdict; the same court raised Kim Keon-hee’s sentence to four years on stock manipulation and bribery charges, convicting her of additional offences including gift acceptance and a price manipulation charge on which she had previously been acquitted. A special prosecutor also summoned Mr Yoon for questioning, and the court held a preliminary hearing in his insurrection appeal, where prosecutors have asked for a life sentence. The international coverage is itself a signal — the courts’ pursuit of the old regime is drawing wider attention than any earlier Yoon hearing — but the domestic significance is confirmation of a pattern already in place, not a new development. The process is widening on schedule, maintaining the conditions that make PPP recovery difficult before the June 3 elections. Those conditions are not improving for the opposition. Jang Dong-hyuk, the PPP chairman, and Mr Song campaigned separately this week. Candidates have begun physically excluding Mr Jang from events: Oh Se-hoon, the Seoul mayoral candidate, held a nomination ceremony at the National Assembly without arranging a seat for the party chairman. Mr Lee’s approval fell three points to 62.2%, driven by economic anxiety over oil prices and inflation linked to the Iran war. He has been above 60% for seven consecutive weeks; the floor appears durable even if the ceiling has come down. One new complication arrived with the release of Yoo Dong-gyu, one of three Daejang-dong corruption figures freed as their detention periods expired. Mr Yoo publicly claimed the land development scheme “could not have proceeded without the mayor’s knowledge” — the most direct public accusation yet linking Mr Lee to the scandal. Presidential immunity bars prosecution while Mr Lee is in office, and Mr Yoo has made similar claims throughout the investigation. But he is now making them as a free man, which changes the political weight of the accusation, if not its legal standing.
Appeals court increases Yoon Suk-yeol's obstruction sentence to 7 years; wife Kim Keon-hee's corruption sentence raised to 4 years
April 27 – May 01, 2026
North Korea naming controversy: Unification Ministry proposes using Pyongyang's preferred term 'Joseon'; PPP pushes back, opposition seeks minister's dismissal
April 28 – May 01, 2026
Korean banking sector pushes into digital finance: won-backed stablecoin, mobile ID expansion, and KB Financial's blockchain partnership
April 30 – May 03, 2026
96 South Korean lawmakers protest US congressional intervention in Coupang investigation
April 28, 2026
Lee Jae-myung's approval rating falls to 62.2% amid economic concerns; remains above 60% for seventh consecutive week
April 27, 2026
ASEAN+3 and Korea-China-Japan finance ministers meet in Samarkand to strengthen regional safety net
May 03, 2026
PPP vs MBC: opposition party threatens broadcast coverage ban over anchor's closing remarks on Chu Kyung-ho
April 28, 2026
Lee Jae-myung's India visit analyzed as upgrade to semiconductor and supply-chain partnership
April 27, 2026
North Korean DPRK linked to new wave of AI-enhanced npm malware attacks and crypto theft
April 29–30, 2026
South Korea launches next-generation earth observation satellite No. 2 on SpaceX Falcon 9
May 03, 2026
Bell and KAI sign MoU to propose MV-75 tiltrotor for South Korea's helicopter replacement program
April 29, 2026
South Korea commissions fourth Chungnam-class frigate, expects six domestically-built frigates by 2028
May 02, 2026
Daejang-dong corruption detainees released; figures implicate President Lee Jae-myung
April 30, 2026
Bank of Korea data shows AI is sharply reducing youth employment in exposed industries
May 01, 2026
Samsung family completes payment of record 12 trillion won inheritance tax over five years
May 03, 2026
DPK accused of planning constitutional changes to remove 'freedom' language; analyst testimony draws international attention
April 30, 2026

Australia flag Australia

The UK parliament has joined the US in finding that the AUKUS pact is in trouble — meaning both Pillar 1 partners now face parliamentary scrutiny of their submarine programmes just as Australia needs both to deliver. The House of Commons Defence Committee found the programme faces “shortcomings and failings” from faltering political leadership, under-investment, and too few Royal Navy submarines in service. Tan Dhesi, the committee chair, warned that “the investment pipeline has already faltered.”
RBA poised for third consecutive rate hike to 4.35% as Iran-war inflation persists
April 27 – May 04, 2026
UK parliamentary report warns AUKUS at risk from dwindling political leadership; King Charles endorses deal at US Congress
April 27 – May 04, 2026
Penny Wong's North Asia tour secures China jet fuel cooperation and South Korea energy deal amid Strait of Hormuz crisis
April 27 – May 04, 2026

Indonesia flag Indonesia

On May Day, Prabowo Subianto tossed his safari shirt into a crowd of hundreds of thousands at Jakarta’s National Monument, danced to a ska band, and signed six labour decrees from a stage. The same day, his government invoked speech laws against a former parliamentary chairman for an eight-minute YouTube video. The Monas rally was the most elaborate show of political legitimacy the administration has staged. Mr Prabowo arrived on a white Pindad armoured vehicle, distributed basic goods and branded shirts, and announced a string of policies: a new cap limiting ride-hailing platforms to an 8% commission — guaranteeing drivers 92% of their fares — a task force for workers facing layoffs, ratification of an International Labour Organization convention protecting fishing workers, 40-year housing instalment plans, plans for new worker cities, and a 20% fertiliser price cut. He signed Presidential Regulation No. 27/2026 on the spot. Each policy addresses a grievance raised during the August 2025 protests that shook the administration in its early months. Legislators from Gerindra, the governing Great Indonesia Movement party, called Mr Prabowo “the real president of the workers.” One person died in the crush. Amien Rais, a founding figure of Indonesia’s reform-era opposition and former chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, had posted a video alleging that Mr Prabowo and his cabinet secretary, Teddy Indra Wijaya, had a relationship beyond professional bounds. Meutya Hafid, the communications minister, condemned the video as “hoaxes, slander, and hate speech,”
Prabowo's May Day rally at Monas draws massive crowds, marks announcement of multiple pro-labor policies
May 1–3, 2026
Golkar conducts nationwide party consolidation ahead of 2029 elections with dozens of district-level meetings
May 1–3, 2026
Italy's parliament approves donation of ageing aircraft carrier to Indonesia
April 28, 2026
Megawati denies PDI-P orchestrated August 2025 protests; foreign diplomats increasingly seek party meetings
April 27 – May 02, 2026