Regional Summary
Declarations in Search of States Romania this week held the most consequential NATO summit the eastern flank has seen in years, produced the first multilateral document to formalise the “NATO 3.0” concept — a stronger European pillar within the transatlantic alliance — and committed its partners to spending 5% of GDP on defence. It had no functioning government. Nicușor Dan, Romania’s president, presided over the Cotroceni Palace gathering without a cabinet behind him, in a country where the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians is polling at 32% and its leaders have named Călin Georgescu — the pro-Russian figure whose presidential candidacy was annulled in 2024 — as a prospective prime minister. The states that most need functioning institutions to turn security pledges into real capability are, this week, the states showing the deepest cracks. No government illustrated that gap more plainly than that of Andrej Babiš, the Czech prime minister. In the same week his defence minister announced a roughly 20 billion koruna top-up to reach NATO’s 2% spending target ahead of the Ankara summit, Mr Babiš had already removed Jiří Šedivý, the Defence Ministry official responsible for NATO budget negotiations, for sharing Alliance-validated figures showing Czech spending at 1.78% of GDP — a gap the top-up is designed to paper over by reclassifying infrastructure spending in other ministries. The government also confirmed it has quietly stopped making direct financial contributions to the Czech-led international shell procurement programme — a 16-country effort Prague coordinates and takes diplomatic credit for — leaving a €3.6 billion funding gap now covered by external donors. Mr Babiš counts the coordination; he has withdrawn the cash. A Czech Radio defence analyst put it plainly: what matters to NATO planners is not the percentages but the capabilities, forces, and equipment. On that measure, the Czech government is moving in the wrong direction while managing the appearance of moving in the right one. Poland’s problem this week was not a government manipulating its own institutions but finding that decisions affecting it are being made through channels it cannot reach. The Pentagon’s cancellation of a planned 4,000-troop armoured deployment caught Warsaw off guard — equipment was already in European ports when Polish officials discovered their country had been cut. More troubling was the case of Zbigniew Ziobro, a former justice minister facing prosecution in Poland, who obtained a journalist visa to the United States after — according to reporting by Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita — lobbyists with access to informal White House networks arranged a personal intervention by the American president that overrode Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Tom Rose, the Warsaw ambassador, who had explicitly assured Radosław Sikorski, the foreign minister, that Mr Ziobro would not find refuge there. Both events expose the same problem: Poland’s security relationship with Washington is now partly mediated by informal networks that bypass normal diplomacy. Donald Tusk, the prime minister, can manage Jarosław Kaczyński at home; he has no lever for decisions made through channels the ambassador does not know about. Ukraine cut against the pattern — and its most important domestic event was not on the battlefield. Russia’s assault over May 13–15, more than 1,500 drones and multiple ballistic missiles, was the largest two-day attack since the full-scale invasion began. Ukraine answered with a drone barrage that struck the Angstrem Semiconductor Plant in Zelenograd — Russia’s main domestic supplier of military-grade microchips for guided weapons — for the first time in force. The Security Service of Ukraine, not the army’s General Staff, ran the operation, a change in how Ukraine conducts its deep strikes. More significant still was the arrest of Andriy Yermak, the former head of the Presidential Office and widely regarded as the second most powerful person in wartime Ukraine for five years, charged with laundering 460 million hryvnias through a luxury villa project and participating in a broader $100 million scheme tied to a Russian-linked former member of parliament. That the National Anti-Corruption Bureau set bail, sustained detention, and reached this far up the chain of command confirms these institutions have genuine independence — a rarity in the region this week. What Volodymyr Zelensky knew about his closest aide’s conduct, after five years of daily collaboration, is what the case will turn on. Hungary’s new government, four weeks old, has moved faster than almost anyone expected on signals — summoning Russia’s ambassador after drone strikes on Transcarpathia, lifting its veto on EU sanctions against Israeli settlers, dismantling Orbán-era emergency decrees — while moving more slowly than almost anyone hoped on structure. Péter Magyar, the prime minister, has submitted no legislation to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, announced no public media restructuring, and begun no formal proceedings against any of the institutional heads his government has publicly pressured to resign. The Hungarian National Bank, whose governor cannot be removed before 2031, showed within days what that lag costs: it cut swap facility rates in the opposite direction from what the finance minister had told parliament the government wanted, weakening the forint by 0.7% within hours. Security declarations, defence spending commitments, anti-corruption pledges, and democratic resets are only as durable as the institutions that must execute them. Romania can host the summit; it cannot yet form a government. The Czech Republic can lead the shell programme; it has stopped funding it. Poland can sign the declarations; it cannot control the channels through which decisions about it are made. Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies held this week. Whether the rest of the region’s institutions will hold is less clear.Country Summaries
Ukraine
Russia killed 24 people — three of them children — in a single Kyiv apartment building last week. Ukraine answered by sending roughly 500 drones to hit the factory that makes the chips inside Russian precision missiles.
The exchange crossed new thresholds on both sides. Russia’s assault over May 13–15 — more than 1,500 drones and multiple ballistic missiles — was the largest two-day attack since the full-scale invasion began. Examining the wreckage, Volodymyr Zelensky said the missile that hit the apartment block had been manufactured in the second quarter of 2026, its components still sourced abroad in defiance of Western sanctions. Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, said Putin was “banking on escalation.” Ukraine’s retaliation, the largest drone barrage on Russian territory in over a year, struck oil refineries and fuel depots — and, for the first time at this scale, the Angstrem Semiconductor Plant in Zelenograd, the primary domestic supplier of military-grade microchips for Russian guided weapons, operating under US sanctions. At Belbek airfield near Sevastopol, Ukraine’s Security Service claimed the destruction of a Pantsir-S2 system, an S-400 radar installation, and two drone management systems, targeting the air-defence layer protecting Russian aviation over the Black Sea. It was Ukraine’s Security Service, not the army’s General Staff, running these strikes — a change in how Ukraine organises its deep-strike operations.
The most consequential development of the week, though, was in a Kyiv courtroom. Andriy Yermak, the former head of the Presidential Office and by most assessments the second most powerful person in wartime Ukraine for five years, was charged and remanded to pretrial detention. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office allege he laundered UAH 460 million through a luxury villa project called “Dynasty” and took part in a broader $100 million scheme involving the state nuclear company Energoatom. The High Anti-Corruption Court set bail at $3.2 million; he remains detained. Investigators found that the scheme’s operations ran from premises belonging to the family of Andriy Derkach, a Russian-linked former member of parliament under US sanctions — a direct line from wartime corruption to networks linked to Russia.
The arrest matters beyond its individual facts. Mr Yermak was the architect of an attempt in July 2025 to bring under his control the very institutions now charging him, reportedly ordering searches of anti-corruption offices and obstruction of investigators. That those same institutions charged him, set bail, and sustained his detention confirms they have genuine independence. Operation Midas, the investigation that began with mid-level officials, has now reached the former chief of staff, a former deputy prime minister, and two former ministers. NABU’s head said Mr Zelensky is not under investigation, but the question of what the president knew about his closest aide’s activities — after five years of daily collaboration — will shape debate as the case proceeds.
One detail sharpened the picture. Roza Tapanova, a supervisory board member of Oschadbank, offered to contribute 8 million hryvnias toward Mr Yermak’s bail. Citizens filed a petition through the Cabinet of Ministers portal demanding her removal for the conflict of interest. Her continued presence on the board is a live test of whether the reforms Ukraine agreed to for EU membership are being enforced at state enterprises.
Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office, who replaced Mr Yermak in January, gave an interview to The Times from Vilnius. He said he detected “no signs whatsoever” of Russian preparations for a nuclear strike, declared Ukraine ready for direct talks between Mr Zelensky and Putin if Russia “demonstrates sincerity,” and opposed lowering the mobilisation age to 18, saying it “would destroy the future of the country” — while insisting that mobilisation must continue or “the country will simply collapse.” He arrived armed to the interview, citing ten assassination attempts. Ukrainian media picked up the interview across dozens of outlets. Whether it reflects Mr Budanov’s own agenda or a coordinated effort to handle the political damage from the Yermak arrest — or both — is unclear.
The UAE brokered the first phase of a planned 1,000-prisoner swap, with 205 soldiers exchanged. Mr Zelensky noted that some had been held since 2022. The swap’s completion despite the collapse of the May ceasefire framework suggests prisoner exchanges can proceed even when peace talks fail. Mykhailo Fedorov, the defence minister, hosted Alex Karp, Palantir’s chief executive, in Kyiv, announcing that more than 100 companies are now training combat AI targeting models through the Brave1 Dataroom platform — expanding Ukraine’s defence-technology sector, with commercial value that will outlast the war. Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defence minister, visited the Zaporizhzhia front line alongside Mr Fedorov: visible solidarity, calibrated as usual to fall short of formal commitment.
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- Russia’s three-day mass aerial assault on Ukraine kills 30+ civilians including 24 in one Kyiv apartment building — Russia carried out its largest two-day aerial assault since the full-scale invasion began on May 13–15, firing more than 1,500 drones and dozens of missiles at Kyiv and other cities. A single missile struck a nine-storey Kyiv apartment block, killing 24 people including three children. Volodymyr Zelensky vowed retaliation and visited the rubble site; Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, said Putin was ‘banking on escalation’; Yuliia Svyrydenko, the prime minister, toured damaged sites with Klymenko, the interior minister. (reuters.com)
- Budanov gives sweeping Times interview on nuclear threat, peace talks, mobilisation, and assassination attempts — while in new Presidential Office role — Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office, who replaced Andriy Yermak in January, gave a wide-ranging interview to The Times during a visit to Lithuania, covering: his assessment that Russian nuclear strike preparations show ‘no signs whatsoever’; his access to Russian contacts as leverage in peace negotiations; his survival of at least ten Kremlin assassination attempts; and his opposition to lowering the mobilisation age to 18. Domestic Ukrainian outlets further amplified his statements on the need for continued mobilisation and his vision for ending the war through talks. (english.nv.ua)
- 36+ countries approve special tribunal to prosecute Russia for crime of aggression, to be based in The Hague — The Council of Europe minister
Notes
Notes
Ukraine launches largest-ever drone barrage on Moscow region in retaliation for Kyiv strikes
May 13–17, 2026
Russia's three-day mass aerial assault on Ukraine kills 30+ civilians including 24 in one Kyiv apartment building
May 13–17, 2026
Former Zelensky chief of staff Andriy Yermak arrested on money-laundering charges, testing Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions
May 11–17, 2026
Fedorov's defense tech revolution: Palantir partnership, AI warfare, and German defense minister frontline visit
May 11–16, 2026
Budanov gives sweeping Times interview on nuclear threat, peace talks, mobilization, and assassination attempts — while in new Presidential Office role
May 11–17, 2026
Poland
The Pentagon’s cancellation of a planned 4,000-troop armoured deployment caught Warsaw off guard — neither the government’s diplomats nor the presidential office had received any warning, and equipment was already sitting in European ports when officials learned their country had been dropped from an American troop-reduction order.
The cancellation, part of a broader US drawdown of roughly 5,000 troops across Europe, was the week’s most concrete blow. But a second, stranger development proved equally significant: the American president reportedly intervened personally to grant Zbigniew Ziobro, a former justice minister facing prosecution in Poland, a journalist visa — overriding Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Tom Rose, the Warsaw ambassador. Mr Rose had given Radosław Sikorski, the foreign minister, explicit assurances that Mr Ziobro would not find refuge in the United States. Reporting by Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita identified Adam Bielan and Jacek Kurski, figures with access to the White House’s informal network, as the lobbyists who arranged the intervention. Together, the two events reveal that decisions touching Poland are being made through routes that bypass normal diplomacy, the Warsaw embassy, and even the secretary of state.
Warsaw’s political class fell on the troop cancellation like a gift. Donald Tusk, the prime minister, told reporters he had received assurances the move was “logistical” — then turned on his domestic rivals, accusing Jarosław Kaczyński, the Law and Justice (PiS) leader, of “throwing blame onto Poland for US decisions,” and accusing Karol Nawrocki, the presidential candidate, of “covering the country in mud” by his conduct at the Bucharest summit. Mr Sikorski accused Mr Nawrocki of “denouncing before foreigners.” Law and Justice’s Mateusz Morawiecki and Przemysław Czarnek accused Mr Tusk of having destroyed the US-Poland alliance through his anti-American stance. The confrontation mobilised all three poles of Polish politics — government, presidential office, and opposition — simultaneously on a single security event, planting a “who lost America?” question at the heart of the 2027 campaign.
Mr Ziobro, now in the United States, was hired by TV Republika as a political commentator and spent his first days posting combative late-night messages framing his presence abroad as Mr Tusk’s “humiliation.” Mr Kaczyński directed the Law and Justice parliamentary club to “defend Ziobro to the end at any cost,” though Newsweek sources reported he could not silence internal critics — a sign the party’s wounds from last month have not healed. Most polls show a majority of Poles view the flight negatively. But the combination of an American media platform, apparent White House protection, and amplification by the party has turned a legal problem for Law and Justice into a foreign-based counter-narrative that may run for years.
At home, the government crossed a new threshold in its long conflict with the Constitutional Tribunal. After the tribunal — sitting in a panel the government regards as illegitimately composed — issued an injunction ordering the Sejm to stop electing new members to the National Council of the Judiciary, the Sejm ignored it. On May 15, three days after the injunction arrived and while it was still operative, 258 MPs voted for a list of 15 new judicial council members. Waldemar Żurek, the justice minister, noted that even within the tribunal a dissenting judge had questioned whether the injunction mechanism was legally available in this type of proceedings — the government argues the tribunal was acting beyond its own powers. The distinction from previous confrontations matters: this is not the government declining to publish a ruling it dislikes, but the Sejm acting in direct defiance of a live court order.
The week’s other escalation was quieter but has a hard deadline attached. Mr Tusk blocked all four pending presidential nominations to the National Bank of Poland’s management board, including that of Marta Kightley, described as the most critical deputy of Adam Glapiński, the central bank governor. The trigger was a joint press conference Mr Glapiński held with Mr Nawrocki promoting an alternative financing scheme — which Mr Tusk’s government read as the central bank governor openly joining the presidential campaign against an EU instrument the government had just signed. The bank now sits at its legal minimum of six board members. Adam Lipiński, a vice-president of the bank, has a term expiring in November 2026; if he is not replaced, the board drops below the statutory floor. No precedent exists for what happens then.
Against all this, the Bucharest Nine summit — co-hosted by Mr Nawrocki alongside Romania’s president — produced one real if overshadowed result: Nordic states joined the eastern flank format for the first time, deepening a structure that will continue regardless of what Washington decides next.
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- Sejm elects new National Council of the Judiciary members in defiance of Constitutional Tribunal injunction; Law and Justice boycotts — On May 15, the Sejm elected 15 new judicial members to the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), proceeding despite a Constitutional Tribunal injunction issued earlier that week ordering the Sejm to halt proceedings. Law and Justice (PiS) boycotted the vote; 235 MPs voted for the unified list, including 13 coalition-endorsed judges plus one each from Law and Justice and the Confederation. The tribunal had acted on a Law and Justice petition challenging the constitutionality of the new election procedure. (rp.pl)
- TV Republika chief targeted by false-alarm harassment campaign; politicians and president condemn it — Tomasz Sakiewicz, chief of TV Republika, and other conservative-aligned journalists and politicians were targeted by an apparent coordinated harassment campaign in which unknown actors filed false emergency service reports to their home addresses, including fake food deliveries and police call-outs. Sławomir Mentzen, the Confederation leader, revealed his law firm’s phone number was used. A 53-year-old man was arrested and then released after police confirmed his identity had been stolen. Karol Nawrocki, the president, Jarosław Kaczyński, the Law and Justice leader, and Mr Mentzen all condemned the campaign; Mr Cenckiewicz, the former head of the Bureau of National Security (BBN), reported being targeted personally. (wirtualnemedia.pl)
- Bucharest Nine summit expands toward Nordic states; Nawrocki co-chairs meeting in Romania — Karol Nawrocki, Poland’s president, travelled to Bucharest to co-host the Bucharest Nine summit alongside Dan, Romania’s president, with Nordic countries joining for the first time — a sign the format may expand. Mr Nawrocki called for NATO unity ahead of July’s Ankara summit and met Dan. The summit was overshadowed by simultaneous reporting of the US troop cancellation, which Mr Nawrocki addressed on the sidelines. He also symbolically adopted a bear named ‘Batyr’ at a Romanian wildlife sanctuary and drew social-media comment for his English-language speech.
Notes
Notes
Pentagon cancels 4,000-troop deployment to Poland, triggering fierce domestic political battle
May 11–17, 2026
Tusk refuses to countersign four NBP board nominations, deepening government-central bank conflict
May 14–15, 2026
Sejm elects new KRS judicial council members, defying Constitutional Tribunal injunction, with PiS boycott
May 12–17, 2026
TV Republika chief subjected to false police alarm harassment campaign; politicians and president condemn it
May 15–17, 2026
B9 Bucharest Summit expands toward Nordic states; Nawrocki co-chairs meeting in Romania
May 12–17, 2026
Czech Republic
Andrej Babiš forced out the Defence Ministry’s senior NATO budget expert this week for circulating accurate figures on Czech defence spending, while his government quietly stopped paying into the Ukraine shell procurement programme his country leads.
The two moves belong to the same logic. Jiří Šedivý, director of the Defence Policy and Strategy section and the official responsible for NATO spending negotiations, had attended meetings at NATO headquarters and returned with Alliance-validated figures showing Czech defence at 1.78% of GDP — not the 2%-plus the government has presented publicly by counting infrastructure spending in other ministries. He organised an inter-ministerial briefing to share those figures. Tünde Bartha, head of the Government Office, asked him to postpone it. Mr Šedivý proceeded anyway. Mr Babiš then summoned Jaromír Zůna, the defence minister, and, according to Respekt, “insisted he get rid of Šedivý immediately.” Mr Zůna told Mr Šedivý he had been under “enormous pressure” and must leave by end of month. Sources told Respekt the immediate cause was the briefing: “Babiš objected to Šedivý not obfuscating the defence budget situation — to him saying things as they are.”
The same week, Mr Zůna announced the government would add roughly CZK 20 billion to the defence budget to reach 2% of GDP before the NATO summit in Ankara — a figure he said could be achieved without “evasive manoeuvres.” The government removed the official who documented the spending gap in the same week it announced a pre-summit top-up to close it on paper. A Czech Radio defence analyst put the broader point plainly: “The percentages matter for NATO planning bodies, but for the supreme commander they have almost no value. What matters are capabilities, forces, and equipment.” At the May 11th cabinet meeting, ministers formally interrupted the EU’s joint defence procurement mechanism — the Security Action for Europe instrument — without a decision, a sign of hesitation on EU-level defence integration even as Mr Babiš manoeuvres on NATO spending metrics.
On Ukraine, the picture is similarly thin. The Czech-led international shell procurement programme has delivered 4.4 million large-calibre shells since 2024 through a 16-country coalition that Prague coordinates. But Luboš Veselý, the Czech ambassador to Ukraine, confirmed this week that his own government has stopped making direct financial contributions to the programme, leaving a €3.6 billion funding gap now covered by external donors. The coordination role persists; Czech money has stopped flowing. Mr Babiš takes the diplomatic credit without the financial commitment.
The cohabitation conflict between Mr Babiš and Petr Pavel, the president, is no longer confined to the July NATO summit in Ankara. Three independent diplomatic sources told Aktuálně.cz that the Czech permanent mission in New York has already asked the Foreign Ministry who will compose the Czech delegation to the September UN General Assembly (UNGA) — opening a second front. Mr Pavel has led that delegation in all three prior years. On May 17th, Karel Havlíček, the deputy prime minister, met Mr Pavel at Prague Castle; Mr Babiš, as at the previous meeting, did not attend. Petr Macinka, the foreign minister, deflected questions about the UNGA composition: “We haven’t dealt with that yet.” Mr Pavel, meanwhile, attended the Bucharest Nine summit on May 13th and received six US Congress members at Prague Castle on May 11th, keeping alliance relationships alive independently of the government.
The Chamber of Deputies also voted 91-68 to pass an amendment to the public budget laws that the National Budget Council described as a “fundamental change of fiscal paradigm” — moving Czech fiscal rules from a framework stricter than EU requirements to one that will be looser. The amendment excludes defence spending above 2% of GDP from deficit calculations through 2036, allows infrastructure spending above expenditure ceilings, and opens flexibility provisions permitting up to CZK 240 billion in additional spending in a single year; deficits of up to CZK 400 billion could become legally permissible. Alena Schillerová, the finance minister, has already briefed the EU economics commissioner. The opposition announced a Constitutional Court challenge; the amendment still needs Senate approval and a presidential signature, two safeguards that remain intact. On the same day, Mr Babiš declared that “this government does not intend to adopt the euro” and the cabinet formally ended the annual joint Finance Ministry and Czech National Bank reports that had tracked the country’s path toward adoption since EU accession in 2004. What was informal political preference is now institutionalised inaction.
The most consequential domestic development may be the quietest. Marie Pošarová, a newly appointed Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) MP who chairs the supervisory board of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund (SZIF) — the agency responsible for recovering CZK 5.1 billion (€208 million) from Agrofert — argued publicly in a podcast that the conflict-of-interest law should be changed so “Babiš would no longer be in conflict of interest.” Her reasoning: “The problem isn’t Andrej Babiš — it’s the law.” This goes a step beyond March’s parliamentary immunity vote, which blocked prosecution. What Ms Pošarová is describing is legislation to permanently remove the legal basis for pursuing Mr Babiš’s conduct — while she chairs the body tasked with clawing back his company’s subsidies. Separately, French specialist investigators this week completed their three-year probe into Mr Babiš’s alleged purchase of Château Bigaud in Mougins for €14 million through an offshore network and transferred the dossier to the National Financial Prosecutor. The case remains live — but Mr Babiš, who became prime minister in December 2025, now holds French-level immunity that shields him from proceedings while he serves.
The week’s other political spectacle was the Sudeten German parliamentary resolution. It passed 73-0 in a near-empty chamber: all 92 opposition MPs were officially absent, most cabinet ministers including Mr Babiš were excused, and Tomio Okamura spent six minutes reading the list of absences at the session’s opening. SPD organised the resolution against the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft’s planned Brno assembly, while SPD’s own European allies — Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Austria’s Freedom Party — explicitly call for cancellation of the Beneš decrees and have themselves been banned from the assembly. Bernd Posselt, the Sudeten German leader, called the session a “farce.” Mr Babiš had himself planned to attend the assembly as recently as February before he reversed course under SPD pressure. The Czech-German diplomatic cost is real: Mr Macinka had already warned Bavarian officials they “would not enjoy” the event.
Czech defence industry continues its westward integration regardless of the government’s hedging. The state-owned military repair enterprise VOP received a unique Bundeswehr welding certification — a year-long process — enabling it to supply Rheinmetall and KNDS under a seven-year contract; Kolín-based drone maker U&C UAS signed a contract to supply reconnaissance drones to US Army units in Europe; and Czechoslovak Group, led by Michal Strnad, approached Paris and Berlin with a proposal to acquire a stake in tank manufacturer KNDS. Protests organised by Million Moments for Democracy, meanwhile, spread from Prague to Olomouc, Brno, and Hradec Králové — before the main public media legislation has even passed. Mr Babiš acknowledged in a Sunday video that Czech Radio’s international service has already cut a quarter of its staff after the Foreign Ministry reduced its budget support.
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- Czech defence spending push: government moves toward 2% GDP NATO target, army modernisation debated — The Babiš government moved to reach the 2% of GDP NATO defence spending target this year, with Jaromír Zůna, the defence minister, indicating a top-up of roughly CZK 20 billion is needed. Mr Babiš publicly questioned the metric of GDP percentages versus actual military capability (citing Luxembourg’s small army), and the parliament’s defence committee reviewed NATO commitment fulfilment. Separately, plans to create a robotic army battalion at Vyškov and the government’s broader defence modernisation trajectory were reported. (militarnyi.com)
- Czech defence industry expands: Czechoslovak Group seeks KNDS stake, VOP gains NATO welding certification, drone contract with US Army — A cluster of Czech defence industry developments this week: Czechoslovak Group (CSG) approached France and Germany with a proposal to acquire a stake in tank manufacturer KNDS; the state-owned military repair enterprise VOP received a unique German certification enabling it to weld military vehicles for Rheinmetall and prepare for CV90 assembly; and Kolín-based drone maker U&C UAS signed a contract to supply reconnaissance drones to US Army units in Europe. Petr Pavel, the president, also appointed new generals on May 8th. (ft.com)
- Pavel and Babiš reach partial agreement on four ambassador nominations — Petr Pavel and Andrej Babiš agreed on changes to four ambassador nominations from the previous Fiala government’s approved list. Mr Pavel said he respects the new government’s desire to post people it trusts in certain countries, but declined to name the specific posts involved. Ambassador appointments require a presidential signature. (irozhlas.cz)
Notes
Notes
Pavel-Babiš dispute over NATO Ankara summit delegation deepens, constitutional lawsuit threatened
May 10–17, 2026
Coalition parliament passes resolution against Sudeten German assembly in Brno, damaging Czech-German relations
May 11–17, 2026
Public broadcaster media law draws cross-coalition criticism; nationwide protests erupt
May 13–17, 2026
Czech defense spending push: government moves toward 2% GDP NATO target, army modernization debated
May 10–15, 2026
Parliament approves loosened budget rules over opposition criticism, opening path to higher deficits
May 13–17, 2026
French tax investigators close Babiš villa case; national financial prosecutor takes over
May 11–12, 2026
Czech defense industry expands: CSG seeks KNDS stake, VOP gains NATO welding certification, drone contract with US Army
May 10–17, 2026
Babiš halts Czech payments for Ukraine shell procurement pipeline while keeping program running
May 11, 2026
Babiš ousts respected NATO expert from Defense Ministry; Šedivý departure linked to army budget transparency
May 12, 2026
Other
Romania
Romania hosted the most significant NATO summit on its eastern flank in years this week — without a functioning government to share the credit.
The Bucharest Nine (B9)–Nordic summit at Cotroceni Palace on May 13–14 was Nicușor Dan’s most consequential act since taking the presidency. Mr Dan welcomed Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary-general, Volodymyr Zelensky, and all B9 and Nordic heads of state, and produced the first high-level multilateral document to formally adopt the “NATO 3.0” concept — a stronger European pillar within a reinforced transatlantic alliance. The concept had previously appeared only in a single American sub-secretary’s speech in February. All parties except Hungary signed; Budapest issued a “constructive abstention” pending its own government formation. The declaration names Russia the “most significant and direct long-term threat,” condemns Russian hybrid warfare and drone incursions on the eastern flank, calls for urgent air and missile defence expansion, and commits signatories to the 5% GDP defence trajectory agreed at The Hague. Mr Rutte cited US aircraft refuelling at a Romanian airport as evidence that America’s commitment to the alliance remains operational.
The summit brought complications too. European diplomats, citing Mr Dan’s cancellation of the Europe Day ceremony and his critical comments about the EU, have raised questions about his stance toward Brussels. The president addressed this at the summit, reaffirming what he called the “three-pillar formula” — Europe, the United States, NATO. The concern comes from a single source and does not change the overall assessment of Romania’s Western alignment, but it registers at a moment when that alignment is also being contested from within.
Back in Bucharest, the formation contest has calcified into what one outlet called an “almost mathematical” deadlock. The president has inverted the normal constitutional process, requiring parties to demonstrate a parliamentary majority before he names a prime minister candidate — rather than naming a candidate to build one around. Second-round consultations are scheduled for May 18. The arithmetic remains stuck: the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Save Romania Union will not enter any government containing the Social Democratic Party (PSD); the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) will not support any government it does not lead; PSD has no path without one of them. Mr Dan has ruled out AUR in government and ruled out snap elections, leaving a technocrat minority option as the most plausible escape — if anyone can produce the votes for it.
AUR’s position hardened further this week. Dan Dungaciu, the party’s first vice-president, went to Cotroceni with an unambiguous message: AUR will govern only on its own terms. More significantly, Mr Dungaciu named Călin Georgescu — the pro-Russian figure whose presidential candidacy was annulled in 2024 — as a prospective prime minister, subject to Mr Georgescu’s “formal, explicit consent.” “We’re working on that,” Mr Dungaciu said. This is the clearest public signal yet that AUR is preparing to position Mr Georgescu for a governing role. The president’s exclusion of AUR from the executive blocks that for now, but the scenario has moved from speculation to named intention. Mr Georgescu himself praised the no-confidence motion that toppled the previous government, calling it “the first step toward national reconciliation” and crediting George Simion — AUR’s leader — for “organizing this checkmate action with PSD.” Polling by the Center for Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) puts AUR at 32% alone — a figure that previously described the entire far-right bloc combined. The smaller far-right parties are fragmenting into AUR, not away from it.
The most unexpected development of the week came not from AUR but from PNL. The party’s formal leadership insists it will not join a PSD-AUR coalition. Yet PNL senators voted alongside PSD and AUR in the Senate judicial committee to advance legislation modelled on Hungary’s 2017 non-governmental organisation (NGO) transparency law — a tool designed to intimidate civil society organisations. The vote reveals that PNL’s parliamentary faction does not share its leadership’s stated position, at least on this measure. Ciprian Ciucu, the Bucharest sector 6 mayor and a vocal internal critic, separately threatened that a party congress was “inevitable if things continue like this” — publicly naming, for the first time, the mechanism by which PNL’s anti-coalition stance could be reversed. Similar NGO restriction bills were blocked in 2017 and 2018; whether this one clears the full Senate is unclear.
The economy is not improving. Romania holds the highest central bank policy rate in the region — 6.5%, unchanged for a seventh consecutive meeting — while inflation runs at 10.71% and the economy contracts. The central bank’s vice-governor publicly linked the political crisis to economic damage, an unusual acknowledgment from an institution that normally stays clear of formation politics. Standard & Poor’s has not yet followed through on last week’s downgrade warning, but the deepening deadlock and the central bank’s trapped position are precisely the conditions that make that action more likely, not less.
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- National Bank of Romania holds key rate at 6.5% as inflation hits 10.7% and economy contracts — The National Bank of Romania’s board voted on May 15 to hold the policy rate at 6.50% for a seventh consecutive meeting, citing high inflation (10.71% in April, driven by energy and fuel prices) set against a contracting economy and political uncertainty. Cosmin Marinescu, the bank’s vice-governor, warned publicly that the ongoing political crisis is compounding already-weak economic fundamentals. The leu weakened slightly against the dollar in the period.
Notes
Notes
Romania's post-censure government formation reaches deadlock as Cotroceni consultations begin
May 11–17, 2026
B9+Nordic Summit in Bucharest introduces 'NATO 3.0' concept with Zelenski and Rutte attending
May 11–17, 2026
Hungary
Hungary summoned Russia’s ambassador and demanded an explanation for drone strikes on Transcarpathia, the region of western Ukraine where Hungary’s ethnic minority lives — the sharpest break yet with the Orbán era’s deference to Moscow.
Anita Orbán, the foreign minister, told Evgeny Stanislavov, the Russian ambassador, the attacks were “completely unacceptable” and asked publicly when Russia plans to end “this bloody war.” The ambassador left within 30 minutes. Péter Magyar, the prime minister, condemned the strikes. Tamás Sulyok, the president, condemned them independently. The Transcarpathia framing is politically crafted as well as diplomatically significant: framing the condemnation around Hungary’s ethnic minority in Ukraine simultaneously breaks with Moscow and invokes the Trianon solidarity sentiment — a cross-partisan feeling that makes the shift durable at home. On the same day the full cabinet was sworn in, Hungary also lifted its veto blocking new EU sanctions against Israeli settlers, a move that cost nothing domestically and restored goodwill in Brussels. Later in the week, Mr Magyar announced the end of both the six-year COVID emergency and the four-year Ukraine war emergency, dismantling the emergency decrees most often cited as instruments of Orbán-era democratic backsliding. Three moves in five days, each individually low-risk, together confirm a pattern now documented across four consecutive weeks.
The domestic agenda was equally busy, though substance and appearance diverged. Mr Magyar opened the Karmelita Monastery — Orbán’s fortress-like former office — to public tours, dismantled its security fencing, and led journalists through what he called its luxury renovations. He released footage of 15 to 20 sacks of shredded documents alongside campaign materials from the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) found in the basement of the former transport ministry, announcing a criminal complaint for alleged illegal party financing using state resources. He published renovation photos of the Kúria, Hungary’s supreme court, alleging a bar, gilded ceilings, and a presidential suite, and demanded the chief justice, Varga Zs. András, resign. He also fired Bertalan Havasi, Orbán’s long-serving press secretary, via a Saturday gazette notice; Fidesz politicians challenged the legality of the move, an independent fact-check confirmed the firing was valid, and the challenge posts were quietly deleted.
The pattern across all these actions is the same: public exposure of alleged misconduct as pressure for voluntary resignation, rather than formal legal removal. Mr Sulyok — whom 60% of Hungarians in polls want gone — has refused to resign. So has Varga Zs. András. Péter Polt, the prosecutor general, has said nothing. Removing all three requires supermajority votes, court proceedings, or legal action that Mr Magyar’s government has not yet started. What is conspicuously absent in this first full week is legislation: Mr Magyar’s government has submitted no draft bill for accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, announced no public media restructuring, and begun no formal constitutional proceedings against any institutional head. The question that loomed before the government took office remains open: is the communications blitz building toward structural reform, or substituting for it?
One crack appeared in state media without any government instruction. The Hungarian News Agency (MTI) published official photos from which Mr Sulyok had been cropped — after Mr Magyar had ministers block the president from camera lines at the swearing-in ceremony. The head of the Danube Media Service (Duna Médiaszolgáltató), the public broadcaster, ordered an internal investigation. Nobody told the agency to crop the president; editorial staff appear to have anticipated the new government’s preferences and acted on their own. The informal realignment has begun before the formal kind.
The economy meanwhile delivered an early reminder of inherited constraints. The Hungarian National Bank, whose governor Mihály Varga serves until 2031 and cannot be removed by the new government, cut the implicit rate on its FX-swap facility from 5.75% to 5.25%, reversing the forint’s 10% post-election rally and weakening the currency by 0.7% within hours. András Miklós Kármán, the finance minister, had told Parliament that week that the government wanted cheaper borrowing costs, not a weak currency. The central bank moved in the opposite direction anyway. Analysts at MBH Bank now forecast a formal rate-cutting cycle starting in June. The constraint, long identified as a structural risk, has now operated in real time and in basis points.
In his first interview since leaving office, Viktor Orbán told Magyar Nemzet that the past 16 years were Hungary’s “most successful period of the past hundred years.” He acknowledged that only 19% of voters under 40 chose Fidesz — identifying the generational collapse as the decisive defeat — and outlined a rebuilding strategy starting “from the radical fringe inward,” beginning with rural communities and working toward Budapest. A Fidesz congress is set for June 13. The interview confirmed what the structural picture predicted: Mr Orbán intends to run an organised opposition, not retire, and will frame every move by Mr Magyar’s government as unconstitutional persecution.
Other Stories
Other Stories
- Magyar’s Respect and Freedom Party government formally takes office, ending sixteen years of Orbán rule — Péter Magyar was sworn in as prime minister on May 9 and his 16-minister Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) cabinet was formally appointed by Tamás Sulyok, the president, on May 12, marking the first non-Orbán government since 2010. The inauguration featured symbolic gestures including the EU flag returned to parliament, Roma children performing the Roma anthem, and Mr Magyar immediately calling on Mr Sulyok to resign. International coverage was extensive, with the Guardian editorial and Reuters framing it as a democratic-renewal test case for Europe. (apnews.com)
- Magyar alleges luxury Kúria renovation and demands supreme court chief resign — Péter Magyar, the prime minister, released photos of the Kúria, Hungary’s supreme court, renovation — claiming it features a bar, gilded ceilings, and a presidential suite — and called for the chief justice, Varga Zs. András, to resign. The Kúria denied the claims in a press release, and the Hungarian Judges’ Association responded with photos of underfunded ordinary courts. The Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) accused Mr Magyar of unconstitutionally attempting to subordinate the independent judiciary. (telex.hu)
- Orbán severance pay blocked; former ministers’ payouts redirected to Ukrainian orphanage — Péter Magyar, the prime minister, announced that former ministers and Viktor Orbán would not receive their legally mandated severance payments. Mr Orbán pre-empted this by announcing he would donate his 38.8 million forint entitlement to a Hungarian children’s home in Transcarpathia, Ukraine. Mr Magyar accepted and asked Mr Orbán to also persuade Bertalan Havasi to forgo his payout. Multiple domestic and international outlets covered the dispute, which also touched on whether Mr Magyar’s government could legally block the payments. (telex.hu)
- Hungary’s central bank cuts implicit rate; forint retreats after post-election rally; credit agencies review ratings — The Hungarian National Bank, under governor Mihály Varga, cut the implicit rate via an FX-swap facility adjustment, signalling that the post-election forint surge had become too strong for Hungarian exporters. The forint had strengthened sharply after the Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) election win but retreated after the bank’s move. Analysts at MBH Bank forecast a formal rate-cutting cycle starting in June. Separately, S&P and Fitch were both scheduled to review Hungary’s sovereign rating, with Fitch noting the economy has stagnated since 2023. The bank also awarded the Lámfalussy Prize to the Polish central bank governor at its annual conference. (vg.hu)
- Hungary moves to unlock €10.4 billion in frozen EU funds before August deadline; lifts Israel veto — EU officials said Hungary could still meet the August 31 deadline to qualify for €10.4 billion in frozen pandemic recovery funds if it enacts required rule-of-law reforms quickly. On the day Mr Magyar took office, Hungary lifted the veto that had blocked new EU sanctions against Israeli settlers; the EU approved its first new Israel-related sanctions package as a result. The Guardian and the Washington Post both tied the EU funds opportunity to Mr Magyar’s reform agenda.
Notes
Notes
Magyar demands President Sulyok resign; photo-exclusion incident triggers national debate
May 12–17, 2026
Magyar fires Orbán's former press chief Havasi; legal dispute over dismissal's validity erupts
May 16–17, 2026
Magyar opens Karmelita and government buildings to public, removes iconic security fencing
May 12–17, 2026
Shredded documents and Fidesz campaign materials found in former transport ministry basement
May 17, 2026
Orbán gives first interviews as opposition leader; forint and fiscal data dominate his messaging
May 13–17, 2026
Orbán severance pay blocked; former ministers' payouts redirected to Ukrainian orphanage
May 15–17, 2026
MNB executes implicit rate cut, forint weakens after post-election rally; credit agencies review Hungary
May 13–17, 2026
Hungary summons Russian ambassador over massive Ukraine drone attack near its border
May 13–14, 2026
Hungary races to unlock €10.4 billion in frozen EU funds before August deadline; lifts Israel veto