Regional Summary
The Double Game Breaks Cover The week’s most revealing disclosures were not battlefield reports but receipts. Saudi Arabia struck Iranian territory in late March; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) destroyed Iran’s Lavan Island refinery in April; both were simultaneously signing partnership agreements in European capitals and calling Tehran to discuss mediation. Across the Near East and South Asia, the defining pattern of this war has been the double game — covert action wrapped in public restraint. This week, the wrapping came off. The UAE is the most exposed. For six weeks, analysts had placed it in a passive defence posture; those assessments were wrong. French Mirage jets and Chinese drones from the UAE’s own inventory hit Lavan in early April, destroying most of its refining capacity. Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, disclosed this week a secret visit to Abu Dhabi on March 26, saying he met Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE’s president, at Al-Ain and called it “a historic breakthrough.” The UAE Foreign Ministry declared the claim “entirely unfounded.” Flight-tracking data corroborated two business jets travelling Tel Aviv–Al-Ain and back the same day; multiple sources confirmed the meeting happened. The denial collapsed within days. Iran’s answer arrived on May 17: a drone breached the perimeter of the Barakah nuclear plant, struck a generator, and started a fire — the first strike on a nuclear facility in this conflict. Abdullah bin Zayed, the UAE’s foreign minister, called Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to report it and invoked the UAE’s “full right to respond.” Mr Abdullah then called Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, and other Gulf leaders, arguing for coordinated offensive action. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar refused. The UAE is the most hawkish state in the Gulf and, on offensive action, the most isolated. Saudi Arabia ran the same dual strategy with more discipline. Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, toured European capitals signing partnership agreements — councils with Spain and Greece, a joint statement with Britain rejecting Hormuz as a pressure tool — while covert strikes hit Iranian soil and militia positions in Iraq. Riyadh’s preferred image, responsible actor rather than hidden combatant, is not false; it is partial. The domestic reorganisation made the wartime footing visible. On May 15, King Salman appointed Prince Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Muqrin as acting deputy minister of the National Guard and simultaneously as special adviser to the monarch — a dual title that creates a direct line to the king bypassing the ministry layer, unusual enough to signal wartime purpose. Saudi Aramco, meanwhile, reported first-quarter net income of roughly $33.6 billion, a 26% rise driven by the Hormuz closure, while carrying out $35 billion in sale-leaseback deals on real estate, including the Dhahran headquarters campus. The kingdom is selling the institutional heart of the oil state to fund both the war and what comes after it. The would-be brokers have not kept cleaner hands. The American president, speaking from Air Force One, credited Field Marshal Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, by name for the Iran ceasefire, calling it done “as a favour to Pakistan.” But American officials were simultaneously briefing CBS News that Iran had parked military aircraft, including a reconnaissance variant of the RC-130, at Pakistan’s Nur Khan air base during the conflict — potentially shielding them from American strikes. The administration’s public praise and its private briefings pull in opposite directions. India’s position is no cleaner. S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, hosted BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) foreign ministers in New Delhi on May 14 and 15, with both Iran and the UAE in the room; no joint statement emerged. The following day, Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, flew to Abu Dhabi, signed a defence partnership with the UAE covering maritime security and cyberdefence, and condemned attacks on UAE territory. The approach that produced the Abu Dhabi pact is the same one that made BRICS consensus impossible. Turkey has been the most adept practitioner of the double game and the least exposed. Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, flew to Doha, called Tehran, and inserted Ankara into both sides of the American-Iran talks in a single week — gathering real intelligence on negotiating positions, not relaying pleasantries. But the week’s most striking document came not from the foreign ministry. The Central Bank of Turkey published a working paper finding that the March 2025 political operation against Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s mayor — described in the paper only as “the March 2025 operation,” never by name — generated a foreign-exchange shock comparable to the Iran war. A state institution formally tallied what no official would say aloud: jailing the opposition’s presidential candidate cost the economy roughly as much as a regional conflict. The indirect framing — institutional honesty constrained by political caution — captures the logic of the double game applied inward. Across the region, the same logic holds: the costs are being recorded somewhere, even when they cannot be named, and the gap between the record and the public account will not hold indefinitely.Country Summaries
Turkey
Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, had his busiest diplomatic week in the period, flying to Doha, calling Tehran, and inserting Turkey into the US-Iran negotiations from both sides at once.
In Doha, Mr Fidan met Qatar’s emir and prime minister, warned at a joint press conference that “the alternative to the ceasefire is renewed war,” and offered Turkish participation in Hormuz maritime security — but only if a diplomatic deal was in place first. In an Al Jazeera interview he called Israel “the elephant in the room,” pushed for US-Iran talks, and described Turkey’s approach as rejecting “hegemony” in favour of regional cooperation. Turkey-Qatar coordination, he said, is “result-oriented” and works mostly out of public view. On May 17, he called Iran’s foreign minister to discuss where the US-Iran talks stand — the second documented contact with Tehran in less than a week. His statement that he saw “sufficient will and intention on both sides to stop the war” suggests Turkey is gathering real intelligence on negotiating positions, not merely relaying diplomatic pleasantries.
The most unexpected development of the week came not from the foreign ministry but from the central bank. The Central Bank of Turkey published its Q2 2026 Inflation Report, revising its interim 2026 target upward by 50% — from 16% to 24% — and its year-end forecast by 44%, from 18% to 26%. For the first time, it dropped its forecast range entirely, citing uncertainty it compared to major crisis periods. The oil price assumption jumped from $60.9 to $89.4 per barrel; food inflation from 19% to 26.3%. Fatih Karahan, the central bank governor, delivered the news with an explicit hawkish commitment: “If there is a significant and permanent deterioration in the inflation outlook, monetary policy will be tightened.” Deutsche Bank called the report “more realistic.”
But the report was not the most striking product the central bank circulated this week. A technical working paper — without naming Ekrem İmamoğlu — found that the foreign-exchange demand shock from the March 2025 political operation against Mr İmamoğlu was statistically comparable to the shock generated by the Iran war. The paper used the same analytical framework for both events, making no explicit political attribution, but its implication is unmistakable: a state institution has formally documented that jailing the opposition’s presidential candidate cost the Turkish economy roughly as much as a regional war. The indirect framing — “the March 2025 operation” rather than the man’s name — is itself telling: institutional honesty constrained by political caution.
The prosecution of Mr İmamoğlu ground on, but cracks appeared in its machinery. Istanbul prosecutors arrested 12 more people in a new wave targeting the Istanbul municipality’s road maintenance and IT units. At the espionage trial’s May 11–12 hearing, Mr İmamoğlu described the charges as “absurd,” “shameful,” and “inexplicable by law, reason, or conscience,” demanding the intelligence services produce a single document showing actual espionage. All four defendants — Mr İmamoğlu, his campaign director Necati Özkan, journalist Merdan Yanardağ, and businessman Hüseyin Gün — rejected all charges; the court extended detention for all of them. Yet government-proximate reporting acknowledged that Mr Gün failed to implicate Mr İmamoğlu as expected, and Özgür Özel, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), speaking at the party’s 109th consecutive rally in Balıkesir, said cooperation witnesses are retracting statements one by one — citing one named witness who alleged he was handed pre-written statements implicating Mr İmamoğlu in exchange for his freedom.
Mr Özel used the Balıkesir rally — described as the city’s largest-ever political gathering — to signal that CHP is no longer betting everything on Mr İmamoğlu’s release. “Ekrem İmamoğlu is in prison,” he said. “They may not release him. In that case, we have other candidates.” He called for simultaneous general and local elections. The sharpest moment came from Ahmet Akın, the Balıkesir mayor whom the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had reportedly been targeting for defection. At CHP’s own rally, Mr Akın reaffirmed his party membership: “From Atatürk’s CHP I will not separate. I’m saying this plainly and openly to everyone.” AKP had signalled that further mayoral defections were coming; it got a public repudiation at the opposition’s event instead.
Within the ruling coalition, a youth festival at Kocaeli stadium generated its own trouble. Islamist conservative figures — including a writer at the pro-government Yeni Şafak — criticized the dancing content; one voice from the religious right asked how a party that “set out to raise an Islamic generation ended up raising a secular one.” Cabinet ministers simultaneously launched a coordinated “İyi ki Erdoğan” (Thank goodness for Erdoğan) social media campaign. Such campaigns signal anxiety more than confidence. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech at the event focused on the Kurdish peace process — framed as “Terror-Free Turkey” — but the Iran war has brought that process to a near-standstill, Reuters confirmed this week; it broke out two weeks after parliament issued Kurdish peace recommendations. A pro-government outlet claimed Turkey’s intelligence service is in active contact with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership in Kandil, seeking a disarmament plan within ten days; AKP sources confirmed talks continue but declined to confirm the Kandil contact. The claim originated in a single AKP-proximate source and cannot be verified.
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- Erdoğan attends Organization of Turkic States informal summit in Kazakhstan, calls for Turkic world tech cooperation amid Hormuz crisis — Recep Tayyip Erdoğan traveled to Türkistan, Kazakhstan for the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (May 13-15), where he called for deeper cooperation in technology, AI, defence industry, and the ‘Common Corridor’ transport route, citing the Hormuz Strait crisis as evidence of the strategic value of alternative Eurasian corridors. He met bilaterally with Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan’s president, on the sidelines and addressed the presence of Turkish Cypriots at the summit.
Notes
Notes
İmamoğlu prosecution deepens: new IBB arrests, espionage trial proceeds, TCMB paper quantifies economic shock
May 10–17, 2026
TCMB releases revised inflation report raising 2026 interim target from 16% to 24%, signals no rate cuts
May 12–17, 2026
MİT dismantles 9-person spy network working for two foreign intelligence services; 7 arrested in 4-city operation
May 15–17, 2026
Foreign Minister Fidan conducts intensive Iran-war diplomacy: Qatar visit, Hormuz calls, Al Jazeera interview
May 10–17, 2026
CHP holds 109th 'Millet İradesine Sahip Çıkıyor' rally in Balıkesir; Özel calls for snap elections
May 14–17, 2026
PKK peace process stalls after Iran war outbreak; MİT contacts Kandil, security report expected within 10 days
May 13–17, 2026
AKP holds Kocaeli youth festival with Erdoğan; 'İyi ki Erdoğan' cabinet hashtag campaign triggers internal and opposition controversy
May 15–17, 2026
Erdoğan attends Turkish States Organization informal summit in Kazakhstan, calls for Turkic world tech cooperation amid Hormuz crisis
May 14, 2026
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia launched covert airstrikes on Iranian territory in late March — the first known direct Saudi military action on Iranian soil — settling months of uncertainty over whether the kingdom was managing the conflict as a broker or fighting it as a belligerent.
The strikes, disclosed this week by Reuters citing Western and Iranian officials, hit Iran directly and separately targeted Iranian-backed Shia militia positions in Iraq. The New York Times added that the UAE conducted parallel secret operations. Neither Saudi nor Iranian officials confirmed the reports. More striking is what Saudi Arabia was doing publicly at the same time: Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, was touring European capitals, signing partnership agreements, and telephoning his Iranian counterpart to discuss mediation. The covert strikes and the diplomatic handshakes are not contradictions — they are two tracks of the same strategy, military action taken quietly while public restraint is carefully maintained. A senior Saudi royal told Middle East Eye that Saudi conduct had prevented Israel from plunging the region into ruin — the image Riyadh wants projected is that of the responsible actor, not a hidden combatant.
The European tour delivered results. Saudi Arabia and Spain signed a Strategic Partnership Council agreement and a visa exemption deal in Madrid; Saudi Arabia and Greece co-chaired a strategic partnership council in Athens; a UK-Saudi joint statement rejected the use of Hormuz as a pressure tool. Prince Faisal also held calls with counterparts in Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the UAE, and Egypt, and met the US special envoy for Syria in Riyadh. His calls with Tehran now carry a different weight: they are the diplomatic track of a state that is simultaneously striking Iran, not the gestures of a passive broker.
The kingdom has also been reorganising at home. King Salman issued seven royal decrees on May 15, the most consequential being the appointment of Prince Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Muqrin as acting deputy minister of the National Guard and special adviser to the monarch. The dual title creates a direct line to the king that bypasses the ministry layer — atypical enough to signal wartime purpose. The decree came 14 days after an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps attempt to infiltrate Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island on May 1, following an emergency Gulf Co-operation Council interior ministers’ meeting. The Al-Muqrin family’s 60-year relationship with the National Guard gives the appointment tribal legitimacy alongside its operational logic. Bloomberg separately reported that Pakistan has signalled Turkey and Qatar may join the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence agreement signed last September — a development that, if confirmed, would mark the first multi-member Arab-Pakistani security architecture; the report is paywalled and uncorroborated.
Saudi Arabia is also building influence in Yemen through a different kind of proxy. Middle East Eye reports that Saudi-backed Salafi commanders, organised through the National Shield Forces established in 2023, have displaced UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council influence across Hadhramout, Shabwa, Abyan, and into Aden. Salafi military doctrine, which emphasises obedience to legitimate political authority, makes these commanders reliably loyal to Riyadh in ways UAE-aligned factions are not. The shift is a direct expression of the Saudi-UAE rivalry playing out in Yemen’s military reorganisation.
Aramco reported Q1 net income of roughly $33.6 billion, a 26% rise year-on-year, driven by the Hormuz closure. But the company is simultaneously carrying out the most ambitious asset sales in its 93-year history: $35 billion in sale-leaseback deals covering real estate — including the Dhahran headquarters campus — plus minority stakes in midstream and downstream facilities, and a separate $10 billion from its broader property portfolio. Aramco is selling and leasing back the institutional heart of the oil state to unlock capital. Amin Nasser, the chief executive, warned the oil market has already lost more than 1 billion barrels from the Hormuz disruption, that gasoline and jet fuel inventories are reaching critically low levels, and that the market may not normalise until 2027. He confirmed the East-West pipeline is already running at its 7 million barrel-per-day limit and that Aramco could reach 12 million barrels per day capacity within three weeks if required.
The Vision 2030 megaproject failures continued. The Mukaab — the $50 billion cube structure that was to be the centrepiece of the New Murabba development in Riyadh — has been suspended after initial excavation work, with budget constraints from cost overruns and war-related financial pressure cited as the cause. Faisal al-Ibrahim, the economy minister, publicly acknowledged that multiple projects had been modified, delayed, or redefined — an unusual admission. The Mukaab joins The Line as a second flagship project halted indefinitely, confirming the pattern is systemic. The Public Investment Fund, adjusting its portfolio, stepped away from LIV Golf and signed as an official FIFA World Cup 2026 tournament supporter: a shift from a loss-leader investment toward partnerships with clearer returns.
A Paris investigating magistrate accepted complaints this week from three rights organisations against Mohammed bin Salman for torture and enforced disappearances related to the 2018 Khashoggi killing, after a French court of appeal overruled years of prosecutor opposition on admissibility. French jurisdiction rests on a 2022 visit. The investigation puts Mr bin Salman at legal risk in a Western European jurisdiction and may limit future French travel. It will have no domestic political impact.
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- Saudi foreign minister conducts intensive diplomatic tour across Europe and Gulf amid Iran war diplomacy — Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the foreign minister, conducted a high-tempo diplomatic campaign this week, including bilateral meetings in London (with Yvette Cooper, the UK foreign minister), Madrid (where he signed a Saudi-Spanish Strategic Partnership Council memorandum of understanding and visa exemption agreement), and Athens (where he co-chaired a Saudi-Greek strategic partnership council). He held phone calls with counterparts in Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the UAE, and Egypt focused on the US-Iran conflict, Hormuz shipping, and de-escalation efforts. He also met Tom Barrack, the US special envoy for Syria, in Riyadh. (english.aawsat.com)
- Aramco Q1 profits surge 25% as Hormuz closure triggers historic oil supply shock — Saudi Aramco reported a 25-26% jump in Q1 2026 net income to approximately $33.6 billion, as the Strait of Hormuz closure drove oil prices higher and expanded refining margins. Amin Nasser, the chief executive, warned the oil market has lost more than 1 billion barrels due to Hormuz disruptions, that gasoline and jet fuel inventories are reaching critically low levels, and that market normalisation may not occur until 2027 if disruptions persist. Aramco ramped its East-West pipeline to full capacity of 7 million barrels a day to reroute exports. (cnbc.com)
- Cambridge University’s Judge Business School seeks memorandum of understanding with Saudi Defence Ministry despite human rights objections — Cambridge University’s Judge Business School sought approval for a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence to provide leadership development and innovation management training, introduced via the UK Ministry of Defence. Senior Cambridge academics described the proposal as ‘horrifying.’ A follow-up Guardian report revealed families of Saudi scholars facing the death penalty are urging Cambridge to cancel the plans, adding to institutional reputational pressure. (theguardian.com)
- Saudi aid agency expands Yemen humanitarian operations across health, education, and demining — Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief) launched several Yemen initiatives this week: Project Masam removed 839 landmines in the first week of May; an educational recovery project was launched in Aden, Lahij, and Taiz targeting 18,000+ students; a volunteer heart surgery camp funded 120 cardiac procedures in Mukalla; and KSrelief expanded cholera response, market and school rehabilitation projects. Saudi-backed Salafi military commanders are also reported to be gaining influence in Yemen’s restructuring army. (arabnews.com)
- Saudi-UAE rivalry deepens as both nations pursue competing regional hegemon strategies — Analysis pieces this week highlighted growing fractures between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, longtime allies whose close relationship under MBS and MBZ has frayed. Disagreements span Yemen (competing proxies), economic competition, and divergent postures toward Iran and Israel during the war. Gulf policy analysts warned the US against picking sides in the rivalry. (lanacion.com.ar)
- Saudi crown prince and UAE president discuss regional crisis in phone call — Mohammed bin Salman held a phone conversation with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the UAE’s president, to discuss regional developments and trilateral co-operation. The call was reported alongside a separate call between Mr Trump and Sheikh Mohamed, reflecting intensive Gulf-US co-ordination during the Iran war period. (arabnews.pk)
- Hajj 2026 underway with over 860,000 foreign pilgrims arrived as of mid-week — Saudi Arabia’s Hajj minister reported that more than 860,000 foreign pilgrims had arrived in the kingdom by mid-week for the 2026 Hajj season, with the government mobilising extensive logistical, transport, and digital operations. The minister attributed preparations to directives from King Salman and Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince. (saudigazette.com.sa)
- Wife of British-Saudi detainee Ahmed al-Doush appeals for release as health declines — The wife of Ahmed al-Doush, a British national imprisoned in Saudi Arabia since 2024 for social media posts, publicly appealed for his release as his health reportedly deteriorates sharply. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published a report in March 2026 recommending his release, but Saudi Arabia in April confirmed his conviction, reducing his sentence while describing the posts as terrorist-related content. (theguardian.com)
- Electronic Frontier Foundation launches campaign for imprisoned Saudi Wikipedian Osama Khalid — The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) launched a campaign for Osama Khalid, a Saudi Arabian Wikipedia contributor and blogger imprisoned for his writing on Saudi Arabia, open-source technology, and other topics. The foundation described the case as emblematic of the kingdom’s pattern of jailing online speech. (eff.org)
- Crown prince receives delegation honouring King Salman’s 60-plus years of Quran memorisation patronage — Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, received a delegation honouring King Salman for his more than 60 years of support for Holy Quran memorisation associations across the kingdom. The delegation presented gifts including a luxury shield, a handwritten Quran copy, and commemorative plaques. (english.aawsat.com)
- Saudi deputy foreign minister attends Uganda presidential inauguration on behalf of crown prince — Waleed al-Kheraiji, the deputy foreign minister, attended the inauguration of Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s president, in Kampala on behalf of Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince. During the ceremony, Mr al-Kheraiji conveyed congratulations from King Salman and the crown prince. (saudigazette.com.sa)
Notes
Notes
Reuters exclusive: Saudi Air Force conducted covert retaliatory strikes on Iran in late March
May 11–15, 2026
Saudi FM conducts intensive diplomatic tour across Europe and Gulf amid Iran war diplomacy
May 11–17, 2026
Aramco launches most ambitious asset monetization plan in company history, targeting \$35 billion
May 13–17, 2026
PIF named FIFA World Cup 2026 official supporter as it simultaneously exits LIV Golf funding
May 12–17, 2026
French court opens judicial investigation into MBS over Khashoggi killing following rights groups' complaint
May 16–17, 2026
Cambridge University's Judge Business School seeks MoU with Saudi Defense Ministry despite human rights objections
May 11–17, 2026
KSrelief expands Yemen humanitarian operations across health, education, and demining
May 11–16, 2026
Saudi-Pakistani defense pact may expand to include Turkey and Qatar amid Iran war security realignment
May 12–13, 2026
Saudi-UAE rivalry deepens as both nations pursue competing regional hegemon strategies
May 12–17, 2026
King Salman issues seven royal decrees reshuffling deputy-level posts including National Guard
May 13–14, 2026
Saudi Arabia suspends construction of Mukaab mega-project in Riyadh amid financial pressures
May 13–16, 2026
MBS receives delegation honoring King Salman's 60+ years of Quran memorization patronage
May 13, 2026
Other
United Arab Emirates
UAE spent weeks absorbing Iranian missiles in silence, insisting it would not retaliate — but it already had. The Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, and Reuters all confirmed this week that UAE struck Iran’s Lavan Island oil refinery in early April, destroying most of its refining capacity, using French Mirage jets and Chinese Wing Loong drones from its own inventory. UAE never publicly claimed the strikes. Six weeks of desk assessments describing a “passive defense posture” were wrong.
That covert strike reframes everything that followed. Iran’s response came on May 17: a drone breached the perimeter of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in Al Dhafra, struck an electrical generator, and started a fire. Two other drones were intercepted; this one got through. No radiation was released and no one was hurt, but Barakah generates roughly 25% of UAE’s electricity, and no nuclear plant in this conflict had been targeted before. Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister, called Rafael Grossi, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s director-general, to report the strike and assert UAE’s “full right to respond to terrorist attacks.” The American president warned Iran the “clock is ticking.” UAE’s government issued a broader statement invoking “full sovereign, legal, diplomatic, and military rights to address any threat or hostile act.”
The Lavan revelation also exposed how deep the UAE-Israel relationship ran during the war. Binyamin Netanyahu this week disclosed that he had secretly visited UAE and met Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE president, in Al-Ain on March 26, calling it a “historic breakthrough.” The UAE Foreign Ministry declared the claim “entirely unfounded.” Multiple Israeli and Arab sources confirmed the meeting happened; flight-tracking data corroborated two business jets travelling Tel Aviv–Al-Ain and back the same day. One detail, confirmed by multiple sources, stands out: Mr bin Zayed reportedly drove Mr Netanyahu himself from the plane to the palace. The chief of staff of Israel’s Defence Forces, the Mossad director — at least twice, for “coordination about the war” — and the Shin Bet chief all made separate covert visits to Abu Dhabi. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, said the disclosure confirmed what Iranian security services had long told their leaders: the collusion was “unforgivable,” and those responsible would be “held to account.”
UAE’s flat denial of a documented meeting captures how it has operated throughout: maximum operational integration with Israel, zero public acknowledgment. That posture is now under strain. The denial was contradicted by independent reporting within days of being issued, and Iran’s formal accusation that UAE is an “active partner” in the war strips away any remaining claim to neutrality — at least in Tehran’s view.
Having struck Iran covertly, UAE then sought support for a collective Gulf response. Mr bin Zayed called Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, and other Gulf leaders, arguing for coordinated offensive military action. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar refused. The conflict, they said, was “not their war.” Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador, published a justification of Riyadh’s restraint in Arab News, warning that joining UAE’s offensive would destroy oil facilities, desalination plants, and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plans. The refusal reveals the precise floor of Gulf Co-operation Council solidarity: Riyadh will condemn Iranian attacks on UAE territory; it will not fight alongside UAE against Iran. UAE is the most hawkish state in the Gulf and, on offensive action, the most isolated.
Even as the fighting continued, UAE moved fast to insulate its economy. Narendra Modi stopped in Abu Dhabi on May 15 for a two-to-three-hour visit that produced seven agreements. The most consequential: the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) will store up to 30 million barrels of crude in India’s underground petroleum reserve caverns in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, giving UAE a supply hedge if Hormuz operations are disrupted. The two countries also signed a defence agreement covering manufacturing, maritime security, and cyber cooperation — the deepest partnership UAE has concluded outside its relationships with the US and France. G42, the UAE’s AI and technology conglomerate, agreed a term sheet with India’s Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) for an 8-exaflop supercomputer cluster. Total UAE investment in the package: $5 billion.
That same week, Khaled bin Mohamed, the Abu Dhabi crown prince, chaired an ADNOC board meeting and ordered the West-East pipeline accelerated to more than 3 million barrels per day of Hormuz-bypass export capacity by 2027, up from roughly 1.5 to 1.8 million today. Even at that level the pipeline covers a fraction of normal Hormuz throughput — the geographic constraint cannot be eliminated, only reduced. Together, the India storage deal and the pipeline acceleration address the same problem: keeping UAE oil revenue flowing if the strait closes.
Separately, Mubadala Energy took a final investment decision on the Commonwealth liquefied-natural-gas export facility in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, closing $9.75 billion in project financing for a total commitment of $21.25 billion. The facility’s 9.5 million tonnes per year of capacity will serve long-term buyers including Aramco Trading, Saudi Arabia’s commercial oil arm — a commercial relationship that has outlasted the political tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The facility is due to start operations in 2030.
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- Netanyahu claims secret wartime visit to UAE; Abu Dhabi denies, Israel’s security chiefs also said to have visited — Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office announced that Binyamin Netanyahu secretly visited the UAE and met Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE president, in Al-Ain on March 26 during Operation Roaring Lion, calling it a ‘historic breakthrough.’ The UAE Foreign Ministry immediately denied any such visit took place, while multiple Israeli and Arab sources subsequently confirmed the meeting occurred. Reports then emerged that the chief of staff of Israel’s Defence Forces, the Mossad director, and the Shin Bet chief also made covert visits to Abu Dhabi during the conflict, further exposing deep wartime UAE-Israel intelligence and defence cooperation. (cbsnews.com)
- Mubadala invests $325M in world’s largest offshore wind farm, Hornsea 3 — Mubadala Investment Company announced a $325 million investment in Ørsted’s Hornsea 3 offshore wind project in the UK, joining an Apollo-managed consortium. Once completed, the 2.9-gigawatt facility will be the world’s largest offshore wind farm, expected to power more than 3.3 million UK homes. The investment extends Mubadala’s growing global renewable energy portfolio.
Notes
Notes
Drone strikes UAE's Barakah nuclear power plant, triggering fire and raising ceasefire alarm
May 16–17, 2026
Netanyahu claims secret wartime visit to UAE; Abu Dhabi denies, Israel's security chiefs also said to have visited
May 13–16, 2026
PM Modi's Abu Dhabi stopover yields defence pact, \$5B investment, and ADNOC energy deals
May 13–17, 2026
UAE secretly struck Iran's Lavan Island refinery; tried and failed to rally Gulf states for coordinated military response
May 11–17, 2026
ADNOC ordered to fast-track West-East Pipeline to double Hormuz-bypass export capacity by 2027
May 11–17, 2026
Mubadala Energy takes final investment decision on \$13B Commonwealth LNG project in Louisiana
May 14–15, 2026
India
India chaired its first major BRICS test of 2026 and could not produce a joint statement — not through procedural failure, but because two of its members, Iran and the UAE, are at war, and India spent the same week signing a defence pact with one of them.
The BRICS foreign ministers met at Bharat Mandapam on May 14 and 15. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, pushed for BRICS to condemn US and Israeli “unlawful aggression”; Iran’s deputy foreign minister said afterwards that “one member country” pushed back with language condemning Iran instead. S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister and the meeting’s host, called for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and zero tolerance on terrorism — language careful enough to offend neither side, but not careful enough to bridge the gap. No joint statement was issued. Mr Jaishankar discussed crude oil imports with Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, ahead of the expiry of a US sanctions waiver, and met separately with Mr Araghchi, who assured him of maritime safety through Hormuz. Ajit Doval, the national security adviser, met Mr Araghchi separately. Only the bilateral sidelines produced results.
Why the BRICS meeting had failed became clear the following day. Narendra Modi flew to Abu Dhabi and signed a strategic defence partnership with the UAE — covering maritime security and cyberdefence — alongside agreements with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for petroleum storage of up to 30 million barrels at Fujairah, liquefied petroleum gas supply deals, and a $5 billion UAE investment commitment in Indian infrastructure. Mr Modi condemned attacks on the UAE and called for an open Strait of Hormuz. The Fujairah storage arrangement is more than a diplomatic gesture: the facility sits outside the Hormuz chokepoint, giving India reserve access even if Iranian forces restrict the strait. India’s domestic strategic petroleum reserves cover only around ten days of imports; this deal partly fills that gap. But it also means India has committed to formal defence ties with the UAE at the exact moment Iran — also a BRICS member — is in active conflict with it. The approach that produced the UAE pact is the same one that made BRICS consensus impossible.
Even as India managed the Gulf crisis, it was extending its reach in Europe. In the Netherlands, Mr Modi announced a strategic partnership that included a deal between Tata Electronics and ASML — the Dutch company whose lithography machines are the most tightly export-controlled technology in semiconductor manufacturing. ASML’s chief executive said the company would “establish and ramp up” production at Tata’s $11 billion semiconductor fab in Dholera, Gujarat. The commitment marks a genuine shift in India’s technology access, not a symbolic one. In Sweden, Mr Modi raised bilateral ties to a strategic partnership, launched a technology and AI corridor, and addressed a European industry roundtable alongside Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president — the closest India-EU industry engagement yet.
The week’s most painful adjustment came at home. State fuel retailers raised petrol and diesel by 3 rupees per litre on May 15 — the first retail price increase in four years. Analysts and the opposition noted prices had been held down during state election campaigns; the hike came days after the West Bengal results. Retailers had been absorbing losses of roughly 100 rupees per litre on diesel and 20 rupees on petrol since the war began. The Reserve Bank of India’s governor said further hikes may be needed. The BBC and Nomura independently quantified the broader damage: India’s foreign exchange reserves had fallen $38 billion since the Iran war began, from $690 billion, with Nomura projecting the fiscal deficit at 4.6% of GDP by March 2027. The government also restricted silver imports and raised duties on both silver and gold to 15%, capping duty-free gold imports for jewellers at 100 kg. Rahul Gandhi and Mallikarjun Kharge of the Indian National Congress, and Akhilesh Yadav of the Samajwadi Party, all condemned the hike. The opposition now has a concrete price-based grievance, sharper than anything it has held since the farm laws.
The US Justice Department moved to drop criminal fraud charges against Gautam Adani, filed in November 2024 over an alleged $265 million solar energy bribery scheme. Mr Adani hired Robert Giuffra, the American president’s personal lawyer, and pledged $10 billion in US investment; multiple outlets described an unusual April meeting at which the pledge was presented to Justice Department officials. Mr Adani and his nephew Sagar Adani also settled a civil fraud suit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission for $18 million, without admitting wrongdoing. Whether the Indian government facilitated the arrangement cannot be assessed from what has been reported. What can be assessed is the effect: the Justice Department’s move removes the opposition’s most internationally credible line of attack on the Bharatiya Janata Party’s corporate ties, at the same moment the fuel hike hands them a new domestic one.
India’s military posture generated no new action but considerable noise. General Upendra Dwivedi, the army chief, warned on May 16 that Pakistan must decide whether it wants to be “part of geography or history” if it continues supporting terrorism; General Anil Chauhan, the chief of defence staff, said Indian forces had “dominated every ladder of escalation” during Operation Sindoor. Pakistan’s military called General Dwivedi’s remarks “madness and warmongering.” Both statements fell in the first-anniversary week of Sindoor’s launch and carried no operational announcement — the doctrine itself signals intent. On a separate front, the Narcotics Control Bureau seized 227.7 kg of Captagon worth ₹182 crore — India’s first seizure of the drug — arresting a Syrian national whose consignment was concealed in a commercial machine destined for Saudi Arabia. The find reveals a West Asia drug-transit route running through India: a new link between the regional war’s disruption and criminal networks operating on Indian territory.
Other Stories
Other Stories
- Modi’s five-nation tour — Sweden stop: strategic partnership, Polar Star honour, EU industry engagement — Modi arrived in Sweden on May 17 for the third leg of his tour, upgrading India-Sweden relations to a strategic partnership and endorsing a joint action plan (2026–2030) on green transition, emerging technology, trade, security and defence. Modi was awarded Sweden’s Royal Order of the Polar Star, his 31st international honour. He addressed the European Round Table for Industry alongside Sweden’s prime minister and Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president. (hindustantimes.com)
- India hikes fuel prices 3 rupees per litre, imposes gold and silver import restrictions amid Iran war economic squeeze — India’s state-run fuel retailers raised petrol and diesel prices by 3 rupees per litre on May 15 for the first time in four years, reflecting the economic strain from the Strait of Hormuz disruption. The government separately restricted silver imports and capped duty-free gold imports for jewellers. Modi, who had already appealed to citizens to adopt austerity measures including working from home and reducing foreign travel, denied reports of a foreign travel tax. The rupee hit a record low against the dollar and the Reserve Bank of India’s governor acknowledged further hikes may be needed. (aljazeera.com)
- US Justice Department moves to drop criminal fraud charges against Gautam Adani; civil fraud case settled for $18 million — The US Justice Department is close to dropping criminal fraud charges against Gautam Adani filed in November 2024 over an alleged $265 million bribery scheme, after Adani hired a new legal team led by Robert Giuffra, the American president’s personal lawyer, and pledged $10 billion in US investment. In parallel, Adani and his nephew Sagar Adani agreed to settle the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil fraud suit for $18 million without admitting wrongdoing. Multiple sources described an unusual Justice Department meeting in April at which the investment pledge was presented. (reuters.com)
- Amit Shah launches anti-narcotics push at Research and Analysis Wing memorial lecture, announces first Captagon seizure — Home Minister Amit Shah delivered the R.N. Kao Memorial Lecture at the Research and Analysis Wing on May 16, calling for a global war on drugs, uniform international laws, and real-time intelligence sharing to combat narco-terrorism. He set a goal of a ‘Drug-Free India by 2047.’ Separately, he announced that the Narcotics Control Bureau seized India’s first-ever Captagon (‘Jihadi Drug’) consignment worth ₹182 crore under Operation RAGEPILL, arresting a Syrian national. (hindustantimes.com)
- Amit Shah holds marathon Gujarat events on Bharatiya Janata Party election victories, tech park inaugurations, and dairy sector push — Home Minister Amit Shah conducted a two-day Gujarat visit on May 17, inaugurating the ‘Million Minds Tech Park’ technology park in a special economic zone in Ahmedabad, the Ganesh Real Estate Management Institute (GREMI), the National Institute of Design’s Innovation Centre, and the Madhur Dairy plant. Shah made extensive political speeches citing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its National Democratic Alliance now governing 80% of India following West Bengal and Gujarat victories, criticised Indian National Congress leadership, and called for Gujarat to lead in AI, deep tech and service sectors.
Notes
Notes
BRICS Foreign Ministers meet in New Delhi as Iran war and divisions test bloc unity, ends without joint statement
May 13–17, 2026
Modi's five-nation tour — Netherlands stop: 17 agreements, Tata-ASML semiconductor deal, strategic partnership elevated
May 15–17, 2026
Modi's five-nation tour — UAE stop: strategic defence pact, \$5B investment, energy security deals
May 13–15, 2026
Modi's five-nation tour — Sweden stop: strategic partnership, Polar Star honour, EU industry engagement
May 16–17, 2026
India hikes fuel prices 3 rupees per litre, imposes gold and silver import restrictions amid Iran war economic squeeze
May 10–17, 2026
US DOJ moves to drop criminal fraud charges against Gautam Adani; SEC civil case settled for \$18 million
May 14–16, 2026
Indian Army chief warns Pakistan 'choose geography or history'; military marks first anniversary of Operation Sindoor
May 11–17, 2026
Amit Shah launches anti-narcotics push at RAW memorial lecture, announces first Captagon seizure
May 15–16, 2026
Amit Shah holds marathon Gujarat events on BJP election victories, tech park inaugurations, and dairy sector push
May 17, 2026
Pakistan
The American president said the Iran ceasefire was done “as a favour to Pakistan” — naming Field Marshal Asim Munir, the chief of defence forces, and Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, from Air Force One. It was the most significant American endorsement of Pakistan since the post-9/11 coalition, turning what had been a visible, unrewarded mediation role into an openly acknowledged strategic partnership.
The endorsement goes deeper than one statement. Mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, made his second trip to Tehran in a week and met Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, taking the diplomacy beyond Field Marshal Munir’s military track. A formal congressional letter called Pakistan’s role “a model of true statesmanship”; Qatar’s prime minister endorsed the effort in a call with Mr Sharif, who described it as “a shining moment in history.”
Yet while the White House praised Pakistan, American officials were briefing CBS News. Their account — given on condition of anonymity — is that Iran parked multiple military aircraft, including a reconnaissance variant of the RC-130, at Nur Khan air base during the conflict, potentially shielding them from American strikes. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry confirmed Iranian aircraft are present but said they were there to support potential talks, not for military purposes. That American officials are leaking this account while the president congratulates Islamabad suggests the endorsement is not as unified as it appears.
The BBC and the UN confirmed this week that Pakistan’s March 16 airstrike killed at least 269 people at the Omid Drug Rehabilitation Hospital in Kabul — described as the deadliest single strike in Afghanistan, possibly ever. Human Rights Watch called it an unlawful attack and a possible war crime. Pakistan insists the target was military and terrorist infrastructure. The facility was a kilometre from UN offices, had been documented by BBC journalists in 2023, and families have confirmed civilian inpatients among the dead. This allegation could surface at the UN Human Rights Council and in Western government responses in ways that Pakistan’s diplomacy cannot easily absorb.
An investigation published this week by Drop Site News made explicit what the mediation story had left implicit: the American president’s embrace of Pakistan came alongside his administration’s silence on Imran Khan’s imprisonment. The piece also describes the Inter-Services Public Relations directorate (ISPR) using private WhatsApp messages to push a version of the mediation to reporters — messages subsequently contradicted by events. The piece quotes Masood Khan, a former ambassador: “For the first time, I feel proud to be a Pakistani.” For a Western audience, the investigation lays out a case for complicity that Pakistan cannot easily reach or suppress.
Imran Khan reached 1,000 days in custody this week. Salman Akram Raja, secretary general of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), alleged he has been tortured and lost sight in one eye; Mr Khan’s sister filed a petition at the Islamabad High Court challenging his solitary confinement; Sohail Afridi, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa chief minister, led a sit-in at Adiala Road with Mr Khan’s family and party leaders. Authorities sealed roads to the jail and imposed Section 144 across Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The protest did not grow into mass mobilisation — the security forces held. But the shift to torture allegations marks a change in PTI’s international advocacy: these are no longer medical access concerns but claims that, if true, would constitute custodial abuse under international law.
Pakistan is also building new capabilities while failing to suppress old threats. The Army Rocket Force Command conducted a training launch of the Fatah-4, a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 750 kilometres — the second F-series test in roughly three weeks. Defence analysts identify it as a conventional variant of the nuclear-capable Babur, with terrain-following guidance and a warhead profile suited to striking airfields, fuel stores, and munitions depots. That same week, General Upendra Dwivedi, India’s army chief, warned that Pakistan must decide “whether they want to be part of geography or history.” ISPR’s response escalated to its most explicit nuclear deterrence language in the monitored period: “geographic obliteration would certainly be mutual and comprehensive.” It is not a doctrinal revision — it is an escalation in the vividness of the threat.
That military posture abroad coexists with acute failure at home. More than 50 security personnel were killed in a single week: a suicide attack on an army camp in Bajaur killed at least 15 soldiers; a vehicle-borne attack attributed to the Pakistani Taliban killed eight or nine in the northwest; five personnel including a major died in an intelligence operation in Balochistan. Lawmakers from Balochistan told parliament the province resembles a “civil war.” The Global Terrorism Index 2026 ranked Pakistan first in the world for terrorism impact — the first time it has held that position. International analysts now contrast the army’s global diplomatic role with its inability to suppress insurgencies at home.
Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), this week formed a committee to negotiate the federal budget and warned that the government can pass neither the budget nor any constitutional amendment without his party’s support — a reminder that the legislative agenda of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) depends on its coalition partners. A planned prime ministerial visit to China (May 23–26) will focus on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 2.0’s pivot from roads and power plants toward digital infrastructure: artificial intelligence, industrial e-commerce, and telecommunications. Thirty per cent of $10 billion in CPEC 2.0 agreements have already become firm projects, and the visit is expected to advance that integration.
Other Stories
Other Stories
- Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions risk ceasefire collapse as Pakistani Taliban claims attacks and Kabul airstrike allegations resurface — Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated further this week, with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) claiming a deadly attack on a security compound in northwest Pakistan that killed eight or nine soldiers, and Al Jazeera reporting that both sides have continued to strike each other despite a March ceasefire. The BBC published a report about the March 16 Pakistani airstrike on a Kabul drug rehabilitation centre — which the UN says may have killed more than 250 — with families calling for a war crimes investigation. Pakistan summoned a senior Afghan diplomat after a TTP attack. (aljazeera.com)
- Pakistan tests Fatah-4 ground-launched cruise missile with 750km range — Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command on May 14 conducted a training launch of the indigenously developed Fatah-4 ground-launched cruise missile, described by the Inter-Services Public Relations directorate (ISPR) as capable of engaging long-range targets with high precision using advanced avionics and navigation systems. The test was witnessed by senior military and scientific officials; Asif Ali Zardari, the president, Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, and Field Marshal Munir commended the launch. (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
- PPP-PML-N coalition tensions: Bilawal rules out 28th Amendment talks, flags budget difficulties, viral press conference moment — Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari this week denied that the government had contacted his party about any 28th Constitutional Amendment, and said the government could not pass either an amendment or the upcoming budget without PPP’s support. He also constituted a PPP committee to negotiate the federal budget. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar separately said he saw ‘no indications’ of the 28th Amendment. A viral video of Mr Bhutto-Zardari sharply cutting off PPP spokesperson Shazia Marri during a press conference dominated social media, with Ms Marri later defending the exchange. (dunyanews.tv)
- President Zardari holds dual investiture ceremonies conferring civil and military awards on dozens of recipients including Shahid Afridi — Asif Ali Zardari, the president, presided over two investiture ceremonies at Aiwan-e-Sadr this week. On May 13, civil awards were conferred on recipients from journalism, sports, literature, and public service — including the Hilal-e-Imtiaz for former cricket captain Shahid Afridi. On May 14, 47 military awards were given to officers and soldiers for bravery and meritorious service, including posthumous awards for three killed personnel. (geo.tv)
- Pakistan Cricket Board chairman Naqvi’s potential India visit for International Cricket Council meetings raises political questions amid post-Operation Sindoor tensions — Multiple reports this week noted that the International Cricket Council (ICC) and the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) have invited Mohsin Naqvi, the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) chairman, to attend ICC quarterly board meetings and the Indian Premier League (IPL) 2026 final in Ahmedabad (May 30-31), but that the final decision rests with Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, given the fraught state of India-Pakistan relations. Mr Naqvi’s dual role as both interior minister and PCB chairman was highlighted as a complicating factor. (livemint.com)
- Maryam Nawaz meets Azerbaijani president Aliyev in Baku as Pakistan-Azerbaijan ties deepen under trilateral Turkey framework — Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz Sharif visited Baku for the 13th World Urban Forum and met Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, conveying greetings from Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, and Nawaz Sharif. Mr Aliyev described the Pakistan-Azerbaijan relationship as advancing under a trilateral framework with Türkiye. Mr Sharif had also spoken with Mr Aliyev by phone earlier in the week. (pakistantoday.com.pk)
- Bilawal inaugurates 11 health projects in Balochistan including first air ambulance service — PPP chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari visited Quetta on May 15 to inaugurate 11 public welfare and healthcare projects, including Balochistan’s first air ambulance service and a modern trauma centre. He was briefed on the law and order situation by Sarfraz Bugti, the chief minister.
Notes
Notes
Pakistan's Iran-US mediation effort peaks: Naqvi in Tehran, Trump credits Islamabad, US congressman praises Munir and Shehbaz
May 11–18, 2026
India-Pakistan rhetorical escalation: Indian Army Chief warns of 'geography or history,' ISPR responds sharply; Munir's Operation Sindoor claims contested by FARA filings
May 10–17, 2026
Imran Khan: solitary confinement challenged in court, PTI alleges torture and vision loss in one eye
May 11–16, 2026
Wave of militant attacks kills dozens across Pakistan as army faces domestic security crisis
May 13–17, 2026
Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions risk ceasefire collapse as TTP claims attacks and Kabul airstrike allegations resurface
May 11–16, 2026
PM Shehbaz announces China visit (May 23-26) as Pakistan-China digital and economic cooperation expands
May 13–17, 2026
PPP-PML-N coalition tensions: Bilawal rules out 28th Amendment talks, flags budget difficulties, viral press conference moment
May 13–17, 2026
President Zardari holds dual investiture ceremonies conferring civil and military awards on dozens of recipients including Shahid Afridi
May 12–15, 2026
PCB Chairman Naqvi's potential India visit for ICC meetings raises political questions amid post-Operation Sindoor tensions
May 16–17, 2026
Maryam Nawaz meets Azerbaijani President Aliyev in Baku as Pakistan-Azerbaijan ties deepen under trilateral Turkey framework
May 13–18, 2026
Bilawal inaugurates 11 health projects in Balochistan including first air ambulance service