Skip to main content

Regional Summary

Ambition Without Mandate Europe spent this week acting like a great power. Friedrich Merz circulated a proposal to reshape EU membership law for Ukraine. Emmanuel Macron called Alexander Lukashenko — the first such conversation since 2022 — trying to crack Russia’s coalition from within. Italy pushed the EU toward sanctions against an Israeli minister and hosted India’s prime minister in the same week. Britain was told to fill the gaps left by a shrinking American commitment to NATO. The assertiveness is real. So is what lies beneath it: every government making these moves governs from acute domestic weakness, and the gap between what they are promising and what their politics can sustain is the central risk this week has exposed. Germany shows the paradox most sharply. Mr Merz proposes to reshape European architecture — associate membership for Ukraine, €90 billion in new financing, a new burden-sharing plan he calls NATO 3.0 — while his approval rating sits at 13–16%, the lowest recorded for any sitting chancellor. His coalition’s combined support has fallen 11 points since February’s election, to 34%. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) stands at 29% nationally; in Saxony-Anhalt, where a September state election approaches, it reaches 41%, and if smaller parties fall below the 5% threshold an AfD absolute majority — a first for the Federal Republic — becomes arithmetically possible. Boris Pistorius, the defence minister, unveiled a 12-point overhaul of the federal procurement agency: project teams embedded near research institutions, four new regional offices. It is the organisational answer to €108 billion in committed spending across more than 320 programmes. Within days, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal referred a key provision of the procurement acceleration law to the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Germany is building the machine while a court decides whether the engine is valid. Mr Macron made the week’s boldest diplomatic move: calling Mr Lukashenko to warn against Belarus following Russia deeper into the war and to offer a western opening. Russia’s Oreshnik barrage — 600 drones, 90 missiles, four dead in Kyiv — lent the call urgency; Volodymyr Zelensky had named Belarus as a possible new attack route. But Mr Macron is twelve months from the end of his mandate, and the same week showed the scale of his plan to fill key state positions before he leaves. Parliament confirmed Emmanuel Moulin as governor of the Banque de France despite 54% of MPs voting against him — not enough to clear the three-fifths veto threshold. Mediapart and Le JDD documented more than 20 former allies Mr Macron has placed in key state positions in recent months: the Constitutional Council, the Court of Auditors, the Council of State, the public broadcaster. Marine Le Pen called it obstruction; a constitutional law professor questioned the appointments’ democratic legitimacy. They are legal. Their scale and timing make them something more than ordinary patronage — a president entrenching himself in the state’s institutions because he can no longer govern by mandate. The same contraction of political time shapes events in London and Madrid. Keir Starmer’s government polls at 17%, faces a by-election in three weeks where Reform UK trails Labour by just three points, and the Pentagon has told it to fill NATO’s northern gaps as Washington draws down. Rachel Reeves, the chancellor, unveiled a summer relief package — a temporary VAT cut, a fuel-duty freeze, import tariff reductions — carefully funded to avoid rattling the gilt market; it is a government that can still act, but only within tight limits. Spain is navigating something harder. The Zapatero indictment has fractured the coalition’s left flank, and a conspicuously timed statement from America’s Department of Homeland Security — confirming it helped extract data for the probe — arrived the same week the new American ambassador met opposition leaders in Madrid. Washington worked Spain’s courts and its opposition simultaneously. Pedro Sánchez ruled out early elections and expressed support for his patron, but the parties to his left are already positioning for 2027. What Italy showed this week is what works when a government is not in survival mode. Antonio Tajani, the foreign minister, chose the right instrument — a formal request to the EU foreign policy chief — secured French backing and placed EU sanctions against Israel’s national security minister on the June 15 agenda. It was clean, fast and effective. European foreign policy works best when governments have room to be deliberate; it fails when they are consumed by keeping themselves alive. The AfD’s arithmetic in Saxony-Anhalt, Mr Macron’s institutional placements, Mr Sánchez’s judicial calendar, Mr Starmer’s by-election — these are not distractions from the story of European reassertion. They are the constraints within which that reassertion must happen, or fail to. Europe is building the architecture. The question is whether any of the builders will be in office long enough to finish it.

Country Summaries


Germany flag Germany

Friedrich Merz circulated a letter to all 27 EU leaders proposing a new legal category — “associate membership” for Ukraine — and within hours Volodymyr Zelensky’s office called it unfair. The proposal is substantive. Ukraine would gain non-voting seats at EU summits, ministerial meetings, in the Commission and the Parliament, along with a political commitment to extend the EU’s mutual defence clause as a security guarantee. Mr Merz’s logic is transparent: any peace settlement that falls short of NATO membership or full territorial recovery needs some other anchor to sell to Ukrainians. A snap-back clause would apply if Ukraine backslides on rule of law. Mr Zelensky’s office rejected the idea as “unjust,” insisting on full membership. Whether that rejection is firm or a negotiating posture ahead of peace talks is the central question; Berlin says it will press the proposal with EU leaders regardless. Russia’s third use of the Oreshnik ballistic missile also shaped the diplomatic atmosphere. The weapon has a range of up to 5,000 kilometres, travels at up to 12,000 kilometres per hour, is nuclear-capable, and no existing air-defence system can intercept it. The attack on Kyiv and surrounding areas killed at least four and injured around 100. The strike also hit the Kyiv studio of ARD, Germany’s public broadcasting consortium. Whether deliberate or incidental, hitting a German media institution’s office in Kyiv gave Germany a symbolic stake. Mr Merz condemned it as “reckless escalation.” Johann Wadephul, the foreign minister, called it “rocket terror” and linked it to his proposals at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Helsingborg: “Only a strong Ukraine will be able to move Putin to relent.” At Helsingborg, Mr Wadephul made the most assertive German claim to NATO leadership since the Federal Republic was founded. He announced Germany is reaching 4% of GDP on defence and security-related spending this year — a figure that includes items beyond pure defence, leaving Germany still below 3% by narrower measures — and moving toward 5%. He proposed NATO partners contribute an additional €90 billion in Ukraine financing on top of existing EU loans and called for closer European-Ukrainian defence industry cooperation, framing the whole package as “NATO 3.0”: a new burden-sharing arrangement in which Europe assumes greater responsibility. Boris Pistorius, the defence minister, offered some reassurance about relations with the United States, saying he had received “no reliable confirmation” of American troop withdrawal from Germany. Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, attended the meeting — itself a signal that Washington has not walked away. Mr Pistorius did not, for the second consecutive week, travel to Washington for the meeting on Tomahawk procurement that had been expected, attending Helsingborg instead and leaving the matter unresolved. The same week produced Germany’s sharpest illustration yet of its procurement paradox. Mr Pistorius unveiled a 12-point overhaul of the Federal Procurement Office (BAAINBw), replacing its hierarchy with project teams embedded near research institutions and opening four satellite offices — Bremen for space and naval industry, Kiel for maritime electronics, Dresden as an IT hub, and Brussels for NATO coordination. The reform is the organisational answer to a real problem: Germany has committed to €108 billion in 2026 defence spending across more than 320 programmes, and without the capacity to execute it, the money risks becoming waste rather than capability. Within days, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal ruled that a key provision of the procurement acceleration law — the law Mr Pistorius designed to speed procurement — may be unconstitutional, and referred the question to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Germany is building the procurement machine while facing the possibility that its legal engine will be ruled invalid. Domestically, the picture surrounding all this foreign-policy ambition has grown starker. Mr Merz’s approval has fallen to 13–16% in the latest polling — the Tagesschau noted that no incumbent chancellor has ever scored worse. The coalition’s combined support stands at 34%, down 11 points since February’s election. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) sits at 29% nationally and 41% in Saxony-Anhalt, where a September state election poses the most concrete governance risk in the Federal Republic’s history: if smaller parties fall below the 5% threshold, an AfD absolute majority is arithmetically possible, a first for the Federal Republic. The AfD candidate, Ulrich Siegmund, is running a campaign of citizen dialogues and projecting a September premiership; a taz analysis confirmed the party holds concrete lists of civil servants to replace, a deportation police unit to create, and media funding to cut. The firewall against working with the AfD is cracking from both sides of the coalition: Albig, a former Social Democratic Party (SPD) minister-president, called for loosening it and was condemned by his own party; Markus Söder, the leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), admitted that containment was “harder than expected” — the first such acknowledgment from a senior coalition figure. Alice Weidel, the AfD leader, said she could imagine tolerating a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) minority government “if Mr Merz is no longer chancellor,” a direct attempt to split the governing party’s parliamentary bloc by exploiting its 13-seat surplus. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the federal president, launched a partial counterweight. He declared May 23 the first-ever Day of Honour (“Ehrentag”) on the 77th anniversary of the Basic Law’s proclamation, personally volunteering at events across several states and calling on citizens to show commitment to democracy through action rather than, in his words, “retreating to the sofa.” The initiative runs through May 31. Whether civic engagement can offset the economic grievances and political polarisation driving the AfD’s rise is a separate question, but the presidency is now more actively rallying democratic participation than at any point this briefing has covered. Germany has spent this week proposing to shape Europe’s institutional future — a new EU membership category, a reoriented NATO, a €90 billion Ukraine financing mechanism — while governing on the weakest domestic legitimacy base in the Federal Republic’s history. That tension has been present for weeks. It has not been this acute.
Merz proposes 'associate EU membership' for Ukraine; Zelensky rejects it as unfair
May 20–23, 2026
NATO foreign ministers meet in Helsingborg amid US troop withdrawal signals and Ukraine financing debate
May 19–24, 2026
Steinmeier launches 'Ehrentag' civic engagement day for Basic Law's 77th birthday
May 19–24, 2026
Merz government approval collapses; coalition tensions mount as AfD holds polling lead
May 19–24, 2026
AfD polling at record highs; 'firewall' debate intensifies ahead of Saxony-Anhalt election
May 20–24, 2026
Pistorius overhauls Bundeswehr procurement agency with new structure, sites and court challenge
May 19–24, 2026

United Kingdom flag United Kingdom

Russia jammed the GPS on the RAF aircraft carrying John Healey, the defence secretary, for the three-hour flight back from Estonia — the Ministry of Defence called it the most dangerous Russian action against the UK since 2022. The attack came the day after it emerged that two Russian warplanes had made dangerous, repeated passes at an RAF spy plane over the Black Sea the previous month. Whether Mr Healey was personally targeted is unknown; the flight path was visible on public aircraft tracking websites. A similar incident targeted his predecessor, Grant Shapps, in 2024, suggesting Russia targets UK defence ministers flying near the front. Mr Healey condemned it as “unacceptable.” He was in Helsingborg, Sweden, for the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, where the American administration delivered a different kind of threat to the alliance. The Pentagon formally told allies it planned to shrink the pool of military capabilities available under the NATO Force Model during a crisis or conflict. The announcement coincided with the chaotic cancellation and then reinstatement of US troop deployments to Poland and Germany. Marco Rubio, the American secretary of state, attempted to reassure allies; Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, said the drift toward less American reliance was “to be expected.” European allies began quietly planning alternative structures. For the UK, which holds the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and spends more on defence than any European ally except France, the message from Helsingborg was blunt: fill the gap. Not all the week’s security signals pointed in the same direction. UK, American and Australian defence ministers were preparing to announce a collaboration on uncrewed underwater vehicles at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore — the first concrete deliverable under Pillar Two of AUKUS, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership, which has until now lacked clear projects. Australia separately committed A$11 billion to extend its Collins-class submarines. Pillar Two is now operational in at least one domain; the broader submarine readiness picture, with most of the Royal Navy’s Astute-class fleet in low readiness, remains unaddressed. The American president described a US-Iran deal as “largely negotiated,” with a 60-day ceasefire reportedly in its final stages. Keir Starmer, the prime minister, welcomed the progress, calling for “unconditional and unrestricted” freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and stating Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. A ceasefire and Hormuz reopening would cut oil prices by roughly half — stripping out the primary driver of the inflation and borrowing pressures consuming the government’s political capital. Darren Jones, the chief secretary to the Treasury, was careful to say a peacekeeping mission was “not on the table right now,” while noting that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel Lyme Bay, with minehunting drones aboard, is already positioned at Gibraltar. The allies have positioned themselves for exactly this transition, but no deal is yet done. In the meantime, the economic vice is tightening. Rachel Reeves, the chancellor, announced what she called a “Great British Summer Savings” package: a temporary VAT cut from 20% to 5% on tickets to family attractions and children’s meals, free bus rides for under-16s in August, a fuel duty freeze cancelling planned September and December rises, import tariff cuts on over 100 food items, and a new tax on oil companies routing profits through foreign branches to reduce their UK corporation tax bill. The Treasury expects “hundreds of millions” annually from the loophole closure. She quietly dropped an earlier plan to cap supermarket prices after retailers and banks objected. Ms Reeves opened her Commons statement by citing first-quarter GDP growth of 0.6%, the fastest in the G7 — but Bloomberg’s verdict was blunter: the economy had “turned sour” for businesses even as the headline number flattered. The underlying picture explained why. Andrew Bailey, the Bank of England governor, told the Treasury Committee that rate cuts had been “effectively taken off the table,” the Iran war “the dominating change in the landscape.” The consumer prices index fell to 2.8% in April from 3.3% in March, partly because of the Ofgem cap reduction, but Mr Bailey warned the July cap rise would push it back up. April public borrowing exceeded expectations — the highest since COVID — narrowing the chancellor’s already thin fiscal headroom. Ms Reeves constructed the package carefully to avoid testing the gilt market, funding it through targeted tax measures rather than new borrowing: a political intervention disguised as fiscal prudence. Whether it shifts the political weather is unclear. Labour is polling at 17%. The Makerfield by-election on 18 June — the vote that will define the leadership contest — shows Andy Burnham leading Reform UK’s candidate by just 3 points, 43% to 40%, with Restore Britain’s candidate at 7%. Elon Musk endorsed Restore Britain on X, prompting Nigel Farage to warn he was “trying to split the right” and that Mr Burnham would be “delighted.” Mr Farage has his own problems: the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner is investigating a £5 million gift from Christopher Harborne, a crypto billionaire, which Mr Farage claims predated his return to Parliament and needed no declaration. He also claims his phone was hacked by Russian state actors who then fed the story to the media — a claim his colleague Robert Jenrick defended. A separate County Court judgment from 2024 for an unpaid debt of £9,400 is still unpaid on the public record. Mr Farage says it was sent to the wrong address and he is appealing. Even as the leadership contest approaches its 18 June test, a new faultline has opened inside the Labour Party. David Lammy, the foreign secretary, refused five times on live television to say whether the UK should rejoin the EU. Analysis in Politico found Brexit already dominating how Labour’s potential successors are positioning themselves: Wes Streeting has called it “a catastrophic mistake,” while Mr Burnham has kept his position deliberately vague. Mr Starmer is staying — his spokesman and Mr Lammy both said they would set no departure timetable. But the Washington Post called the UK “seemingly ungovernable,” Bloomberg assessed that “Starmer’s Lame Duck Status Risks Policymaking Paralysis,” and the gap between the government’s stated intent and its capacity to act has rarely been wider. The Makerfield result, three weeks away, will determine whether the gap widens further.
Starmer fights to survive Labour leadership crisis after disastrous local elections
May 18–24, 2026
Reeves announces £1.8bn cost-of-living package including VAT cuts, fuel duty freeze, and food tariff reductions
May 18–23, 2026
NATO allies alarmed by US troop withdrawal and force posture changes in Europe
May 19–23, 2026
Bank of England and FCA unveil shared vision for tokenisation and 24/7 settlement in UK financial markets
May 18–23, 2026

Italy flag Italy

Israel’s interception of a Gaza-aid flotilla in international waters — and the video Ben-Gvir, Israel’s national security minister, posted of blindfolded activists kneeling — gave Italy the chance to push for EU sanctions against a specific Israeli official, the most concrete European foreign policy move Rome has made this period. Antonio Tajani, the foreign minister, formally asked Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, to bring sanctions against Mr Ben-Gvir to the Foreign Affairs Council. Ms Kallas agreed; the item is on the June 15 agenda. France backed Rome’s position by banning Mr Ben-Gvir from its territory. The move was not reactive protest: Italy chose the right tool, used the right channel and secured allied support. Sergio Mattarella, the president, Giorgia Meloni, the prime minister, Mr Tajani, and Guido Crosetto, the defence minister, all condemned the treatment of the 430 detained activists — 29 of them Italian — in notably unified terms. Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister, was milder (“he shouldn’t have done it”), but that was a footnote: the same pattern — a coalition partner dissenting without breaking ranks — has appeared across several incidents without cracking the government’s line. The flotilla reached further than the Mediterranean. Part of the convoy spent seven days at the gates of Sirte trying to deliver aid to Gaza through eastern Libya before Haftar’s forces turned it away — refusing to take responsibility for the aid and sending the convoy back. Italy maintains ties with Haftar’s eastern Libyan authorities as part of its Libya strategy. Italian citizens were part of a convoy those same authorities rejected. Rome has not commented on this. Even as the flotilla dominated coverage, Ms Meloni hosted Narendra Modi for a summit at Villa Doria Pamphilj. Open-source reporting was thin — crowded out — but a government source confirms they signed agreements, though their content is not yet public. India is a BRICS member, a participant in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and the world’s most populous democracy; a summit with Mr Modi is the clearest sign yet that Italy’s claim to be a Western power with Global South reach is more than rhetoric. In the same week, Mr Tajani reaffirmed Italy’s Hormuz role at the Festival dell’Economia di Trento. All three lines of Italy’s foreign policy — EU diplomatic push, Global South outreach, Mediterranean activism — were active at once for the first time this period. Washington was conspicuously absent: despite Italy and the United States both concerned about Mr Ben-Gvir’s conduct, no direct US-Italy contact on Hormuz, the Sigonella refusal, or the flotilla was reported this week. The structural question hanging over all of it is money. Christine Lagarde, the ECB president, went on Italian television on May 24 to reject Ms Meloni’s request to extend the national escape clause to energy spending: Rome must “respect fiscal rules.” Ms Meloni replied that “extraordinary circumstances require EU responses.” That ended the exchange she had opened with her May 17 letter to the European Commission. The stakes are immediate: Italy’s €14.9 billion plan under the EU’s SAFE defence-financing instrument must receive Treasury authorisation by May 30. Ms Meloni had tied Italy’s participation to receiving the energy flexibility the EU has now denied her. The government extended fuel excise cuts through early June and handed €200 million to road freight operators to head off a truckers’ strike, showing it can absorb domestic pressure; the SAFE decision is a harder problem. The competing interpretation — that Ms Meloni’s letter was primarily coalition management, that both sides anticipated the rejection, and that SAFE will be approved on its original terms before the deadline — gains weight from how fast and how publicly the EU moved to refuse it. The week’s domestic controversy confirms a fault line rather than creating one. Chiara Colosimo, the Brothers of Italy (FdI) chair of the Parliamentary Antimafia Commission, was photographed at a Capaci anniversary event smiling beside a Mussolini bust and arm-in-arm with Luigi Ciavardini, convicted in the 1980 Bologna station bombing that killed 85 people. Activists in Palermo named Ciavardini on protest banners during the commemoration. FdI officials defended Ms Colosimo. Giuseppe Conte, the Five Star Movement leader, used the occasion to attack. Mr Mattarella delivered a strong anti-mafia statement; Ms Meloni attended a separate commemoration. The government’s response — neither condemning the associations nor pressing Ms Colosimo to step back — is consistent with its approach when FdI’s links to neo-fascist networks surface at symbolic moments. Meanwhile, more than 6.6 million Italians were voting across 749 municipalities on May 24-25, with Venice the most watched race: the centre-right running a unified FdI–League (Lega)–Forza Italia candidate against a centre-left alliance — the most direct test yet of whether the opposition coalition of Elly Schlein, the Democratic Party (PD) leader, and Mr Conte can win in a major city. Results were not available before this analysis closed.
Italy leads EU push for sanctions against Israeli minister Ben-Gvir over Flotilla activists abuse
May 19–24, 2026
Local elections across 750 Italian municipalities test party standings ahead of 2027 national vote
May 18–24, 2026
Italy's bid for EU Stability Pact flexibility on energy spending rebuffed by Lagarde; government extends fuel excise cuts, averts truckers' strike
May 18–24, 2026
34th anniversary of the Capaci massacre commemorated by Mattarella, Meloni, and party leaders
May 22–24, 2026
Two Parma teachers attacked by student gang; Defense Minister Crosetto demands harsh consequences
May 22–23, 2026

Spain flag Spain

The indictment of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero — the most prominent living former leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Pedro Sánchez’s political patron — for influence-peddling in a €53m state airline rescue is the most politically damaging judicial blow the governing coalition has taken in this legislature. Judge José Luis Calama of the National High Court alleges Mr Zapatero led a network that used shell companies and opaque financial channels to hide €1.95m in flows, partly routed through his daughters’ communications firm, connected to the 2021 Plus Ultra rescue. The judge froze €490,780 in bank accounts. The prime minister expressed full support and ruled out snap elections — a response that cost him: the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), a party the coalition depends on, called his staying in office “irresponsible,” and Gabriel Rufián, the parliamentary spokesman of the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), questioned the prime minister in parliament. The judicial pressure will not ease soon. Mr Zapatero must declare on June 2; the prime minister’s brother David Sánchez follows on June 4; a mid-June sentence in the Koldo case is expected to seek 24 years for former interior minister José Luis Ábalos; and military police reports on two further cases — involving Santos Cerdán, a Sumar minister, and the prime minister’s wife Begoña Gómez — are due before summer. The indictment drove the largest anti-government protest of the legislature on May 23. Spanish Civil Society (Sociedad Civil Española) organised a “March for Dignity” from Plaza de Colón to the Arco de Moncloa; organisers claimed 120,000 attended, the government estimated 40,000. Three people were arrested, seven police officers injured, and reporters from Spain’s state broadcaster and La Sexta were attacked — images broadcast nationally. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, the People’s Party (PP) leader, did not march; the party sent its Senate spokesperson, Alicia García, instead. PP confirmed it is four votes short of the 176-seat threshold for a no-confidence motion and will not bring one it cannot win. Mr Feijóo invoked the word “change” 33 times at his party’s National Executive and told regional barons and mayors to keep their organisations at permanent electoral readiness. The strategy is slow erosion through accumulated judicial pressure, not parliamentary confrontation. The most striking development this week connects Spain’s domestic crisis to Washington. US Homeland Security Investigations publicly confirmed it helped Spanish police extract data from a mobile device in the money-laundering probe that produced the Zapatero indictment. The public nature of that statement — and its timing, days after the indictment and simultaneous with Benjamín León Jr., the new US ambassador, holding meetings with Santiago Abascal, the Vox leader, Mr Feijóo, and Isabel Díaz Ayuso, the Madrid regional president — suggests something more deliberate than routine law-enforcement cooperation. Mr Abascal met the ambassador for over an hour on May 22 and described Spain’s corruption crisis as having a “worrying international dimension.” The American administration last made headlines in Spain in March 2026 with overt trade and sovereignty threats. This week it worked on a different axis: quiet engagement with the political opposition and a public law-enforcement statement timed to coincide with it. The parties to the prime minister’s left are fracturing further. Mr Rufián offered to lead a left-wing electoral front for the 2027 general elections “if it helps”; Yolanda Díaz, the outgoing deputy prime minister, endorsed him publicly. But Enrique Santiago of United Left (IU) warned against concentrating power in a single leader and demanded policy detail; Adelante Andalucía — which won eight seats in Sunday’s Andalusia election and has national ambitions — rejected any pact outright; Podemos is backing Irene Montero as its preferred candidate. Sumar’s four component parties scheduled a joint event for May 30 in Barcelona without a candidate or a brand. An ERC-led left coalition would put a Catalan nationalist at the head of a formation competing for progressive votes in 2027, scrambling the coalition arithmetic the prime minister has relied on since 2019. Abroad, Ms Díaz’s visit to Shanghai produced the most concrete economic development of the week: SAIC Motor is evaluating Ferrol, in Galicia, for what would be the European Union’s first Chinese electric vehicle manufacturing plant. She also met Li Shufu, Geely Group’s president, and toured the AI robotics firm AgiBot. Separately, Spain’s migrant regularisation programme drew 549,596 applications in its first month — slightly above expectations — with 91,505 provisional work permits already issued. The government will match newly regularised workers to shortages in construction, tourism, transport, and care; official estimates put the number of additional social security contributors Spain needs over the next decade at 2.4 million. The confrontation with Israel sharpened after around 2,000 people rallied in Bilbao condemning Basque police handling of returning flotilla activists — video showed officers using batons, and the force launched an internal investigation. The Israeli Embassy formally demanded an “explanation” from the Spanish government. José Manuel Albares, the foreign minister, meanwhile attended NATO foreign ministers’ talks in Helsingborg, Sweden, and held a meeting with Johann Wadephul, the German foreign minister, in Berlin — routine diplomacy with no new commitments. One notable non-event: the coalition negotiations between PP and Vox in Andalusia — the story to watch last week — remain unresolved a full week after the May 17 election. Vox is waiting for Juan Manuel Moreno, the PP regional president, to call. The slow pace suggests Mr Moreno is calculating that the national anti-government momentum reduces his urgency to close a deal, and that he can negotiate from strength, conceding little.
Former PM Zapatero indicted in Plus Ultra airline rescue corruption case, triggering government crisis
May 19–25, 2026
PP wins Andalusia election but loses majority, needs Vox to form government
May 18–25, 2026
Feijóo puts PP on full electoral alert, vows party is ready for snap election
May 23–25, 2026
Thousands protest housing costs in Madrid; government faces political pressure on crisis
May 21–24, 2026
Armed Forces Day national ceremony to be held in Vigo on May 30, presided by King Felipe VI
May 24, 2026

France flag France

After Russia struck Kyiv with a nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile, Emmanuel Macron called Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus’s president — the first conversation between the two men since February 2022, and a signal that France is trying to fracture Russia’s alliance system rather than merely condemn its escalation. The call was at Macron’s initiative. He carried two messages: a warning against Belarus following Russia deeper into its war of aggression, and an invitation for Minsk to approach Europe. The timing was deliberate. Volodymyr Zelensky had named Belarus as a possible new Russian attack route; Mr Lukashenko has been releasing political prisoners and sending signals westward. Russia’s Oreshnik barrage — 600 drones, 90 missiles, 4 dead in Kyiv — gave the moment urgency. France read the escalation as a crack to lever open. Macron condemned the strikes as a dead end, but his substantive move was the phone call to Minsk. That same week, Jean-Noël Barrot, the foreign minister, banned Itamar Ben-Gvir from France, citing what he called Ben-Gvir’s “unspeakable actions” against French and European nationals on the Gaza flotilla. France summoned the Israeli ambassador and — with Italy — called for EU-level sanctions against the Israeli minister. Mr Barrot also criticised the flotilla itself as producing “no useful effect,” maintaining France’s characteristic dual stance: pressure on Israel’s far right without full alignment with the pro-Palestinian camp. Thirty-six French nationals were aboard the vessel. The week’s most consequential story, though, was domestic. What had been described as cronyism is now documented as a strategy. Parliament confirmed Emmanuel Moulin as governor of the Banque de France on May 20, despite 54% of MPs voting against him — not enough to clear the three-fifths veto threshold. Moulin is a former Élysée secretary-general and a Macron confidant. But Mediapart and Le JDD documented that this appointment caps something larger: more than 20 former Macronist figures placed in key state positions in recent months. Richard Ferrand, former president of the National Assembly, is now at the Constitutional Council. Amélie de Montchalin, a former minister, went to the Court of Auditors. Marc Guillaume, a former government secretary-general, is at the Council of State. Baptiste Rossi, Macron’s speechwriter, went to France Télévisions. Europe 1 set out the reasoning: to stop the National Rally (RN) from governing if it wins in 2027. Marine Le Pen put it bluntly: Macron is “multiplying appointments of friends to obstruct the RN after 2027.” A constitutional law professor at the Sorbonne questioned the appointments’ democratic legitimacy. The placements are legal. Their scale and timing — twelve months before the end of Macron’s mandate — make them something more than ordinary patronage. The party Macron is trying to contain is showing its own fractures. Ms Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, the RN president, contradicted each other publicly on their flagship promise to lower the retirement age to 62. Mr Bardella told German journalists the question was “being examined.” Ms Le Pen publicly held the commitment. Libération noted drily that “the RN still doesn’t understand its own position on pensions.” The divergence runs deeper: a social-populist wing loyal to Ms Le Pen defends welfare-state positions, while a business-friendly camp around Mr Bardella wants to revise the programme. The Engie chief executive made the business community’s view plain, calling the RN’s ideas “bad for France, for energy security, for electricity prices and decarbonisation.” The July 7 appeal verdict is forcing the split into the open — the RN cannot keep its programme vague while preparing two distinct 2027 campaign pitches. Gabriel Attal, a former prime minister, declared his 2027 candidacy on May 22 at a citizen debate in Mur-de-Barrez, a village in Aveyron — deliberately rural, deliberately distant from the Macron urban-centrist legacy he is trying to both inherit and escape. He also took over Macron’s 2022 campaign social media accounts, some 85,000 followers, and renamed them “Attal président,” irritating Renaissance and drawing criticism from Ms Le Pen. The RN predicted the candidacy would last “until autumn.” Sébastien Lecornu, the prime minister, put a number on the strain. The Middle East war has already cost France more than €6 billion. Flanked by ten ministers at a Matignon press conference — a signal of cabinet unity — Mr Lecornu unveiled €710 million in fuel subsidies targeting workers, fishers, farmers, and home-care workers, raising the employer fuel supplement cap from €300 to €600. He ruled out tax cuts and promised new spending cuts by mid-June. “This war will last,” he said, “with no return to normal before somewhere between summer and autumn.” The mid-June budget review is the next thing to watch.
Lecornu announces €710M fuel aid package as Middle East war drives prolonged energy crisis
May 19–22, 2026
RN internal tensions over 2027 programme: Le Pen and Bardella diverge on pension reform age
May 19–24, 2026
Macron names ally Emmanuel Moulin as Banque de France governor, drawing opposition from across parties
May 19–24, 2026
Bardella's girlfriend at centre of media storm: Bourbon des Deux-Siciles family sues Belgian outlet for defamation
May 18–24, 2026